On the Transformation of the Legal Profession: The Advent of Temporary Lawyering by Johnson, Vincent R & Coyle, Virginia
Digital Commons at St. Mary's University
Faculty Articles School of Law Faculty Scholarship
1990
On the Transformation of the Legal Profession:
The Advent of Temporary Lawyering
Vincent R. Johnson
Virginia Coyle
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/facarticles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information,
please contact jlloyd@stmarytx.edu.
Recommended Citation
Vincent R. Johnson and Virginia Coyle, On the Transformation of the Legal Profession: The Advent of Temporary Lawyering, 66
Notre Dame L. Rev. 359 (1990).
On The Transformation of the Legal Profession:




I. THE CHANGING CONTOURS OF LAW PRACTICE ......... 360
A. A Catalog of Change ...................... 360
B. Departures from the Traditional Career Track ....... 368
II. THE TREND TOWARD TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES ......... 375
III. PLACEMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF TEMPORARY LAWYERS . 379
IV. Ethical Issues in Temporary Lawyering ............. 389
A. Objections and Authorities ................... 389
B. The Interests Advanced By 'emporary Lawyering ..... 392
1. Institutional Flexibility ................. 394
2. Reconciliation of Supply-and Demand ....... 400
C. Perils Inherent in Core/Ring Employment
Configurations .......................... 404
D. Conflicts of Interest ....................... 407
1. Former Clients ...................... 408
(a) Movement Between Firms Under the Model
Rules and Imputed Disqualification ....... 408
(b) Avoiding Actual Knowledge of
Confidential Information ............... 411
(c) Peripheral Involvement ................ 412
(d) Appearances of Impropriety under the
Model Code ....................... 413
* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas, and
Director of the St. Mary's Institute on World Legal Problems at the University of
Innsbruck, Austria. J.D., University "of Notre Dame; LL.M., Yale University. Professor
Johnson served as the 1988-89 Judicial Fellow at the Supreme Court of the United
States.
** Associate, Matthews & Branscomb, Austin, Texas. B.A., University of Minnesota-
Duluth; J.D., St. Mary's University School of Law.
Professor Michael Ariens provided extensive information on recent developments in
the legal profession, and useful advice and support were offered by Professor Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Dean Barbara Bader Aldave, and Professor Gerald S. Reamey. Valuable re-
search and editorial assistance were furnished by Sara Murray, Pat Barsalou, Michael
Warren and James Bagnal..
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
(e) Screening of Disqualified Temporary
Attorneys "Associated With" a Firm ....... 414
2. Interests of Third Persons ............... 418
3. Multiple Clients ...................... 420
4. Interests of the Temporary Lawyer ......... 421
E. Confidentiality .......................... 423
F. Impermissible Fee Splitting ................... 425
1. Fee Splitting Among Lawyers and the
Necessity of Obtaining a Client's Consent
to Employment of a Temporary Attorney .... 426
2. Fee Splitting With Nonlawyers ............ 431
V. GUIDELINES: CHARTING A CONSERVATIVE COURSE ..... 438
VI. CONCLUSION .............................. 441
I. THE CHANGING CONTOURS OF LAW PRACTICE
A. A Catalog of Change
The structure of the legal profession and the nature of law
practice have changed dramatically during the past quarter of a
Gentury' Indeed, the transformation has been so thorough2 that
it is difficult to say with confidence which of the many develop-
ments has had the greatest impact on the culture of law practice.
The growth in the number of attorneys and law firms has sur-
passed the population growth rate;3 women and minorities com-
1 This Article carries forward the work of one of the co-authors chronicling various
ethical dimensions of the ongoing transformation of the legal profession. See Johnson,
Solicitation of Law Firm Clients by Departing Partners and Associates: Tort, Fiduciary, and
Disciplinary Liability, 50 U. PiTr. L. REv. 1 (1988) (developing a legal and ethical ratio-
nale to support limited departure-based solicitation of law firm clients by attorneys
changing firms) [hereinafter Solicitation of Law Firm Clients]; Johnson, Ethical Limitations
on Creative Financing of Mass Tort Class Actions, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 539 (1988) (offer-
ing a functional and economic analysis of the ethical standards applicable to lawyer fi-
nancing of mega-trials and to fee allocation agreements which redistribute among
worker-attorneys and investor-attorneys an award of fees and expenses in a successful
mass tort class action) [hereinafter Ethical Limitations on Creative Financing]; Johnson,
Switching Firms-And Taking Clients, 25 TRIAL 117 (Nov. 1989) (identifying doctrinal
benchmarks among the uncertain legal and ethical standards applicable to attorneys
switching law firms) [hereinafter Switching Firms].
2 See generally Address by William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States,
before the Australian Bar Association, in Sydney, Australia (Sept. 3, 1988) (discussing
major changes in the legal profession during the past 35 years). Cf Gilson & Mnookin,
Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: The Economics of Associate Career Patterns, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 567 (1989) ("The traditional American corporate law firm, long an oasis of orga-
nizational stability, in recent years has been the subject of dramatic change.").
3 See Bradlow, The Changing Legal Environment: The 1980s and Beyond, 74 A.B.A. J.
72 (Dec. 1988). See -also Goldberg, Then and Now: 75 Years of Change, 76 A.B.A. J. 56, 58
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prise increasingly larger percentages of law school graduates,4
practitioners5 aid the academic bar;6 the intra-firm ratio of asso-
(Jan. 1990) ("Over the last 75 years, the number of lawyers skyrocketed from 122,519 in
1920 to 725,000 in 1989. Instead of one lawyer for every 863 people, we now have one
for every 415."); Raridon, The Practice of Law-the Next 50 Years, 15 LEGAL ECON. 31, 32
(Apr. 1989) (in 1979, there were approximately 500,000 lawyers in United States; in
1989, 700,000 attorneys; by 1992, the 1,000,000-attorney mark will be reached).
4 See C. EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 5 (1981) ("the proportion of women in the law
schools rose from 4% in the 1960s to 8% by 1970, and then to 33% by 1980").
Forty-three percent of 42,860 persons entering law school in 1988 were women. Tigar,
Practice Puts New Demands on Litigation Unit, Nat'l L. J., Aug. 7, 1989, at 32 (discussing
changes in the legal profession and the need for response).
The percentage of black students enrolled in accredited law schools rose from 1%
in 1965, to 4.3% in 1972, and to 4.7% in 1976-77. See G. SEGAL, BLAcKS IN THE LAW:
PHILADELPHIA AND THE NATION 6 (1983); see also Ramsey, Affirmative Action at American
Bar Association Approved Law Schools: 1979-1980, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 377, 379 (1980) (not-
ing that between 1969 and 1979 the number of minority law students increased signifi-
cantly). In 1988, 5.5 percent of the persons entering law school were black. See Tigar,
supra, at 32. Minorities as a whole accounted for twelve percent of law school enroll-
ment in 1988. See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 58; but see Holley & Kleven, Minorities and
the Legal Profession: Current Platitudes, Current Barriers, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 299, 302
(1987) (expressing skepticism about various figures; "no more than 4.5% or 5.5% of the
new lawyers entering the profession since 1970 were Black and Hispanic"). Women and
minorities are also more readily included today on law journal editorial boards than in
years past. See Butterfield, First Black Elected to Head Harvard's Law Review, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 6, 1990, at A20, col. 4 (first female president of the Harvard Law Review was select-
ed in 1977; first male of Chinese American descent in 1989; first black male in 1990).
5 See Epstein, supra note 4, at 5:
There were few women lawyers in the United States in the 1960s .... Ten
years later, the picture had totally changed. By 1970 there were 13,000 women
lawyers, and they were to increase in numbers even more dramatically ....
After decades of virtually no movement, the number of women lawyers grew-
radically in the decade of 1970 to 1980, from 13,000 to 62,000 (from 4 percent
to 12.4 percent) ....
Today, women account for approximately twenty percent of all lawyers. See Goldberg,
supra note 3, at 58. See also Jensen, Minorities Didn't Share in Firm Growth, Nat'l L.J., Feb.
19, 1990, at 1, col. 2 ("the number and percentage of female partners and associates [in
the nation's 250 largest law firms] continue to grow steadily"); Kaye, Historical Observa-
tion: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 61 N.Y. ST. B.J. 12, 14 (May 1989), (Women "have
entered every corner of the legal profession: private law firms, government, public inter-
est, teaching, the judiciary.").
The progress of minorities, including blacks, Hispanics, and Asian-Americans, has
been slow. See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 58 ("Greater numbers of blacks, Hispanics and
Asians have entered law, but make up only 1 percent of large-firm partnerships.");
Holley & Kleven, supra note 4, at 301 ("Blacks and Hispanics are, while on the increase,
still notoriously underrepresented in the legal profession relative to their numbers in the
general population."); Howell, The Mission of Black Law Schools Toward the Year 2000, 19
N.C. CENTRAL L. J. 40, 43 (1990) (noting "the negative reality of poor bar examination
performance among Blacks"); Jensen, supra, at 28, col. I ("the go-go decade of the
1980s ... failed to produce any significant increase in opportunities for black, Hispanic,
Asian-American, or American Indian attorneys").
6 See Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theomy, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Educa-
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ciate attorneys to partners7 & has climbed significantly;' starting
salaries in many major firms now approach or surpass judicial
salaries;9 billable hours1" and billing rates" have soared; and a
tion or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUc. 61, 69, 84 (1988) ("until
quite recently, law teachers were almost exclusively white, middle-class males;" noting "in-
creasing number of women [law] teachers"); Schneider, Task Force Reports on Women in
the Courts: The Challenge for Legal Education, 38 J. LEGAL EDUc. 87, 88 (1988):
Women law teachers are still a minority on the faculty of many law schools.
However, at schools such as Brooklyn Law School and a few others there are a
sufficient number of women law teachers (more than twenty at Brooklyn) to
constitute a real critical mass, and many of the women play leadership roles
within the law school community.
7 Some law firms differentiate between equity and non-equity partners. See, e.g.,
Miller & Green, Top-Grossing Firm in Atlanta Adopts Two-Tier Partnership, Wall St. J., June
6, 1990, at B2, col. 5. Unless the context indicates otherwise, no such distinction is
drawn herein.
8 See Gibbons, Law Practice in 2001, 76 A.B.A. J. 69, 70 (Jan. 1990):
In the last 10 years, the ratio of associates to partners at all firms has increased
from one associate for every one partner to 1.2 associates per partner ....
And at firms with more than 150 lawyers, the ratio has jumped from 1.2
associates for each partner to 1.5 associates per partner. The highest ratio . . .
is at many of the biggest firms where there are now three associates for every
partner.
See also R. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 191 (1989) ("the ratio increased significantly be-
tween 1975 and 1987"); Raridon, supra note 3, at 36 (citing Altman & Weil Survey of
Law Firm Economics, discussing future trends for legal profession). In 1979, the overall
ratio of associates to equity partners was .70; in 1987, the rado was .97. Id.
9 See Raridon, supra note 3, at 31 (first-year associate salaries at New York City law
firms are comparable to salaries paid to federal judges and often surpass the salaries of
state judges).
In 1990, a representative sampling of the starting salaries paid by nonpatent law
firms revealed the following figures: New York City, $83,000; Los Angeles, $70-75,000;
Chicago, $70,000; Washington, D.C., $65-70,000; San Francisco, $65,000. See Rutman,
Most Firms Put Brakes on Starting Salay Hikes, Nat'l LJ., Sept. 24, 1990, at S3; Special
Report: Associate Salaries, Legal Times, Aug. 13, 1990, at 10 (starting salaries have leveled
off); The 16th Annual Salary Survey, 19 Student Lawyer 22, 23-25 (Nov. 1989) (survey
based on projected July 1, 1989, salaries, without bonuses) [hereinafter Salay Survey]. See
also Moss, Associates' Pay at $71,000, 74 A.B.A. J. 17 (Jan. 1988) (large New York City
firms' starting salary for 1988 was $71,000); Dallas Law Firm Beats Starting Salaries at
Most New York Firms, Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1989, at B8, col. 6 (six new associates at Bickel
& Brewer, a 40-attorney Dallas firm, were paid $85,000 a year); Alston, New-Hires Paid
Near Apex of Novice Professionals, Kansas City Bus. J., at § 1, p. 19 (noting that salaries
for first-year lawyers have nearly tripled in the past decade); Goldberg, supra note 3, at
58:
"Salary wars" [on Wall Street] spun out of control, boosting starting rates at
major firms from $9,500 in the late '60s to $83,000 in the late '80s. Partner
draws at the same firms often hit the six- and seven-figure range. (Such com-
pensation was, by no means, typical of the profession-a 1984 ABA survey
showed that 77 percent earned less than $75,000.)
Average starting salaries in large firms (firms with over 100 attorneys) increased
23% to 50% over the three-year period of 1985-88. NALP Releases Employment Report on
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rapid proliferation of branch offices has produced regional, na-
tional and international "mega-firms," 2 with some entities now
Class of 1988 Graduates, Nat'l Assoc. for Law Placement News Release, Oct. 31, 1989
(annual employment and salary survey of recent law graduates). The average percentage
increase in attorney salaries between 1985 and 1988 differed depending on the city: New
York City, 45.55%; Los Angeles, 45%; Chicago, 49.61%; Dallas, 23.70%; Milwaukee,
50.49%. Id.
10 According to one survey, the average number of hours billed by associates work-
ing at New York City's "hardest working" firms reached 2,500 in 1987. See Marcotte,
Hours Way Up: 2,500 Now Magic Number, 74 A.B.A. J. 19 (Dec. 1988). The same "hardest
working" firms averaged 2,210 billable hours'a year in 1982. Id. Hours billed at "re-
laxed" large firms in New York City rose from 1,590 hours in 1982 to, 1,860 in 1987.
Id. The average for all large New York firms increased from 1,780 in 1982 to 2,290
hours in 1987. Id.
Nationally, the picture is much the same. See Gibbons, supra note 8, at 71 ("In
1979 partners averaged 1,544 billable hours; in 1988 they averaged 1,731 hours ....
[T]he average associate [billed] 1,696 hours in 1979 and 1,834 hours in 1988.").
11 Billing rates for partners in several firms have reached $500 per hour in New
York, Chicago, and Boston. Clients Beware: The $500-an-Hour Lawyer Has Arrived, Wall St.
J., Nov. 20, 1989, at B2, col. 3. One Houston attorney charged $400/hour in 1988,
$475/hour in 1989, and expected to raise his fee again on January 1, 1990. Id.
12 Statistics from the 250 largest law firms in the United States-show that the num-
ber of attorneys who were associated with top firms and practiced in branch offices rose
from 17% in 1978 'to 28% in 1988. See Bellows, Branches: Key to Growth: Survey of a De-
cade of Big-Firm Expansion Raises Questions About Future, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 26, 1988-Jan. 2,
1989, at S13, col. 1 (analysis of trend toward branch office expansion in legal profes-
sion). If the trend toward branch offices continues at the same rate, by 1997 more attor-
neys will practice in branch offices than in home offices. Id. But see Lambert & Noah,
Law Firm Expansion Slowed in 1989 at 500 Largest Firms, Wall St. J., May 24, 1990, at B8,
col. 11 (The 500 largest firms grew 7.7% in 1989, compared with growth of 9.2% in
1988 and 9.9% in 1987."). Some firms "branch out" by merging with established firms in
locations desired for expansion. See, e.g., Chicago-Dallas Liaison, Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1989,
at B8, col. 5 (180-attorney Chicago firm merged with a 6-lawyer Dallas firm in order to
establish a presence in what was regarded as a "top growth city").
With the ongoing economic consolidation of western Europe and the removal of
many political barriers in eastern Europe, a number of American firms are now opening
European branch offices. See, e.g., Lambert & Noah, Steptoe &Johnson Will Create Moscow
Office as Joint Venture with Soviets, Wall St. J., May 24, 1990, at B8, col. 1 (discussing first
law office to be run jointly by Soviets and Americans); Cohen & Felsenthal, Three Large
Firms Negotiate to Form Venture in Europe and New York, Wall St. J., May 18, 1990, B3, at
col. 3 (discussing joint venture by law firms in Boston, San Francisco and Washington,
D.C. to open offices in New York City and London, and noting that other offices may
follow in Germany and Japan); Geyelin & Marcus, Baker & McKenzie Opens New Offices in
East and West Berlin, Wall St. J., Mar. 19, 1990, at B8, col. 3 (discussing new branch
offices "designed to take advantage of new investment opportunities"); Sullivan & Hayes,
U.S. Firm to Form Venture with Soviet Austrian and Finnish Lawyers, Wall St. J., Feb. 21,
1990, at B7, col. 3 (U.S. firm formed partnership with Soviet, Austrian and Finnish law-
yers, which was the first multinational joint-venture law firm in Soviet Union); Harlan &
Lambert, New York Law Firm Affiliates with New London Firm, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1990,
at B8, cols. 5-6 (noting New York firm's affiliation with new London firm, and observing
that "[p]artnerships between U.S. and European lawyers are permitted in some nations"
and that "informal affiliations have become popular in anticipation of the dropping of
1990]
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numbering more than 1,000 attorneys.'3
At first glance, many of these developments appear to relate
more to the professional lives of attorneys in mid- to large-size
firms than to the career pursuits of the majority4 of lawyers
who practice alone or with only a few colleagues. But in fact, for
several reasons, the impact of many recent changes has been felt
at every level of the profession. To begin with, events which affect
larger firms have a "trickle down" effect. Many attorneys move
from larger firms to smaller practices; 5 the high media profile
of larger firms shapes public and professional expectations; 16 the
litigation and negotiation tactics of larger firms force smaller ones
to respond in kind;17 and, as has long been the case, attorneys
trade barriers in 1992"); Marcus & Brannigan, Eastern Bloc, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1990, at
B1l, col. 4 (noting branch offices recently opened in Budapest and Moscow); Abramson
& Brannigan, U.S., British Firms Plan Budapest Practice, Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1990, at B4,
col. I (firms in London, Washington and Chicago united to launch a new practice in
Budapest); Law Firms From Three Nations Join Forces to Open Brussels Office, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 5, 1990, at B5, col. 6 (Los Angeles, London and Paris firms jointly open Brussels
office); Hagedorn & Pollock, Legal Beat, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1989, at B12, col. 2 (discuss-
ing new offices in Brussels opened by several different firms); Europe Gets New Wave of
U.S. Law Firms, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1989, at B10, col. 4 (four large firms opened offices
in Brussels within a period of several weeks). See also Bower, U.S. Legal Profession Faces
"Fortress Europe,' Nat'l L.J., Mar. 19, 1990, at 15. col. 1 (noting "rash of announcements
of European mergers, affiliations and strategic alliances by U.S law firms").
13 A 1990 article indicated that three mega-firms employed over 1,000 attorneys:
Baker & McKenzie (1,519); Jones Day (1,202); and Skadden Arps (1,133). See Firm Rank-
ings, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 24, 1990, at S4 (results of annual survey of the 250 largest law
firms in the United States). Five years earlier, Baker & McKenzie was the largest firm
with 704 attorneys. Id. Baker & McKenzie was the first and only firm to surpass the
1,000-attorney landmark in 1988. 1988"s Unsettled Legacy, Nat'l L. J., Dec. 26, 1988-Jan. 2,
1989, at S2, col. 1. See also Goldberg, supra note 3, at 59 ("Over the last 12 years . . .
the number of firms with more than 100 lawyers increased five-fold-from 47 to 245.
The number of lawyers in these firms jumped from 6,558 to 51,851."); Miller & Green,
Baker & McKenzie Nabs 14-lawyer Real-Estate Finance Group, Wall St. J., June 6, 1990, at
B2, col. 5.
14 See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 58 (in 1990, as in 1915, "most lawyers are in pri-
vate practice and work alone or in small firms").
15 Cf Solicitation of Law Firm Clients, supra note 1, at 4 n.2 and 7 n.8 (movement
from large to small firms is suggested by the fact that few law school graduates begin
their careers as sole practitioners, although many end up self-employed).
16 Cf Jost, What Image Do We Deserve?, 74 A.B.A. J. 47, (Nov. 1, 1988) (discussing
how media portrayals of the legal profession shape public perceptions); Machlowitz, Law-
yers on TV, 74 A.B.A. J. 52, 55, (Nov. 1, 1988) (television portrayals of attorneys have an
enormous influence on the public's attitudes about the legal profession); Kanarek, Law
Students Must Have Realistic Expectations, 21 SYLLABUS, Spring 1990, at 1 (Law students'
"decisions to pursue law as a career have been influenced in large part by media cover-
age of the biggest deals and cases, and the focus of most legal periodicals [is] on life in
the country's largest law firms."); Redlich, Why Must Law Schools Blur Students' "Vision"?,
Nat'l L.J., Aug. 18, 1986, at S-18 (even law students' perceptions of the legal profession
are affected by media portrayals).
17 Cf Galanter & Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger The Promotion-to-Partner Tournament
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in larger firms frequently play leading roles in defining and apply-
ing the ethical standards which govern the entire profession.'8 In
addition, all attorneys have been affected by Supreme Court deci-
sions during the past three decades which have served to catalyze
the transformation of the legal profession. These rulings have pro-
moted attorney mobility and competition in the delivery of legal
services by striking down minimum fee schedules,19 residency
requirements for admission to the bar,2" striking down various
limitations on lawyer advertising,2' or by otherwise influencing
and the Growth of Large Law Firms, 76 VA. L. REV. 747, 748 (1990) ("Many features of
the big law firm's style ... have been emulated in other vehicles for delivering legal
services. The specialized boutique firm, the public-interest law firm, and the corporate
law department all model themselves on a style of practice developed in the large
firm."). See generally Cook, The Search for Professionalism, 52 TEX. B.J. 1302 (1989)
(self-destructive methods of litigation evoke retaliation from other lawyers and make
problems worse); Walker & Cerniglia, American Inns of Court: A Return to .Civility in Prac-
ticing Law, 52 TEX. BJ. 1306 (1989) ("Thrown into a system where discovery methods
are often employed as weapons, young attorneys see no alternative but to adopt similar
tactics in order to survive."). But see Reavley, Rambo Litigators: Pitting Aggressive Tactics
Against Legal Ethics, 17 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 637, 651-52 (1990) (A distinguished jurist
recommends that when confronted with "unfair tactics by an adversary," the better
course is "[n]ever [to] fight fire with fire.").
18 Illustrative of this proposition is the fact that Robert J. Kutak, the chairman of
the ABA committee which drafted the 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct, was a
senior partner in the large (100-125 lawyer) Omaha, Nebraska firm of Kutak, Rock &
Campbell, Cf. Shaffer, The Ethics of Dissent and Friendship in the American Professions, 88
W. VA. L. REV. 623, 623 (1986):
[P]rdfessional ethics is a creature of the establishment; it comes to us from the
old boys who run things. As ethics, it is and has always been the study of what
the better doctors and lawyers do. As professional regulation, it has for about a
century been what the better lawyers and doctors impose on their colleagues
and on the country-a negative matter, mostly, of what better professionals try
to keep lesser professionals from doing.
See generally Taylor, Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary Proceedings, 31 AM JUR TRIALS 633,
758 (1984) ("ITihe members [of an attorney grievance committee] are usually members
of large or medium size firms, middle-aged or older, and ordinarily not trial lawyers .. .
they are not likely to engage in family law or criminal or general practice, although
there may be a few exceptions.").
19 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
20 Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546 (1989) (Virgin Islands bar residency require-
ment violated privileges and immunities clause); Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987)
(federal court bar residency requirement invalidated under supervisory power as unneces-
sary, irrational, and in contravention of principles of right and justice); Supreme Court
v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (state bar 'residency requirement violated privileges and
immunities clause).
21 See Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm., 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990)
(invalidating broad restrictions on advertisement of attorney certification); Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (rejecting prohibition on use of targeted mail);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (rejecting prohibition on
illustrations in lawyer ads); In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (rejecting requirement that
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the customs and norms which define the practice of law.2" Fur-
ther, the appearance of national legal periodicals such as the
American Lavyer, the National Law Journal, and Legal Times have
fueled changes throughout the profession by providing current
information to attorneys on all facets of law practice.23
The problems accompanying these major changes affect virtu-
ally all lawyers. To mention but a few examples: malpractice suits
escalate annually;24  clients concerned about rising attorney
fees 5 are more willing to "shop" for legal services;2 6 attorneys
lawyer advertisements must use only approved language for describing categories of prac-
tice); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (rejecting prohibition against advertisement
of the cost and availability of routine legal services).
22 See Keller v. State Bar, 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990) (discussing constitutional limita-
tions on use of state bar dues); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (decision bearing
upon the extent of an attorney's duty to prevent perjury by a client); In re Snyder, 472
U.S. 634 (1985) (discussing permissible range of attorney criticism of the judiciary);
Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (considering applicability of attorney-client
privilege to corporate clients). See generally Martineau, The Supreme Court and State Regula-
tion of the Legal Profession, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 199 (1981) ("Since 1945 more and
more issues involving the legal profession have been brought to ... [the United States
Supreme Court]; and, since 1957, it has found various federal constitutional and statuto-
ry provisions violated by states' efforts to control the practice of law.").
23 See Moss, Law Job Trends, 76 A.B.A. J. 36 (Apr. 1990) (One placement agency
"headhunter" attributes the rapid rise in attorney mobility during the 1980s to the ad-
vent in 1979 of the legal tabloid American Lawyer and has stated: "All of a sudden peo-
ple had access to what was going on with lawyers and what was going on in the country
as a whole."); K. EISLER, SHARK TANK: GREED, POLITICS, AND THE COLLAPSE OF ONE OF
AMERICA'S LARGEST LAW FIRMs 113, 121 (1990) (American Lawyer magazine provided
previously unavailable information on law-related money matters which was voraciously
consumed in legal circles.).
24 See 1 R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 1.6 (3d ed. 1989) (legal
profession's rapid growth has caused a substantial, steady rise in the frequency of mal-
practice suits); Zeldis, New York Firms are Biting the Bullet, Nat'l L. J., Sept. 19, 1988, at
2, col. 2 (observing that between 1986 and 1987, there was a "100 percent rise in claims
filed against big firms"); 1988's Unsettled Legacy, supra note 13, at S2 (malpractice suits
skyrocketed in 1988).
25 See, e.g., Lambert & Brannigan, American Home Products Corp. is Contesting More
than $26 million in Professionals' Fees, Wall St. J., Mar. 23, 1990, at B8, col. 2 (fees
charged by lawyers, bankers, and accountants for work on corporate reorganization de-
nounced as excessive).
26 See Bradlow, supra note 3, at 72 (more clients shop for cost-efficient legal services
and challenge questionable billings). Cf. Bayer & Welch, Keeping Tabs on Outside Legal
Counsel, Legal Times, Feb. 19, 1990, at 25, col. 1 ("in-house counsel monitor outside
legal costs by comparing bills from different law firms for similar cases and by watching
for signs of unannounced 'value billing'"); Goldberg, supra note 3, at 59 ("Corporate
clients have gotten more demanding ... , often choosing three and four firms to repre-
sent them in different practice areas, and requesting detailed billing statements and price
discounts for volume work"); Marcotte, Cost-Conscious Corporate Counsel, 76 A.B.A. J. 22
(Mar. 1990) (corporate legal departments continue to use various "cost-control measures"
to keep outside legal bills down); Raridon, supra note 3, at 32 (corporations are cutting
legal costs through competitive bidding and alternative dispute resolution); Ray, When
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switch firms and take clients with them;27  and job-related
stress" and psychological "burnout '29  are common professional
maladies.
Law Firms Go Under, 76 A.B.A. J. 55 (Mar. 1990) (demise of major firm -was precipitated,
in part, by numerous clients objecting to high fees).
27 See generally HiUman, Law Firms and Their Partners: The Law and Ethics of Grab-
bing and Leaving, 67 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 2 (1988) ("Law firms ... are in turmoil."); So-
licitation of Law Firm Clients, supra note 1, at 4-6 (thousands of associates leave law firms
annually, either to move to different firms or to practice on their own); Switching Firms,
supra note 1, at 117 (discussing ethical and legal problems which arise when attorneys
switch firms and attempt to take clients with them); Terry, Ethical Pitfalls and Malpractice
Consequences of Law Firm Breakups, 61 TEMPLE L. REv. 1055 (1988); Comment, Lateral
Moves and the Quest for Clients: Tort Liability of Departing Attorneys for Taking Firm Clients,
75 CALIF. L. REV. 1809 (1987) (noting increase in lateral moves by associates and part-
ners).
28 See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 58:
Says Stephen Gillers of New York University Law, School: "I've noticed
profound and disquieting changes among practitioners-a feeling of anxiety and
angst because of a loss of control. A profession that was traditionally able to
write the rules governing the terms of its practica is losing control of that pow-
er to others and to the market." "We're working -harder, yet there's less social
esteem and self-esteem," comments Geoffrey Hazard of Yale Law School ....
"The pressure to learn one's field and deliver a better product never lets up.
Stress has become a fact of life."
LaMothe, Endangered Species, 23 STAN. LAW. 15, 31 (Spring/Summe- 189) ("Most studies
show that working mothers report much greater stress than all other workers due to
their combined job and family demands. Men too report stress when child care duties
force them to miss work."); Hayes, Law, Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1990, at B1, col. 2 (discuss-
ing Connecticut survey documenting high levels of job-related stress suffered by one in
every five attorneys); Goldberg, Simon Ri/kind Remembers, 76 A.B.A. J. 61 (Jan. 1990)
(senior partner in major New York firm, who began law school in 1922, asserts: "The
critical difference between then and now is the level of anxiety").
29 See Harper, The Best and Brightest, Bored and Burned Out, 73 A.B.A. J. 28, 29 (May
15, 1987) ("associates burn out because of too many hours, a lack of control over cases
and boredom with doing the same type of work repeatedly"); Martel, Lawyer Burnout, 24
Trial 62 (July 1988) (analysis of high incidence of burnout among trial lawyers). See also
Moss, supra note 23, at 36: [According to one placement agency "headhunter":]
Lawyers are looking to get out of law because work is drying up while the pres-
sure grows to bring in business and bill more hours . .. . [T]he competitive
environment has forced older lawyers to spend more time in practice and less
time training their junior counterparts. The result is that younger attorneys are
feeling dissatisfied and unfulfilled. Lawyers come to me all the time and say:
"What else is there for me to do other than practice in a law firm or corpora-
tion?"
Cf. Gibbons, supra note 8, at 74 ("firms are waking up to the fact that they have to
change, which means ... finding ways to keep lawyers from burning out"). But see
Marcus & Harlan, Lawyers are Overwhelmingly Satisfied with Their Job Choices, Wall St. J.,
May 21, 1990, at B2, col. 5. (Although 79% of 1000 lawyers polled said they were sat-
isfied with their careers and would choose to become lawyers again, 15% of the women
and nearly one-third of the black lawyers surveyed said they planned to leave the profes-
sion).
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A potential solution to these problems lies on the cutting
edge of change in the legal world. It is an entirely new" way of
practicing law: temporary lawyering 1 While some see this as a
radical departure from legal tradition, it is more properly viewed
as merely the latest step away from the traditional associate-to-
partnership career track.
B. Departures from the Traditional Career Track
The difficulties resulting from the transformation of law prac-
tice-which in many respects parallel dilemmas currently faced by
the medical profession2-impose high costs on law firms with
30 A temporary lawyer placement agency by the name of Lawyer's Lawyer existed in
Washington, D.C., as early as 1984. Its founder, Janis Goldman, had worked for four
different law firms and decided to start the agency after all four firms contacted her
during a self-imposed maternity leave, asking her to do short term contract work for
them. Telephone interview with Janis Goldman Mar. 6, 1990 [hereinafter Goldman inter-
view].
There is reason to suspect that Lawyer's Lawyer was not the first agency to place
temporary lawyers. A 1977 ethics opinion of the District of Columbia Bar approved the
use of a lay referral agency for the purpose of placing lawyers in temporary assignments
under an arrangement whereby the agency charged users of the service an hourly rate,
which varied with the experience of the referred attorney, and retained part of that
amount as a fee. See District of Columbia Bar Op. 39 (1977), summarized in 0. MARu,
1980 SUPPLEMENT TO THE DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHics OPINIONS, 10738 (1982)
[hereinafter District of Columbia Op. 39 (1977)].
Although the placement of temporary attorneys by agencies is new, "historically the
position of 'temp' was ubiquitous, and in some jurisdictions compulsory," for, in earlier
days, new members of the profession regularly served in apprenticeship positions. Letter
from Geoffrey C. Hazard to Vincent R. Johnson (July 12, 1990).
31 "Temporary lawyer" is defined herein consistently with the usage of the same
term in ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 88-356
(1988):
The term 'temporary lawyer' means a lawyer engaged by a firm for a limited
period, either directly or through a lawyer placement agency. The term does
not, however, include a lawyer who works part-time for a firm or full-time but
without contemplation of permanent employment, who is nevertheless engaged
by the firm as an employee for an extended period and does legal work only
for that firm .. . . Similarly, 'temporary lawyer' does not include a lawyer who
has an 'of counsel' relationship with a law firm or who is retained in a matter
as independent associated counsel.
Id. at n.1.
For a concise description of the temporary lawyering process, see McMinn, ABA
Formal Opinion 88-356: Justification for Increased Use of Screening Devices to Avert Attorney
Disqualification, 65 N.Y.U. L..REv. (forthcoming, 1990) (describing placement and supervi-
sion process).
32 See Altman & Rosenthal, Changes in Medicine Bring Pain to Healing Profession, N.Y.
Times, February 18, 1990, at 1, col. 4 ("[I]n the last 10 years, doctors have seen their
autonomy eroded, their future earnings potential jeopardized, their prestige reduced and
their competence challenged."); Id. at 20, cols. 1-2 (discussing recent increase in number
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respect to both the marketing of legal services3 and the recruit-
ment, training and retention of competent lawyers.3 4 In an effort
to address these human and economic costs,35 a number of
firms have implemented-or at least have considered-alternatives
to the traditional associate-to-partner track, the typical full-time ca-
of physicians, shift from individual to group practice, influx of women and minorities,
growing scrutiny of costs, and increased disenchantment among doctors); Id. at 21, col. 1
(discussing "savage competition for patients").
33 See Altman & Well Releases Results: 1988 Survey of Law Firm Economics, 51 TEX.
B.J. 852 (1988) ("Overhead expenses incurred by U.S. law firms in 1987 continued to
outpace increases in gross revenue."); Cohen, Street's Law Firms May See Lower Prafit, Wall
St. J., Mar. 1, 1990, at B8, col. 6 ("lawyers at many firms say they're feeling intense
pressure from clients to cut legal costs"). Cf Bradlow, supra note 3, at 72 (identifying
need for firms to adapt to increased costs and competition in legal profession). As firms
respond to the increase in competition and costs associated with changes in the legal
profession, Bradlow predicts that nine major trends will emerge: (1) sound marketing
plans will increase and will be crucial to a firm's ability to survive and grow, (2) the
number of specialists will increase throughout the profession, in both small firms and
mega-firms, (3) firms will offer a greater mix of areas of practice, (4) automation will
become critical to a firm's ability to compete, (5) as hiring criteria broadens, firms will
search for new associates who offer more than mere academic credentials, (6) quality
associates will .become increasingly more difficult to attract and retain, (7) effective finan-
cial management will become critical to a firm's survival, (8) long and short term strate-
gic planning will be increasingly important to ensuring a firm's success, and (9) mana-
gerial expertise will be as important as legal expertise to a firm's survival. Id.
Rising costs and higher salaries have forced some mid-size firms to either merge
with larger firms or fold completely. See Brannigan & Blumenthal, Midsized Law Film
Folds After 123 Years, Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1989, at B16, col. 4 ("[t]here is a notion that
law firms need one million dollars in revenues per partner to continue to be success-
ful").
34 See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 58 ("[c]ompetition among Wall Street firms [has]
intensified-not just for clients, but for new associates as well"); Pollock, Lawyer; Are
Cautiously Embracing PR Firms, Wall St J., Mar. 14, 1990, at B1, col. 5:
Lawyers and legal consultants generally link lawyers' increased use of PR firms
to heightened competition within the top tier of the legal profession. Many law
firms have grown rapidly in the past decade, and they have had to fight harder
both for clients and for graduates of top law schools, which haven't expanded
as quickly as the firms.
Cf. Ray, supra note 26, at 55 (the sudden increase in law firm break-ups is attributable
to "lack of firm loyalty by attorneys, spiraling salary costs and rapid, poorly planned and
underfinanced expansions").
35 See Gibbons, supra note 8, at 70 ("[C]hange in the legal profession is tied first
and foremost to economics. As law firms increasingly face a financial squeeze...
[m]any are beginning to admit that the time has come for lawyers to rethink how they
do business."); Brannigan & Blumenthal, supra note 33, at Bll, col. 5 ("Midsized law
firms, defined as those with 15-100 lawyers, have been struggling to survive in a more
competitive legal market. Rising costs, higher salaries, and a demand by clients for
broader services have forced many firms to fold or to look for mergers"). See generally
Bradlow, supra note 3 (predicting that firms which fail to adapt to changes in the legal
profession will flounder); Raridon, supra note 3 (the "profit squeeze" in the legal profes-
sion will force firms to reorganize and streamline in order to remain competitive).
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reer path followed by most attorneys engaged in private practice
with other lawyers." Three such developments-creation of "staff
attorney" positions, differentiation between "equity" and
"non-equity" partners and increased use of "of-counsel" relation-
ships-are now widespread.37
Typically, staff attorneys (sometimes called "contract associ-
ates" " or "career attorneys""9 ) are lawyers hired on fixed-term
36 See Galanter & Palay, supra note 17, at 753 ("[F]irms have increased the use of
personnel who are either not promoted to partner or are never eligible for promotion."
(citations omitted)); Gibbons, supra note 8, at 71 (noting legal consultant's prediction
that "[m]ost midsize and large law firms will rethink their up-or-out philosophy for asso-
ciates" and indicating that some firms now have a middle tier of well-paid non-partner
career attorneys); Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 2,, at 567 ("The 'up-or-out system'-the
long dominant career pattern by which employee (associate) lawyers are either promoted
to partnership or fired-also appears to be changing. From a structure in which there
were only two categories of lawyer-partner and associate-firms are creating new cate-
gories of employee lawyers, some with labels more euphemistic than others-permanent
associate, staff lawyer, special counsel, non-equity partner, junior partner."); Miller &
Green, supra note 7, at B2, col. 5 ("[An Atlanta firm's move to two-tiered partnership]
reflects something of a national trend at major firms: The long and winding road to
partnership is getting longer and more winding-and the chances are increasing that tile
path will not lead to full equity partnership at all. Driven by the economic realities of a
more competitive legal environment, such alternatives to equity partnership are becoming
more common .... Some firms are adopting other alternatives, such as 'senior
attorney' or 'senior counsel' posts, or in effect creating different tiers of partners by
varying compensation among them."). See also Feiden & Marks, Working Part Time: A
Work Option That Can Reap Unexpected Benefits, 14 LEGAL EcON. 27 (July/Aug. 1988)
(number of part-time and job-sharing opportunities for attorneys increases as law firms
respond to rise in demand for alternative work schedules by both men and women);
Marcotte, Contract Associates, 73 A.B.A. J. 24 (Feb. 1987) (changing attitudes toward work
and economic pressures force more law firms to offer alternatives to traditional
associate-to-partner track).
One of the more interesting approaches to the high cost of law firm opera-
tions-which undoubtedly qualifies as a departure from traditional practices-is attorney
leasing. Under such an arrangement, a firm terminates its employees, who are then
hired by a leasing agency, which leases the attorneys back to the firm. Because the leas-
ing agency can combine the attorneys (and other employees) of many clients, it can
provide more favorable insurance, retirement and other benefits. Such an arrangement
was approved in New Jersey Supreme Court Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics Op.
631 (1989), summarized in 5 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 393 (Dec. 6,
1989).
37 Cf. Wagner, Variations on the "Of-Counsel" Theme, 6 CAL. LAW. 59, 60 (July 1986)
(In California alone, of-counsel associations increased 42% from 1980 to 1985.). See also,
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 90-357 (1990) (noting
"proliferation" of the use of the of-counsel designation); Graham, Where the Big Dollars
Are, 73 A.B.A. J. 23 (May 1987) (In 1987, a legal management consultant noted that use
of two-tiered partnerships had "mushroomed" since 1982, at which point only about 5%
of the nation's major firms had such arrangements. A 1985 survey showed that 42 of 99
non-New York firms with between 31 and 100 lawyers had non-equity partners.).
38 See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 59.
39 See Gibbons, supra note 8, at 71.
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contracts, subject to' renewal, often for a period of one or more
years. New staff attorneys normally are paid considerably less than
first-year, partnership-track associates, 40 and generally work short-
er hours.4 Although some staff attorneys remain with firms
more or less permanently, and ultimately earn generous salaries,
few staff attorneys are ever made partners. Staff attorneys general-
ly have no equity interest in their firms and are excluded from
the highest levels of decision-making. While some staff attorney
positions are filled by lawyers whose credentials would not qualify
them for the partnership track,42  others are occupied by
well-qualified attorneys who have voluntarily foregone the poten-
tial economic benefits of partnership in favor of the non-econom-
ic advantages of a less pressured career."
In contrast, non-equity partnerships are positions created for
the purpose of retaining high-quality lawyers who are not elevated
to full partnership status after completion of their periods as
40 In 1988, staff attorneys at Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue were hired at
$30,000/year, plus a $5,000 cost-of-living allowance in Los Angeles and New York City.
First-year associates, in contrast, started at a salary of $60,000/year. See Couric, Contract
Attorneys, 17 STUDENT LAWYER 21 (Sept. 1988). See also Law Firms Offer Second Path for
Non-Partners, 9 SAN DIEGO Bus. J., 1, at 22 (Jan. 2, 1989) [hereinafter Second Path for
Non-Partners] (At some law firms, 1989 law school graduates entering partnership-track
positions earned $45,000-$65,000 starting salaries, while new staff attorneys on a
non-partnership-track earned $30,000).
Lower salaries for staff attorneys result in lower billing rates and enable law firms
to continue making a profit while keeping client bills down. See Staff Attorneys Find Mar-
ket for Their Services, 5 CINCINNATI BUS. COURIER, sec. 1, at 1 (Feb. 27, 1989) [hereinaf-
ter Staff Attorneys Find Market].
41 See Staff Attorneys Find Market, supra note 38 (staff attorneys are able to spend
evenings and weekends away from the office; associates routinely work up to 70 hours a
week). Cf Couric, supra note 38, at 22 (Staff. attorneys work considerably fewer hours
than do associates in order to bill a comparable number of hours, because staff attor-
neys are not required to participate in non-billable activities, such as pro-bono legal ser-
vices and firm committee work.).
42 See generally Couric, supra note 38, at 21 (Staff attorney positions are often filled
by law school graduates who are otherwise unable to find employment with big firms
because of' grades or because they graduated fiom less prestigious law schools.); Staff
Attorneys Find Market, supra note 38 (If all a firm needs is a licensed attorney, it is un-
economical to pay the high salary demanded by the top law graduate.).
43 See Couric, supra note 38, at 21 (staff/contract positions meet needs of attorneys
desiring fewer hours, lenient parental leave, or sabbatical options in lieu of trauma and
stress of partnership); Jones, Alternatives to Full-Time Lawyering, 50 TEX. B.J. 1018 (1987)
(part-time and flex-time schedules, as well as staff and temporary lawyer positions, meet
the needs of lawyers demanding relief from long hours); Second Path for Non-Partners,
supra note 38 (today's young, talented attorneys have multi-faceted lives and often don't
want to commit to the hours necessary to become a partner). Cf Second Path for
Non-Partners, supra note 38, at 22 (Firms utilizing staff attorneys often recruit at law
schooli for both associates and staff attorneys.).
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associates. 4 Although the structure of such positions varies,4" a
non-equity partnership provides an opportunity for a long-term
relationship with a firm which does not exist under an up-or-out
policy. 6 Depending on the firm and the performance and quali-
fications of the individual, the position may be an interim stage in
the lawyer's career prior to full equity partnership." In other
cases, a lawyer will not advance beyond non-equity partnership
status.48
Generally, a non-equity partner, unlike an equity partner, is paid
on a salaried basis.49 In some firms, non-equity partners are per-
mitted to attend partnership meetings, but may not vote."
Whereas the use of staff attorneys and non-equity partner-
ships are relatively recent developments, of-counsel relationships
have long been employed to accommodate the special needs of
more senior members of the profession-retired partners," for-
mer judges, 2 legislators and specialist attorneys-experienced
lawyers willing or able to provide valuable services or professional
contacts, but often only on a limited basis. Until recently, the
typical of-counsel attorney tended to serve more in an advisory
capacity than as an active front-line participant in litigation and
other aspects of law practice. 3 Today, however, an of-counsel
44 See Miller & Green, supra note 13, at B2, col. 5. Put less charitably, non-equity
partnership is an organizational device which permits law firms to "extract the maximum
surplus [income] from employed lawyers." Abel, supra note 8, at 195. See also Reidinger,
Still Got Something to Say, 73 A.B.A. J. 11, 14 (May 1987) (suggesting that two-tier part-
nerships have resulted, in part, from the fact that partners are being added in greater
numbers than ever before and that "it's harder to be certain of their loyalty to the
firm").
45 See B. HEINTZ & N. MARKHAM-BUGBEE, Two-TIER PARTNERSHIPS AND OTHER AL
TERNATIVES: FIVE APPROACHES 33-41 (Section of Economics of Law Practice, American
Bar Association, 1986). For a brief synopsis of non-equity partnerships and other alterna-
tives for structuring a law firm, see Muns, Partner Compensation, LEGAL ECONOMICS 52,
57-58 (Mar. 1989).
46 See Miller & Green, supra note 13, at B2, col. 5.
47 Id.
48 Id. Cf. Gibbons, supra note 8, at 71 (Some firms are creating a "midtier hierar-
chy" in which "lawyers, who may have little or no chance of making partner, will be
'career attorneys' with salaries significantly larger than what associates would earn.").
49 See B. HEINTZ & N. MARKHAM-BUGBEE, supra note 45, at 34.
50 See Miller & Green, supra note 13, at B2, col. 5; Fousekis, Firm Structure and
Management, 478 PLI/CoMM. 13 (1988) ("Usually the lower tier [in a two-tier partner-
ship system] has no vote on most issues and has a set salary structure.").
51 See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics Informal Op. 678 (1963) (retired and
semiretired partners used as example).
52 See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics Informal Op. 710 (1964) (retired judge
used as example).
53 See generally Wagner, supra note 35, at 59. The term "of-counsel" dates to the
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association may denote, a relationship similar to that of an inde-
pendent contractor and may involve all facets of practice. 4 Sole
practitioners, law professors and even non:legal experts provide
firms with expertise and knowledge by serving in of-counsel posi-
tions.
55
Common to staff attorney, non-equity partnership, and
of-counsel employment is the fact that such positions normally
anticipate the existence of a substantial and continuing relation-
ship between the individual lawyer and the law firm. 6 In this
respect, these positions differ from the most recent significant
departure from the standard associate-to-partner career track: the
use of temporary lawyers.
Although other forms of placement are possible,57 most tem-
porary lawyers (sometimes also called "lawyer temporaries," "legal
temps," "law temps"" 8 or "contract lawyers" 9 ) are placed with
law firms6" by employment agencies. They work for law firms
1500's. It was used to refer to one in the confidence of a high-ranking official, such as
a monarch. Not until the 17th or 18th century did the term begin to take on a special
legal meaning; it was the late 18th century before the "of-counsel" title acquired the
status of honor it has enjoyed in recent times. Id.
54 Id. (The "of-counsel" designation now includes entrepreneurial, independent con-
tractors and is no longer reserved for retired partners, legislators and judges.).
55 See generally id. (Of-counsel relationships have become more entrepreneurial in
the past decade, allowing firms to have access to specialized knowledge and skills as
needed.).
56 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 90-357
(1990) (The term "of counsel" denotes a "close, regular, personal relationship," which
enjoys the "characteristic of continuing land frequent professional contact." The "of coun-
sel" designation is inappropriate where a relationship involves only an individual case.);
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics Informal Op. 84-1506 (1984) (indicating that a con-
tinuing relationship is a characteristic of an "of-counsel" relationship); Wash. State Bar
Ass'n Code of Professional Responsibility Comm., Op. 178, summarized in 1 Law. Man.
on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 488 (1984) (To be listed as of-counsel, a lawyer must
have a "close, i.e., regular and frequent, continuing relationship" with the lawyer or law
firm.).
57 For example, some attorneys seeking temporary positions contact potential em-
ployers directly. In other cases, firms interested in hiring a temporary lawyer propose
that arrangement to a specific attorney who might be willing to work on those terms.
58 See G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 195 (1985 and Supp. 1989).
59 Some persons involved in the temporary placement of lawyers prefer the term
"contract lawyer" over any term using the word "temporary." They reason that many
potential employers have had bad experiences with non-lawyer temporaries and that unfa-
vorable terminological associations should be avoided. Telephone interview with Mr. Ed-
gar A. Bircher, Esq., (founder and President of Lawyers Now, Houston, Texas), March
15, 1989 [hereinafter Bircher Interview].
60 Unless the context indicates otherwise, the term "firm" or "law firm," as used
herein, includes a sole practitioner or corporate law department. Cf. MODEL RULES OF
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under circumstances which, from the very beginning, envision a
limited period of association and an end to the relationship. The
services of the temporary attorney are expected to be discontin-
ued once the firm's purposes have been accomplished. This may
mean, for example, that employment will cease when a particular
case or project is completed, when an attorney on leave returns
to the firm, when unusually heavy client demands subside or
when a qualified full-time attorney is hired and able to commence
work. Whatever the triggering event for discontinuance of the
relationship, everyone involved anticipates that the employment of
the attorney referred by the agency will only be temporary.
The advent of temporary lawyering carries with it difficult
ethical questions. 1 The legal ethics codes now in force-were not
drafted with this permutation of law practice in mind.6" And it
is not at all clear that ethical standards suited for commonplace
arrangements (e.g., traditional forms of private practice, govern-
ment service and corporate employment) are readily transferable
to developments such as temporary lawyering, which are unusual
or innovative. It has been argued, for example, that conflict of
interest rules require a different construction in the context of
mass tort litigation than they do in a run-of-the-mill accident
case, 63 and that the rise of firm-switching by partners and associ-
ates necessitates a different reading of fiduciary standards than
would be required in a less mobile world.6 4 So too, the evolu-
tion of temporary attorneys may demand that the legal profession
rethink the manner in which rules bearing upon such ethical is-
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Terminology Section) (1989).
61 Cf Kuhlman, Temporay Maneuvers, 76 A.B.A. J. 90 (Feb. 1990) (ethics column
opining that an attorney who accepts a temporary position must "exercise considerable
caution"); Berkman, Temporarily Yours: Associates for Hire, Am. Law., Mar. 1988, at 24
("[cjonflict of interest could become a hot issue").
62 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1989) and MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980). To some extent, the codes of ethics in force in virtual-
ly every state are patterned upon, and parallel to, either the Model Rules or the Model
Code. See [1985-1990 Transfer Binder] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 01:3
(1989) (setting forth ethics codes of states which have adopted new legal ethics rules
since 1983); 2 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 58, at App. 4 (noting significant
departures from the model language in states which now have codes patterned on the
Model Rules); NATIONAL REPORTER ON LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(1988) (setting forth codes of legal ethics by state).
Neither the Model Code nor the Model Rules contains a provision specifically ad-
dressing the ethical issues implicated by temporary lawyering.
63 See Ethical Limitations on Creative Financing, supra note 1, at 542-43 & n.17.
64 See Solicitation of Law Firm Clients, supra note 1, at 102-03.
[Vol. 66:359
TEMPORARY LAWYERING
sues as confidentiality, zealous representation and independent
professional judgment are to be applied to such arrangements.
This Article focuses on the ethical problems associated with
the increasing s use of temporary attorneys. The discussion be-
gins by detailing the social background of this latest development
in the delivery of legal services. After describing the mechanics of
the temporary lawyer placement process and assessing the values
which are served or imperiled by this form of employment, specif-
ic ethical concerns are addressed. The conclusion to the Article
outlines basic guidelines relating to this form of law practice.
II. THE TREND TOWARD TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES
Although the hiring of temporary' lawyers is relatively new,
American employers in general have become increasingly depen-
dent66 in recent decades upon various categories of "contingent
employees,"6 7 including part-time and temporary workers. It has'
been estimated that over thirty million Americans -now work
part-time,6 and according to the Department of Labor, approxi-
mately eight percent of the total workforce is comprised of tem-
porary workers.69  The temporary employment industry has
65 See Roth, Rent-A-Lanyer, Litigation News, Apr. 1990, at .6, col. 1 ("the use of
temporary lawyers has grown"); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 88-356 (1988) (noting "increasing use by law firms of temporary lawyers").
See also Gibbons, supra note 8, at 71 (noting career development consulting firm predic-
tion that law firms "will rely more heavily on temporary attorneys working on a
project-to-project basis").
66 See generally J. NAISBITr, MEGATRENDS: TEN NEW DIRECTIONS TRANSFORMING OUR
LIVES 236 (1982) (observing that in recent years the temporary service industry doubled
every 3.5 years); Part-Time Work New Labor Trend, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1986, at Al, col. 1
[hereinafter New Labor Trend] (The trend toward part-time workers is a drastic change
after a fifty-year increase in job stability.); B. OLMSTEAD & S. SMITH, CREATING A FLEXI-
BLE WORKPLACE: How TO SELECT AND MANAGE ALTERNATIVE WORK OPTIONS 375 (1989)
(The use of temporary workers was 400 percent higher in 1986 than in 1970.); id. at
402 (noting various studies recognizing trend); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FLEXIBLE
WORKSTYLES: A LOOK AT CONTINGENT LABOR 1 (1988) ("Increasing numbers of
jobs ...deviate from [the] traditional picture of a permanent full-time position.").
67 See B. OLMSTEAD & S. SMITH, supra note 66; at 373 ("The term contingent employ-
ment was coined in the mid-1980s to describe the growing trend toward using more
nonregular part-time, temporary, and independently -contracted workers.").
68 See, e.g., New Labor Trend, supra note 66, at A14, col. 1; Busy Lawyers Fuel Explo-
sion in Temp Field, 8 WASH. Bus. J., § 1, at 1 (Aug. 28, 1989) [hereinafter Busy Lawyers
Fuel Explosion] (the number of temporary workers hired through agencies increased from
400,000 in 1980 to 1.1 million in 1988).
69 See Short-Timer Chic, 9 NEW JERSEY SUCCESS, § 1, at 29 (June 1989) (In New Jer-
sey alone, 26,000 temporary jobs were being filled daily at the time the article was writ-
ten.). Nationally, the total temporary payroll increased from $431 million in 1971 to over
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grown at an annual rate of twelve to fourteen percent during the
last three years, making it one of the three fastest growing busi-
nesses in the country."
The trend toward nontraditional forms of employment is
attributable in part to declining union strength, growth in the
number of working women, and increasing competition.7 1 It is
also part of a larger reordering of the American workforce, 2 as
recently expressed by two co-authors:
A not-so-quiet revolution is taking place in human resources
management. Like successive shocks from an earthquake, pres-
sures from international competition, fast-paced technological
change, and projected labor force shortages are interacting
with slower economic growth and concerns about continuing
balance-of-trade and budget deficits, sending private-sector
employers scrambling to maintain a foothold. Regaining stabili-
ty and recapturing a competitive edge through increased profit-
ability have become primary concerns of the business commu-
nity.
73
From the viewpoint of the employer, there are several advan-
tages to hiring temporary workers, not the least of which is in-
creased flexibility in responding to economic upturns and down-
turns.74 The temporary employer is spared the expense of re-
cruiting and screening applicants for permanent positions,75 as
well as the cost associated with the payment of taxes and benefits
which are due in the case of permanent employees. On the
ground that temporary workers are properly classified as indepen-
dent contractors rather than standard employees, an employer
normally avoids the burden of paying withholding and social secu-
rity taxes, vacation and sick pay, unemployment insurance, pen-
$10 billion in 1988. Id. See also Marcotte, Boom in Lawyer Temporaries, 74 A.B.A. J. 30,
31 (June 1988) (by the year 2000, the temporary worker industry is projected to include
10 million workers).
70 See Short-Timer Chic, supra note 69 (discussing the growth of the temporary em-
ployment service industry).
71 See New Labor Trend, supra note 66, at A14, col, 1.
72 See B. OLMsTEAD & S. SMITH, supra note 66, at 402.
73 Id. at vi.
74 See id., at 373 (noting advantages).
75 See The Personnel Matchmakers: Employment Agencies, 10 ADVANTAGE, § 1, at 29
(June 1987) (hereinafter The Personnel Matchmakers). For example, one classified adver-
tisement can generate over 100 applicants for a single job. An employment agency is
able to screen applications and forward only the top three to five people to an employ-
er. Employment agency personnel are also trained in recruitment and interviewing, so




sion contributions and health insurance on their behalf.76 These
savings can be considerable.77 Tax and benefit payments, when
added to the overhead costs associated with payroll record-
keeping, may add as much as fifty percent to an employer's pay-
roll costs.7" These savings, along with the labor cost savings
which result from the fact that temporary employees are hired,
only when needed, 9 represent a substantial inducement for con-
tingent employment."0
In terms of management theory, the use of temporary work-
ers is a strategy that creates workplace flexibility by establishing
what has been called a "core/ring" configuration.8 ' A primary
("core") group of full-time employees is supplemented, as neces-
sary, by other ("ring") workers to whom the employer owes fewer
duties in terms of training, compensation, benefits, career devel-
opment and the like. 2 The arrangement endeavors to facilitate
short-term responsiveness through prompt adjustments in the
supply of goods and services.8 3 The core/ring approach may be
distinguished from what has been called the "stretch" strategy.8 4
The stretch strategy in human resources management focuses on
long-term objectives and seeks to build a totally flexible,
non-tiered workforce through the use of such tactics as integrated
work schedules, on- and off-site space arrangements, and
cross-training of employees.8 5 Whether a core/ring strategy is
76 See Short-Timer Chic, supra note 69, at 29. Many temporary employment agencies,
however, offer temporary workers vacation and other benefits after working a requisite
number of hours (usually 1,300-1,500 hours) through the agency. Id. See also Busy Laye2
Fuel Explosion, supra note 68 (paralegal temporary agency provides health and vacation
benefits as a means of attracting experienced temporaries).
77 See B. OLMSTEAD & S. SMITH, supra note 66, at 379 ("In the short term, use of
contingent workers can indeed cut some labor costs ... very directly.").
78 See Short-Timer Chic, supra note 69, at 29. A $400/week salary, for example, may
entail over $200 in additional costs for an employer. Id.
79 See B. OLMSTEAD & S. SMrTH, supra note 66, at 382.
80 Cf id. at 374 (American managers have been receptive to contingent employment
as a means of controlling labor costs); New Labor Trends, supra note 66, at Al, col. 1
(employers and economists state that the use of temporary and part-time workers lowers
labor costs, which in turn results in less expensive goods and services).
81 See B. OLMSTEAD & S. SMITH, supra note 66, at viii.
82 See id. at viii and 374.
83 See id. at 378-79 ("From an employer's perspective, the purpose of using a con-
tingent employment configuration is to lower labor costs, stabilize the core of the organi-
zation, and increase its potential for a highly flexible response to future changes in labor
market conditions.").
84 See id. at ix.
85 Id.
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preferable to a stretch strategy, or vice versa, depends upon the
facts and circumstances of the particular employment context.
In terms of mechanics, most temporary workers are hired
through temporary employment agencies or services. Upon regis-
tering with an agency, the potential temporary worker's skills and
experience are inventoried. The agency then matches that
individual's abilities with the needs of an employer.8 6 The tem-
porary typically is paid a flat hourly rate by the agency, which in
turn bills the employer at the hourly rate plus markup."
Although flexibility is a primary reason many temporaries
prefer this employment alternative over full-time work,8 many
teachers, artists, actors, writers, and students are attracted by the
opportunity to earn money while pursuing other objectives.8 9
Some temporaries are mothers who want to stay current in ca-
reers from which they have been temporarily side-tracked; others
are persons between jobs or in the process of professional reloca-
tion; some are individuals interested in upgrading job skills or
hoping to find a temporary assignment that will lead to full-time
employment."
Traditionally, temporary workers have been employed primar-
ily in those sectors of the economy involving retail sales, educa-
tion, food processing, agriculture and office work.9 More recent-
ly, however, temporary workers have moved into professional
services and other callings.92 Employers increasingly seek tempo-
86 See The Personnel Matchmakers, supra note 75, at 29 (a variety of tests are now
used to determine an individual temporary's skills and expertise).
87 See Short-Timer Chic, supra note 69, at 29.
88 See B. OLMSTEAD & S. SMITH, supra note 66, at 373-74 (contingent workers often
desire more flexibility and control over their own time than they would have in tradi-
tional work settings).
89 See Short-Timer Chic, supra note 69, at 29 (demographics of temporary workers in
today's workforce).
90 See id. See also The Personnel Matchmakers, supra note 75, at 29 (temporary work-
ers thrive on challenge and variety, are highly skilled, and search for jobs where their
expertise and talent are needed and will be fully utilized); B. OLMSTEAD & S. SMITH,
supra note 66, at 375:
For some workers, the opportunity for a temporary job serves as a reentry peri-
od; for others, it is a way to remain partially employed after retirement. Some
like the variety of experience that comes from being assigned to work in differ-
ent companies or use the temporary-agency experience as a way to try out em-
ployers-sort of a probationary period in reverse.
91 See New Labor Trend, supra note 66, at A14, col. 3.
92 See Short-Timer Chic, supra note 69, at 29 (Temporaries are as likely to be techni-
cians, doctors, CPAs or CEOs as word processors or secretaries.); Temporaty Workers are
Going Upscale, N.Y. Times, March 22, 1987, § 12, at 5, col. 1 (temporary workforce in-
cludes increasing numbers of doctors, accountants and lawyers); J. NAISBITT, supra note
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raries with specialized expertise, and temporary employment ser-
vices have been quick to respond. Today, temporary employment
agencies routinely fill requests for specialists in computer pro-
gramming and systems analysis, health care, medicine, certified
public accounting, paralegal services, and law.93 As many as fifty
percent of today's temporaries are college-educated persons."
III. PLACEMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF TEMPORARY LAWYERS
Perhaps surprisingly, the pool of attorneys willing to work as
temporaries is large. One New York agency found that two adver-
tisements attracted one thousand resumes." Lawyers willing to
work on a temporary basis include recent law school graduates,
lawyers newly relocated or otherwise between jobs, attorneys with
young children, retired judges, law school professors, sole practi-
tioners, "burned-out" lawyers in need of shorter work weeks, law-
yers with enough assets that they can be choosy about assign-
ments and "dual careerists." 6 Although mothers with young chil-
66, at 236 (noting. that temporary-service firms which employed "white-collar information
workers" prospered more than firms which employed "blue-collar temps").
93 See, e.g., Short-Timer Chic, supra note 69, at 29; The Personnel Matchmakers, supra
note 75, at 29; New Labor Trend, supra note 66, at A14, col. 3.
94 New Labor Trend, supra note 66, at A14, col. 3.
95 See Mansnerus, Law Firms, Too, Hire Lawyers By the Hour, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4,
1988, at B10, col. 3.
96 See, e.g., Boom in Layer Temporaries, supra note 69, at 30 (lawyers available to
work as temporaries include parents with young children, recent graduates, retired attor-
neys looking for part-time work; lawyers between jobs, sole practitioners and law profes-
sors supplementing their income); Lawyer Offers an Alternative Through Free-Lance Legal
Assistance, Wash. Post, May 22, 1989, at 6 [hereinafter Free-Lance Legal Assistance] (lawyers
placed through temporary agencies include retired government attorneys, parents of
small children and sole practitioners, as well as attorneys who practice law only as a
means to support other interests); Use of Legal Temps Is on the Rise-But Practice Faces
Bar Challenges, Wall St. J., May 12, 1988, at 25, col. 4 [hereinafter Legal Temps] (tempo-
rary lawyers include young parents, "retired" lawyers and aspiring actors); Blodgett, Tem-
poraty Duiy, 71 A.B.A. J. 17 (July .1985) (sole practitioners, women re-entering the
workforce, and mothers with children); Temporary Workers are Going Upscale, supra note
92, at 6 (attorney planning to open own firm can gain valuable experience as a tempo-
rary attorney); Bircher Interview, supra note 59 (contract lawyers include choosy attorneys
with assets, mothers with children, lawyers in transition who cannot afford to go without
income); Telephone Interview with Sally Marks, President of Lawyer to Lawyer, Inc., Dal-
las, Texas (March 14, 1990) [hereinafter Marks Interview] (temporary attorneys include,
among others, young mothers, retired persons who want to stay busy, lawyers who want
more flexible schedules and "burned out" attorneys from large firms who want to work
fewer hours); Mansnerus, supra note 95, at BIO ("dual careerists" include writers, paint-
ers, songwriters and actors).
One agency reports that it has temporary attorneys who are skiers, who work only
in the summer and not in the winter, as well as other attorneys who are sailors, whose
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dren are included within this group, one agency head estimated
that only ten percent of the lawyers placed by her agency were
women in that category.97 According to one writer, "Most of the
lawyers placed by brokers are sole practitioners, retired in-house
counsel or lawyers between jobs.""8 Often, candidates for tempo-
rary lawyer positions have impressive credentials. One legal tem-
porary employment agency places only Ivy League law school
graduates.99  Another states that it offers employers only
"first-rate lawyers, top graduates of top law schools."' 0 A third
agency "recruits only graduates of top ten schools, or those who
graduated in the top ten percent of their class at other law
schools or who worked at major firms or corporations. " 1
The demand for temporary lawyers is impressive. 10 2 Employ-
ers of temporary lawyers include firms of all sizes, corporate law
departments, and even sole practitioners. The best market appears
to consist of medium-size law firms-firms of about ten to twenty-
five lawyers.' "With firms under ten lawyers," one placement
agency reports, "you get into credit problems; with firms over
schedules are the reverse. See Goldman Interview, supra note 30. See also Jones, supra
note 41, at 1020 (pilot/lawyer flies half the month and works as temporary attorney the
other half of the month); Free-Lance Legal Assistance, supra, at 6 (attorney works as tem-
porary to allow herself freedom and time to set own schedule, sail and try a variety of
cases). Some attorneys serve as temporaries while writing books. See Goldman Interview,
supra note 30. It is reported that in California some lawyers work as temporaries while
trying to break into acting or other segments of the entertainment business. See Legal
Temps, supra note 96, at 25, col. 5 ("it's better than waiting tables").
97 See Mansnerus, supra note 95, at B1O.
98 See Berkman, supra note 61, at 26. But see Jones, supra note 41, at 1020 (Attor-
neys who are merely "between jobs" are a minority of those working as legal temporar-
ies.).
99 See Boom in Lawyer Temporaries, supra note 69, at 30.
100 How to Expand Your Staff Without Adding to Headcount at 3 (undated pamphlet
published by Lawyers Now, Houston, Texas).
101 Mansnerus, supra note 95, at B1O.
102 Cf Blodgett, Temporary Duty: Pail-time Option For Lawyers, 71 A.B.A. J. 17 (July
1985) (temporary employment agency for lawyers was created as a result of sole prac-
titioner needing short-term assistance); Free-Lance Legal Assistance, supra note 96, at 6 (the
idea for a temporary lawyer placement service grew from mother/attorney's awareness
that many attorneys were ready for an alternative to the traditional way of practicing
law); Lawyers Working as Freelancers, Temps, UPI (Sept. 10, 1989) [hereinafter Lawyers
Working as Freelancers] (idea to expand into the placement of temporary attorneys was
planted when a regular client asked the owner of an employment agency if she knew of
a municipal bond attorney available for a short period of time).
103 See Bircher Interview, supra note 59. See also Marks Interview, supra note 96 (indi-
cating that fewer large firms than small firms use Dallas agency); Manserus, supra note
95, at BIO (A New York agency indicated that most of its placements were with small or
medium-size firms.); Berkman, supra note 61, at 24 ("typically small and mid-sized
shops . .. are turning to temporary lawyers").
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twenty-five lawyers, there is a 'not bred here' attitude,"1°4 an
elitism which causes large firms to resist considering the advantag-
es offered by temporary lawyering.105 Some agencies have found
that the biggest problem in placing lawyers on a temporary basis
is "getting a foot in the door," overcoming the inertia attributable
to the fact that this form of employment is non-traditional.
10 6
To address this obstacle, placement agencies frequently tailor and
target their promotional messages to different potential audi-
ences.'0 A number of agencies report that -a large portion of
104 Bircher Interview, supra note 59. Cf Manserus, supra note 95, at B1O ("Major
firms tend to be wary.").
105 See generally Zeldis, Temporary Lawyers Progress at Major Firns, But Slowly, N.Y.BJ.,
Apr. 3, 1989, at 1.
106 See Bircher Interview, supra note 59.
107 Lawyers Now, of Houston, states the following in a handsome promotional bro-
chure for smaller law firms:
Small-to-medium-sized firms get caught in a manpower bind now and then.
It's part of running a law firm, but the manpower bind can cost you growth
opportunities, business, and sometimes even clients.
You've seen it. A client suddenly needs help in an area of law you can't
support . . . like a real estate client with a mineral rights problem. Or a client
who used to fit your firm like a glove has grown, or changed, and isn't sure
you can still provide the services he needs. Or you get hit with a problem that
takes more man-hours than you can spare . . . such as out-of-town depositions
or an appeal of a verdict you won. In addition, if you're going to grow you
have to add different specialities, which means adding lawyers. You can't attract
the business without the lawyers to handle it. But hiring specialists and hoping
the business comes in is a high-risk proposition.
So you can't afford to let opportunities, clients and growth slip away, but
you can't afford to hire more lawyers either. It sounds impossible-but not
quite ....
Contract lawyers give you lots of benefits. You expand your capabilities
quickly. . . quicker than if you were to hire ,against your sudden need. You
get exactiy the expertise you need. You focus your contract lawyer on one case
or one problem area. You can start with a specialist on a part-time basis, then
increase the hours as you grow the business.
Contract lawyers spare you lots of problems. There's no deluge of resumes
because Lawyers Now has pre-screened your candidates. You have no withhold-
ing obligations or benefit costs because the lawyer is an independent contractor.
You have no open-ended employment commitment because your contract is for
an agreed period. You don't even have to take a contract lawyer full-time; you
can contract for a few hours a day or a few days a week.
As your business grows you can replace your contract lawyer with a
full-time employee and know you have enough business to justify it. Meanwhile,
you've kept your clients happy and you've made a profit on your contract
lawyer's time.
Full Service For Your Client (undated pamphlet published by Lawyers Now, Houston, Tex-
as). In contrast, Lawyers Now's promotional materials for corporate law departments
states:
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their business is derived from repeat clients."' 8
A growing number of temporary employment agencies now
supply a full range of legal support-legal secretaries, paralegals,
and lawyers-in addition to the more traditional pool of non-
law-related temporary workers.10 9 However, agencies which spe-
cialize in providing temporary placement services for lawyers are
increasingly common."0 They carry such trade names as "Law-
yers Now,""' "Special Counsel, Inc.,"" 2  "Temp Law, Inc.,"' 3
"LAW/temps,"114 "Lawyer to Lawyer, Inc.,"115  "Lawyer's Law-
The problem is that everyone's staffing plan looks great on paper, but
begins breaking down as soon as it's exposed to real life.
The main reason is that we have to hire human beings. They don't fit
into staffing plans as neatly as their theoretical, paper counterparts. Paper law
department employees deliver their annual number of man-hours spread evenly
throughout the year.
In practice, real employees get sick or pregnant and may be lost for
months at a time. You can hire a replacement after a resignation, but it may
be months before the slot is filled. Then there are vacations and temporary
assignments.
A second reason why reality breaks up staffing plans is that unforeseen
emergencies occur. It may be a major action against the company, some matter
of catastrophic proportions that makes all the law department's other work sec-
ondary while your whole effort is to contain the crisis. You may need to add
specialized expertise to your staff, or find help to do the routine work while
your staff tackles the problem.
The usual solutions give us three choices-.., none of them good.
3. You can assign work to a law firm. After all, that's why you retain
them. But you made the choice earlier to keep that work in-house for a reason,
and assigning it to a law firm reverses your own decision.
How to Expand Your Staff Without Adding to Headcount, supra note 100.
108 See, e.g., Telephone interview with Mr. Bob Webster, President of The Lawsmiths,
in San Francisco (March 14, 1990) [hereinafter Webster Interview]; Marks Interview, su-
pra note 96.
109 See Lawyer Working as Freelances, supra note 102 (discussing Sacramento legal
employee placement franchise which was a spinoff of an agency opened in 1973 to pro-
vide paralegals and legal secretaries to law firms).
110 See Temporay Workes are Going Upscale, supra note 92, at 5, col. 1 (discussing
increase in the number of temporary employment agencies which specialize in placing
lawyers, certified public accountants and doctors). See, e.g., Goldman interview, supra note
55 (Lawyer's Lawyer, in Washington, D.C., places attorneys only); Marks Interview, supra
note 96 (Lawyer to Lawyer, Inc., in Dallas, places attorneys only, not legal support
staff).
111 See Bircher Interview, supra note 59.
112 Marcotte, supra note 69, at 30.
113 Marcotte, Splitting Fees Still Unethical, 74 A.B.A. J. 31 (June 1988).
114 Marcotte, Boom in Lauyer Temporaries, supra note 69, at 30.
115 See Marks Interview, supra note 96.
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yer,""6  "Contract Attorneys, Inc.," 117  and "The Law-
smiths."' Specialized agencies, normally headed by attor-
neys,119 have recently opened in major cities throughout the
country (including Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles,
Miami, New York City, San Antonio, San Francisco, and Washing-
ton, D.C,). Although most such agencies operate regionally,120
some have franchised outlets in a number of locations.12 ' A few
agencies provide temporary lawyers with opportunities for various
employment-related benefits, such as health insurance and retire-
ment plans,' 22 although others do not.12
Attorneys interested in working as temporaries register with
an agency, indicating their areas of interest, expertise and experi-
ence. Typically, the agency then interviews each candidate, verifies
credentials, checks references, and inquires whether the attorney
has been the subject of grievance or malpractice actions.' 24 If
the attorney is added to the agency's "pool" of job candidates,
which may include as many as two or three hundred lawyers ' 25
information about the attorney is kept on file, including data re-
flecting preferences as to length, location and types of assign-
ments. 26 When a request for services is received, the agency
tentatively matches the expressed needs of the corporation or law
116 Marcotte, Boom in Lawyer Temporaries, supra note 69, at 31.
117 Id
118 Id.
119 But see Marks Interview, supra note 96 (The president of Lawyer to Lawyer, Inc,
in Dallas, is not a lawyer.).
120 See Berkman, supra note 61, at 24.
121 See Webster Interview, supra note 108 (independently-owned branches of The
Lawsmiths exist in Chicago, Los Angeles, New York City and San Francisco); Lawyers
Working as Freelancers, supra note 102 (Legalsthff, Inc., which had franchises in operation
in four California cities, Houston and Philadelphia expected 100 franchises to be sold by
1992.).
122 See Lawyers Working as Freelanners, supra note 102 (some placement agencies offer
temporary attorneys an opportunity for health benefits and retirement plans).
123 See Goldman Interview, supra note 30 (no benefits); Bircher Interview, supra note
59 (no benefits; there is a "strict independent contractor relationship" between the tem-
porary attorney and the employer); Marks Interview, supra note 96 (no benefits);
Mansnerus, supra note 95, at 10 (no benefits).
124 Goldman Interview, supra note 30 (describing process); Bircher 'Interview, supra
note 59 (describing reference checking, credential verification and grievance inquiry);
Marks Interview, supra note 96 (describing reference checking, credential verification and
possible interview); Webster Interview, supra note 108 (describing reference checking and
credential verification).
125 See Berkman, supra note 61, at 24 (describing seven agencies with between 50
and 300 attorneys each).
126 Marks Interview, supra note 96 (describing data bank); Webster Interview, supra
note 108 (describing portfolio of attorneys).
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firm with the skills of attorneys in the pool of available tempo-
raries,"' taking into account geographic and other consider-
ations. t2 The potential employer is normally sent a list of avail-
able attorneys and a summary of their qualifications, as well as
information on the compensation rates for which the attorneys
are willing to work. 29
Some employers interview the candidates referred by an agen-
cy 3 The actual decision regarding whether a particular attor-
ney will be hired by an employer is made by the employer and
the individual attorney, not by the placement agency.' 31 Howev-
er, according to one writer, once an agency has established credi-
bility with a firm, the firm may rely almost exclusively on the
agency's judgment in selecting the right temporary attorney. 3 2
Some agencies indicate that they maintain contact with both the
employer and the temporary attorney throughout the duration of
the placement to ensure that both parties are satisfied with the
arrangement.133 Others indicate that no contact is maintained,
but that the employer is encouraged to contact the agency with
relevant information.134
The challenge of avoiding conflicts of interest is normally left
to the attorney and the employer. 3 5 However, in some instanc-
127 See Thomas, Lawyer Temporaries-More Firms Find Hiring "Contract" Lawyers Makes
Sense, 41 Wash. St. B.N. 29, 30 (Sept. 1987) [hereinafter Lawyer Temporaries] (temporary
attorney placement service provides pre-screened list of qualified candidates, allowing
firm to by-pass recruitment process); Free-Lance Legal Assistance, supra note 96 (temporary
attorney placement agency matches client law firms with attorneys based on needs for,
and areas of, expertise). Cf More Firms Turn to 'Temp' Lawyers, Nat'l LJ., July 28, 1986,
at 10, col. 1 [hereinafter Firms Turn to 'Temp' Lawyers] (temporary agency matched an
attorney specializing in asbestos litigation with firm needing such expertise).
128 Goldman Interview, supra note 30.
129 See Jones, supra note 41, at 1018; Bircher Interview, supra note 59 (agency for-
wards three resumes with prices).
Before forwarding resumes, some agencies contact prospective candidates to discuss
whether the candidate will accept the position and the rate to be offered to the poten-
tial employer. Id.
130 See Marks Interview, supra note 96 (describing placement process); Webster Inter-
view, supra note 108 (San Francisco agency requires potential employer to interview can-
didates).
131 See Webster Interview, supra note 108; Jones, supra note 41, at 1020.
132 See Berkman, supra note 61, at 24.
133 See Bircher Interview, supra note 59 (Before a bill is sent, the agency will talk to
the temporary attorney's supervisor to determine whether the employer is satisfied. "A
dissatisfied employer will long remember the placement agency, although it will complete-
ly forget the attorney."); Webster Interview, supra note 108 (the agency checks with both
the attorney and the employer to ensure there are no problems).
134 See Marks Interview, supra note 96.
135 Goldman interview, supra note 55; Bircher Interview, supra note 59; Marks Inter-
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es, an employment agency may receive generic, non-detailed infor-
mation at an early stage in the placement process so that the
most obvious conflicts of interest can be avoided.136 Some agen-
cies indicate that potential employers disclose no specific informa-
tion about the prospective assignment or actual client, and that
the request initiating the placement process simply states what
type of attorney is preferred, such as, "a lawyer with two to five
years of general or civil litigation experience."3 7
Although there are no reported cases on point, it seems clear
that a law firm can be held civilly liable for the negligence of a
temporary attorney it employs,"'8 just as liability may be im-
posed on a firm for the actions of non-lawyer staff members.13 9
Consequently, a firm's use of temporary lawyers should affect its
malpractice insurance rate. If a firm's use of independent contrac-
tors is covered by its malpractice policy, the firm will likely be
insulated from liability, at least in part. 4 A firm should'disclose
the fact that it uses temporary lawyers to its malpractice carri-
er. 141
Temporary lawyers, of course; are civilly responsible for their
own negligence. Thus, it is not surprising that some temporaries
voluntarily carry their own malpractice insurance 14 2 and that
others have been required to do so by the agencies through
which they are placed.1 43  Some agencies specifically instruct
their attorneys to discuss the subject of malpractice liability with
view, supra note 96; Webster Interview, supra note 108.
According to one agency, it is possible to make too good of a match between a
qualified temporary lawyer and a firm in need of assistance. In the case in question, a
temporary lawyer was placed with a firm to deal with an environmental law matter. The
attorney soon called the agency to report that the complaint to which the firm needed
to respond was a document which the temporary lawyer had drafted while working for
the federal government. The attorney withdrew from the case immediately, and the agen-
cy dispatched another temporary attorney. Goldman interview, supra note 55.
136 Goldman interview, supra note 55. But see Berkman, supra note 61, at 24 ("bro-
kers earn their commissions by . . . screening . . . potential conflicts").
137 See Webster Interview, supra note 108.
138 See Blodgett, supra note 96, at 17. Cf. 1 R. MALLEN & J. SMrrIH, LEGAL MALPRAC-
TICE § 5.5, at 275 (1989) ("An attorney is responsible for the efficiency and conduct of
employed attorneys and office staff.").
139 Id. § 5.5, at 277 (discussing secretaries, legal clerks and paralegals).
140 See Berkman, supra note 61, at 24 (discussing malpractice coverage).
141 See id. at 24 (recommending that carrier be informed).
142 See Blodgett, supra note 96, at 17.
143 See Oliver v. Board of Governors, Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 779 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Ky.
1989).
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the temporary employers for whom they work.144 Other agencies
do not raise the subject. 45 Many agencies indicate that they do
not carry insurance to cover the risk of liability arising from the
professional malpractice of attorneys they place. 146 Perhaps one
reason for this is that because the temporary attorney industry is
so new, there have been few, if any, claims against placement
agencies.' For the same reason, underwriters do not offer such
coverage; they have not yet determined how to price it.14' An-
other reason is that some agencies assume that malpractice is not
a serious problem because temporary attorneys generally do not
do "high risk" work.149
Attorney placement agencies frequently take steps beyond
mere reference checking and credential verification to minimize
their risk of being sued based on the deficient performance of a
temporary attorney. Some agencies refuse to place lawyers who
have less than a certain amount of legal experience 1 or who
otherwise seem unlikely to do competent work.'51 Other agen-
cies decline to refer candidates to potential employers who are
unable or unwilling to assure that work on complex projects will
be overseen by firm members with appropriate expertise. Some
agencies require candidates for temporary positions' 52 and/or
potential employers'53 to sign "hold harmless" agreements pur-
suant to which the temporary lawyer or" employer agrees to in-
demnify the agency for losses. Additionally, to avoid charges of fa-
cilitating the unauthorized practice of law, agencies generally re-
144 See Marks Interview, supra note 96.
145 See Goldman Interview, supra note 30 (no inquiry is made); Webster Interview,
supra note 108 (no inquiry is made and the issue of potential liability is not considered
to be serious).
146 See Goldman Interview, supra note 30; Marks Interview, supra note 96 (agency
does not secure malpractice insurance to cover misdeeds of temporary attorneys); Web-
ster Interview, supra note 108; Marcotte, Boom in Lawyer Temporaries, supra note 69, at
31; Berkman, supra note 61, at 24 (as long as the temporary is supervised by the firm,
there is no theoretical problem).
147 See Berkman, supra note 61, at 24 (an insurance carrier for 355 large firms indi-
cated that no malpractice claim had ever arisen from the use of a temporary lawyer).
148 See Marks Interview, supra note 96 (underwriters "don't know what to do" with
temporary attorney agencies); Webster Interview, supra note 108 (similar).
149 See Webster Interview, supra note 108. See also Berkman, supra note 61, at 24 ("a
temporary's work is usually routine and highly supervised").
150 See Bircher Interview, supra note 59 (one year minimum).





fuse to supply temporaries to non-lawyers,'54 and some even re-
quire a law firm or law department to guarantee that the tempo-
rary lawyer's work will be part of the firm or department's law
practice.5'
An attorney temporarily placed with a firm is normally paid
from monies received by the agency from the employer. 56 In
such instances, the agency typically charges the employer a fiat
hourly rate for the attorney's work based on the type of services
involved and the lawyer's credentials and experience. For exam-
ple, for ordinary legal work, figures may range between thirty-sev-
en dollars per hour for a lawyer with one year of experience, to
eighty-five dollars per hour for a lawyer with ten years of expe-
rience.157 In contrast, specialized work,"5 ' or an unusually pro-
longed assignment,' may -be priced at a higher rate, with the
ultimate figure determined by negotiation. Some agencies dis-
count hourly rates for high-volume users. 6 Predictably, in de-
pressed markets, the amounts charged for temporary legal services
can be considerably less than those which would prevail in other
parts of the country.'16  In general, "temporary lawyers are will-
ing to accept less than they would charge as sole practitioners be-
cause they do not have to court clients or pay overhead. 1 6 2
The agency's fee for its services is typically paid to the agency
154 See id.
155 See id.
156 See, e.g., Tempormy Duty, supra note 96, at 71 (agency bills the client firm for the
temporary attorney's time; the attorney is then paid by the agency); Legal' Temps, supra
note 96, at 25, col. 5 (the agency charges a client a flat hourly rate, retains a percentage
as commission, and pays the temporary attorney the balance); Goldman Interview, supra
note 30 (indicating that agency pays temporary attorney). But see Free-Lance Legal Assis-
tance, supra note 96 (temporary lawyers are paid by the client iw firm). Lawyers Now,
in Houston, takes the position that it receives payment from the temporary employer on
behalf of the temporary lawyer, and that the 20% thereof which the agency retains is
paid to it by the temporary liwyer as a placement fee. Whether this arrangement would
be sufficient to avoid problems under the ethical rules against fee splitting is unclear. See
infra notes 358-419 and accompanying text.
157 These rates were used in early 1990 by a Houston agency. The president of the
agency indicated that although some lawyers are placed at different rates, generally it is
not possible to increase the rate based merely on the fact that a lawyer has more than
ten years of experience. See Bircher Interview, supra note 59.
158 See id.
159 See id.
160 See Berkman, supra note 61, at 24.
161 In 1988, rates averaged $25 to $35 per hour in San Francisco, but $45 per hour
in New York City. See Mansnerus, supra note 95, at B1O (describing San Francisco as a
"depressed market").
162 Berkman, supra note 61, at 24.
1990]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
by the employer of the temporary lawyer. The amount paid may
be a percentage of the amount charged for the temporary
lawyer's services, ranging, for example, between fifteen and thirty-
five percent, 63 or it may be a flat fee that is unrelated to the
attorney's hourly rate.1'6 Agencies often exercise care to make
sure that the two amounts-the temporary lawyer's legal services
fee and the agency's placement fee-are clearly 'itemized for the
employer or billed separately. 165 In one form or another, the
cost of the temporary attorney's work and the agency's services is
passed on to the ultimate client. That amount may be consider-
ably less than if the firm were billing for similar work performed
by its associates. According to at least one writer, firms are reluc-
tant to make a profit on services performed by temporary lawyers
by charging clients the higher associate rate. 66
The variety of work for which temporary attorneys are hired
is as broad as the practice of law. In addition to other types of
legal assistance, it encompasses corporate representation, court
appearances, depositions and general litigation.' 67 These services
are typically performed under the direct supervision of a firm
attorney assigned to the particular case.'68 Some temporary at-
163 See, e.g., Boom in Lanyer Temporaries, supra note 69, at 30 (Detroit's" Lawyer on
Call adds a 15% agency fee to the hourly rate charged by the lawyers.); Legal Temps,
supra note 96, at 25 col. 5 (Special Counsel Inc., of New York, keeps 25-35% of the
hourly rate charged); Bircher Interview, supra note 59 (Houston's Lawyers Now charges
20%).
164 See, e.g., Marks Interview, supra note 96 (A flat fee is charged for the agency's
services.); Webster Interview, supra note 108 (The agency's fee is totally unrelated to the
attorney's fee.); Blodgett, Temporary Duty, supra note 96, at 17 (Stating in 1985:
"LAW/temps pays the lawyers between $15-$60/hr., depending on experience, and, in
turn, bills the client firms $25-$70/hr.").
165 See Marks Interview, supra note 96 (Dallas agency bills the customer/firm on
behalf of the attorney, then bills an additional flat fee for the the agency's services, care-
fully separating the billing to prevent the slightest appearance of prohibited fee-splitting.);
Webster Interview, supra note 108 (The attorney sets his or her own rate, which is billed
to the employer by the agency; the agency then separately bills the employer for is
services at an amount completely unrelated to the attorney's fee.).
166 See Berkman, supra note 61, at 24. See also Zeldis, Temporary Lawyers Progress At
Major Firms, But Slowly, supra note 105, at 1 (describing as "unusual" firm's decision to
bill temporary recruits at a lower rate than full-time associates).
167 See, e.g., Boom in Lawyer Temporaries, supra note 69, at 31 (temporary agency rou-
tinely provides specialists in international trade or federal regulatory law); Free-Lance Le-
gal Assistance, supra note 96, at 6 (temporary agency provides attorneys with expertise in
securities regulations, litigation, general corporate work and legal research); Fins Turn to
"Temp" Lawyers, supra note 127, at 10, -col. 3 (firms hire temporary attorneys to make
court appearances and take depositions); Berkman, supra note 61, at 24 ("Most frequent-
ly temporary lawyers' work is litigation-related."); Roth, supra note 65, at 6 (agency heads
estimate that 70-75% of their placements are litigation related).
168 Cf Oliver v. Board of Governors, Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 779 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Ky.
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torneys work on a single matter for a firm; others do general
work for a limited period of time.'6 9 While these services are
often performed in the firm's offices, some temporaries work at
other locations and visit the firm's offices only when the assign--
ment requires.
17 0
Assignments may last anywhere from a few hours17 1 to a
year or more.172 Litigation assignments commonly last about six
months 73 and typical short research and writing assignments
last roughly one week.17 4 In some instances, the temporary at-
torney may never meet the client on whose behalf the legal work
is performed.
7 5
Although many temporaries work exclusively for one firm at
a time, others work simultaneously for multiple firms. 76 When
work for an employer is completed, the temporary attorney leaves
the law firm and is available to accept another assignment. An
employer who is impressed with the quality of a temporary's work
may extend an offer of permanent employment to that attorney.
In such instances, the agreement between the employer and the
agency may provide for the agency to receive a placement fee
from the employer.
77
IV. ETHICAL IssuEs IN TEMPORARY LAWYERING
A. Objections and Authorities
There has been a divergence of opinion among ethics com-
1989) (describing supervision as a feature of the placement arrangement under review);
Berkman, supra note 61, at 24 (the work of temporary attorneys is "highly supervised")
169 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 88-356
(1988).
170 See id.
171 See Goldman Interview, supra note 30 (discussing' three-hour assignment in which
a temporary attorney explained real estate forms to an attorney who was beginning to
practice in that area); Marks Interview, supra note 96 (ten hour assignment).
172 See Goldman Interview, supra note 30 (year-and-a-half assigment); Bircher Inter-
view, supra note 59 (three-year contract with a corporation which occasionally needed
environmental law services); Marks Interview, supra note 96 (three years).
173 See Goldman Interview, supra note 30. See also Webster Interview, supra note 108
(assignments of several months are typical).
174 See Goldman Interview, supra note 30.
175 See id.
176 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 88-356, at
2 (1988).
177 See Goldman Interview, supra note 30 (referring to such arrangements as a "lease
with an option"); Bircher Interview, supra note 59 (firm is required to pay the agency
20% of the attorney's first year salary).
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mittees,1 7 8  commentators1 79  and courts1 8 0  concerning
whether the use of temporary lawyers is ethically permissible.
Such arrangements have been perceived as (1) fraught with con-
flict of interest,181 (2) predicated upon impermissible fee split-
178 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 88-356
(1988) (approving use of temporary lawyers, subject to various limitiations); Connecticut
Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics Informal Op. 88-15 (1988), summarized in 4
Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 301-02 (1988) (approving temporary lawyer
placement services, subject to limitations, and finding that payments made directly to a
temporary attorney and separate payments to the placement agency based on a percent-
age of the attorney's compensation were not unethical) [hereinafter Connecticut Informal
Op. 88-15 (1988)]; District of Columbia Op. 39 (1977). supra note 30 at 10738 (ap-
proving use of lay referral agency which placed lawyers in temporary assignments and
charged users of the service an hourly rate, based on the experience of the referred
lawyer, part of which amount was retained by the agency as a fee); Florida Bar Profes-
sional Ethics Comm., Op. 88-12 (1988), summarized in 4 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 330-31 (1988) (corporation providing temporary legal services to lawyers
violates ethics rule against fee splitting with nonlawyers if the company charges custom-
ers an hourly rate and is controlled by nonlawyers) [hereinafter Florida Op. 88-12
(1988)]; Kentucky Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. KBA E-328 (1988) (disapproving business
which would refer attorneys to law firms and corporate law departments on a temporary
basis), summarized in 4 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 155 (1988), and vacated
in part by Oliver v. Board of Governors, Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 779 S.W.2d 212, 221 (Ky.
1989) [hereinafter Kentucky Op. KBA E-328 (1988)]; New Jersey Sup. Ct. Advisory
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 632 (1989), summarized in 5 Law. Man. on Prof. Con-
duct (ABA/BNA) 393-94 (1989) (approving use of temporary lawyer placement agency,
subject to limitations) [hereinafter New Jersey Informal Op. 632 (1989)]; Ass'n of Bar of
City of N.Y., Formal Op. 1988-3 (1988), summarized in 4 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 122-23 (1988) (prohibiting, on unauthorized practice of law and fee splitting
grounds, the use of temporary lawyer placement agencies, except where the agency is
paid a "fixed fee" and the temporary relationship between the employer-firm and the
temporary lawyer is disclosed to the ultimate client) [hereinafter NYC Bar Op. 1988-3
(1988)]; Ass'n of Bar of City of N.Y., Formal Op. 1988-3-A (1988), summarized in 4 Law.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) (1988) (modifying NYC Bar Op. 1988-3 (1988) by
indicating that a placement agency "fixed fee" must be calculated independently of the
fee ultimately paid to the temporary attorney and may take into account the nature and
predicted length of the assignment and the experience and seniority of the temporary at-
torney) [hereinafter NYC Bar Op. 1988-3-A (1988)]; Ass'n of Bar of City of N.Y., Formal
Op. 1989-2 (1989), summarized in 5 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/NBA) 171 (1989)
(modifying NYC Op. 1988-3 (1988) and NYC Op. 1988-3-A (1988)); (compensation of a
temporary lawyer placement agency does not violate nonlawyer fee-splitting rules if such
compensation is separately stated; requiring that agency fee billed to client be separately
stated) [hereinafter NYC Bar Op. 1989-2 (1989)].
179 See Weston, Temporasy Lanyers to the... Rescue?, COMPLEAT LAw. 38, 38-40
(1988) (identifying ethical issues and arguing that temporary lawyers represent "an excel-
lent opportunity" for the small firm and sole practitioner to handle matters that previ-
ously have been impossible because of staffing limitations).
180 See Oliver v. Board of Governors, Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 779 S.W.2d 212, 220 (Ky.
1989) (approving operation of temporary attorney placement agency, if the temporary
lawyer is paid directly by employer-firm and the employment of the temporary attorney
is made to clients on whose matters the temporary attorney works).
181 See Blodgett, Temporay Duty, supra note 96, at 17 ("considerable potential for
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ting,8 2 (3) likely to jeopardize client confidences18 and (4) po-
tentially involving the unauthorized practice of law.'84 Some au-
thorities have endorsed the use of temporary lawyers, subject to
various limitations,"15 while others have taken the position that
such. forms of employment are generally improper or have other-
wise discouraged their use."6 Although an American Bar Associ-
ation Formal Ethics Opinion"8 7 has placed its qualified impri-
conflict of interest"); Marcotte, Boom in Lawyer Temporaries, supra note 69, at 30-31 ("po-
tential for conflicts exists with temporaries working on litigation at different firms ...
[but in] a practical sense it's not been a problem so far"); Kuhlman, supra note 61, at
90 (noting potential conflicts of interest).
182 See e.g., Florida Op. 88-12 (1988), supra note 178, at 3. See generally infra notes
358-419 and accompanying text.
183 See Blodgett, Temporaty Duty, supra note 96, at 17. See generally infra notes 347-57
and accompanying text.
184 See Florida Op. 88-12 (1988), supra note 178, at 2-3 (identifying issue but holding
that it was beyond the scope of the opinion); NYC Bar Op. 1988-3 (1988), supra note
178, at 2 ("It has long been settled that ethical impropriety exists and that a lawyer is
aiding a lay agency . . . to practice law 'so long as a lay agency pays a lawyer one
amount for his services and for those services charges a different amount to the person
to whom they are rendered.'").
185 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 88-356
(1988) (approving use of temporary lawyers, subject to various limitations); Connecticut
Informal -Op. 88-15 (1988), supra note 178, at 1 (supplying guidelines for a
lawyer-recruiter providing law firms and businesses with legal and paralegal temps, and
finding that payments made directly to a temporary attorney and separate payments to
the placement agency based on a percentage of the attorney's compensation are not
unethical); District of Columbia Op. 39 (1977), supra note 55, at 1 10738 (approving use
of lay referral agency which placed lawyers in temporary assignments and charged users
of the service an hourly rate, based on the experience of the referred lawyer, part of
which amount was retained by the agency as a fee); New Jersey Informal Op. 632
(1989), supra note 178, at 394 (A firm's hiring of a temporary lawyer from a placement
agency to which the firm pays a fee based on the temporary lawyer's per diem remuner-
ation is permissible, subject to conflict of interest and confidentiality limitations); Oliver
v. Board of Governors, Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 779 S.W.2d 212, 221 (Ky. 1989) (temporary
placement of attorneys is .permissible if the temporary attorney is paid directly by the
employer-firm and disclosure of the employment is made to clients on whose matters the
temporary employee works).
186 See Florida Op. 88-12 (1988), supra note 178, at 3 (holding that temporary legal
services corporation violates rule against splitting fees with nonlawyers if the company
charges firms an hourly rate and is controlled by nonlawyers); Kentucky Op. KBA E-328
(1988), supra note 178, at 14849 (holding that lawyers may not own or participate in a
service that-supplies temporary lawyers), vacated in part by Oliver v. Board of Governors,
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 779 S.W.2d 212, 221 (Ky. 1989); NYC Bar Op. 1988-3 (1988), supra
note 178, at 5-6 (imposing strict guidelines on temporary lawyer placement agencies);
NYC Bar Op. 1988-3-A (1988), supra note 178, at 1 (reaffirming limitations on temporary
lawyer placement agencies).
187 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 88-356 (1988)
(approving the use of lawyer placement agencies to obtain temporary lawyer services).
Opinion 88-356 is discussed in: Marcotte, Temporary Lawyer Firms Get OK, 75 A.B.A. J.
28 (Mar. 1989): Reich, Beyond Yes and No, 75 A.B.A. J. 108 (Mar. 1989).
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matur on this development in the delivery of legal services, the
issues surrounding the use of temporary lawyers are far from re-
solved in most jurisdictions. In the only major court decision on
the subject, the Kentucky Supreme Court recently split 4-3, with a
bitter dissent. 8 Moreover, the ABA opinion was written in part
to negate two 1988 opinions of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York,'89 "which had been hostile to temporary law-
yer placement agencies."9 ' As one lawyer recently commented,
"Law firms will need even more guidance on how to structure
arrangements with temporary lawyers than the ABA opinion pro-
vides." 91
The following sections argue that no insuperable ethical ob-
stacles exist to temporary employment of attorneys. The employ-
ment relationship may be tailored to fully safeguard all relevant
societal and professional interests.
B. The Interests Advanced By Temporary Lawyering
To a large extent, the standards of conduct applicable to law-
yers are the product of the legal profession's careful evaluation of
both the values served and the values sacrificed by alternative
courses of action. 92 Thus, in certain instances, conduct is
deemed permissible, notwithstanding the fact that it poses a risk
of harm to clients, the profession, or the general public, because
such undertakings are needed to achieve important objectives.'93
The risk of harm in these situations is viewed as a "necessary
188 Oliver v. Board of Governors, Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 779 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. 1989).
189 NYC Bar Op. 1988-3 (1988), supra note 178, at 1; NYC Bar Op. 1988-3-A (1988),
supra note 178, at 1.
190 Roth, supra note 65, at 6. See also Marcotte, supra note 187, at 28 ("The New
York City bar opinion had the effect of making lawyers think temporary agencies were
unethical.").
191 Roth, supra note 65, at 6.
192 Cf Solicitation of Law Firm Clients, supra note 1, at 82 ("[M]any of the standards
governing attorneys are the result of a decades-long process of careful weighing and
deliberation. Bar associations and scholars, ethics committees and courts, have labored at
length over the task of fairly balancing competing interests."); Ethical Constraints on Cre-
ative Financing, supra note 1, at 563 (Stating, with respect to conflicts of interest:
"Impermissibility is a question of context. There may be interests advanced by . . . [an]
arrangement that make the risk of divided loyalties worth taking. Or there may be
checking mechanisms, presently in place or capable of adoption, which acceptably mini-
mize the chances of the risk coming to fruition.").
193 Cf Solicitation of Law Firm Clients, supra note 1, at 43-48 (arguing that although
solicitation of law firm clients by an attorney switching firms is fraught with risks, such
conduct should not be prohibited, but rather reasonably regulated, since it is important
for consumers to obtain information bearing upon the selection of counsel).
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evil," an inevitable cost of allowing lawyers to strive to secure a
greater good.
An apposite example is furnished by the rules on contingent
fees. 194 A contingent fee contract confers on a lawyer a personal
stake in the success of litigation.' To that extent, the arrange-
ment tempts a lawyer to base litigation decisions on personal in-
terests, rather than on the interests of the client.9 6 Notwith-
standing this palpable conflict, contingent fees are deemed ethical
in most fields,'97 for such contracts tend t6 ensure that legal
services will be available to persons with meritorious claims who
cannot otherwise afford representation.9 8 Similarly, lawyers are
permitted to engage in truthful advertising in spite of the fact
that some consumers could misunderstand the information pro-
vided.' The justification is that provision of data concerning
legal services is an indispensable step in empowering laypersons
to intelligently direct their own affairs.00
In the 6ontext of temporary lawyering, it is useful to begin
any discussion of potential ethical problems by considering the
interests which may be advanced by this form of professional em-
ployment. The foregoing sections have alluded to a number of
possible advantages. Chief among these is the fact that temporary
194 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.5(c), (d) and 1.8(j)
(1989); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILriY DR 2-106(C) (1980).
195 See G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 58, at 173 (Contingent fee interest
"could be considered to be champerty ('investing' in litigation), and could skew a
lawyer's judgment.").
196 See. C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, § 16.2.3 at 529 (A contingent fee cre-
ates an incentive for a "quick kill" before many hours are spent on a case.).
197 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.5(c), (d) and 1.80)(2)
(1989) (contingent fees not permitted in criminal cases and certain domestic relations
cases); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C) (1980) (contingent
'fees not permitted in criminal cases).
198 See G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 58, at 173; C. WOLFRAM, supra note
196, at 529; J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 46 (1976) (indicating that the relationship between contingent fees and access
to the justice system has been argued since at least the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury).
199 Cf. Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2281, 2292
(1990) ("Even if we assume that petitioner's letterhead may be potentially misleading to
some consumers, that potential does not satisfy the State's heavy burden of justifying a,
categorical prohibition against the dissemination of accurate factual information to the
public.").
200 See Pearson & O'Neill, The First Amendment, Commercial Speech, and the Advertising
Lawyer, 9 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 293, 303 (1986) (Because "an individual is constantly
confronted with the necessity of making life-affecting decisions ... there must be not
only a freedom to speak but also a freedom to hear.").
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lawyering opens the door to a wide array of potential professional
contributors who might otherwise be barred from providing ser-
vices to the public. Falling within this class are parents with child
care responsibilities, academics, lawyers who have recently relocat-
ed and retired attorneys. Attorneys who leave government service
find it possible to practice law as temporaries even though they
may have only a limited breadth of prior experience. 20 1 Tempo-
rary lawyering can help increase lawyer competence by allowing
sole practitioners to develop a broader range of skills while serv-
ing under the short-term guidance of an established firm.0 2
Lawyer competence is also enhanced by permitting lawyer-parents
to secure temporary employment and thereby maintain legal skills
and knowledge which might otherwise erode during periods when
substantial time must be devoted to familial responsibilities.
Two other potential advantages of temporary lawyering de-
serve more detailed consideration. The first advantage is the op-
portunity for cultivating institutional flexibility. The second advan-
tage is the ability of temporary legal employment to reduce delay
and expense in the delivery of legal services by reconciling supply
with demand. These advantages will be discussed below, along
with the perils posed by the introduction of a core/ring employ:.
ment configuration into the sphere of law practice.
1. Institutional Flexibility
Pressures which favor standardization over individuality and
bureaucratic structure over institutional flexibility20 3 pose per-
haps the greatest dangers now faced by the legal profession.
201 Goldman Interview, supra note 30 (point stated by manager of Washington, D.C.
agency, where "early government out" attorneys are common).
202 Cf. Jones, supra note 41, at 1020; Firms Turn to 'Temp' Lawyers, supra note 127, at
1(attorneys accept temporary assignments to supplement income while establishing own
practice); Blodgett, Temporary Duty, supra note 96, at 17 (sole practitioners serve as tem-
poraries to supplement income); Goldman Interview, supra note 30 (sole practitioners
can develop reputation and experience).
203 Cf Johnson, Law-givers, Story-tellers, and Dubin's Legal Heroes: The Emerging Dichoto-
my in Legal Ethics, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 341, 345-50 (1989) ("Absent the story-tellers'
sensitive appreciation of the human dimension of law practice, otherwise competent law-
yering degenerates into mere legalism . . . . [T]here is more to law practice than law.");
Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 2, at 592 ("[T]he practice of corporate law firms has
changed from one characterized by longstanding relationships with continuing clients to
one in which one-shot transactional work for a succession of clients is of growing impor-
tance. The result has been increased emphasis on the technical specialization necessary
to support a transactional practice, rather than on developing the detailed knowledge of




These pressures threaten to subordinate the individual lawyer to
the collective corporate personality," 4 and in so doing threaten
to transform the profession from a stage where once any attorney
could play a leading role to one where lawyers are routinely rele-
gated to little more than bit parts.
20 5
As the number of lawyers multiplies,20 6 as firms increase in
size, 207 and as law practice ever more resembles the corporate
world driven by the balance sheet,20 1 there is a serious risk that
the profession will be less able and less willing to respond to the
needs, dreams and ideas of individual lawyers, or to avail itself of
their unique -talents.0 9 To the extent that is the case, law will
be a less fulfilling vocation,2 ° clients will less likely be satisfied
204 See Linowitz, Pride of the Profession. A Call for Return to Traditional Values, 24 TRI-
AL 68 (July 1989) (dehumanization of legal profession has negatively affected public per-
ceptions of lawyers); Coffin, The Law School and the Profession: A Need for Bridges, 11
NOVA L. REV. 1053, 1057-64 (1987) (increasingly dehumanized legal profession mandates
legal education modifications); Freeman, A Critical Legal Look at Corporate Practice, 37 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 315, 320-21 (1987) (associates in large corporate firms often lose their
identity while trying to conform to the corporate mold). Cf. Altman, Fostering Firm Cul-
ture Can Stop Dehumanization of a Practice, Nat'l LJ., Jan. 12, 1987, at 15, col. 1 (an in-
creasingly dehumanized legal profession is causing many attorneys to leave practice);
Hochberger, Money Can't Buy Job Satisfaction, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 1, 1986, at 13, col. 2 (large
firms dehumanize law practice, causing many attorneys to leave profession).
205 When associates' work consists merely of "one memo-writing assignment after
another-unconnected to the overall transaction, out of touch with the client, and sev-
ered from the related brainstorming and decision making"-job dissatisfaction comes as
no surprise. Lopez, Training Future Lawyers to Work With the Politically and Socially Sub-
ordinated. Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 350 (1989). See also Free-
man, supra note 204, at 322 (large legal matters, assigned to associates in fragments, are
making work boring); Hochberger, supra note 204, at 13 (large firms' associates often
work on isolated fragments of clients' matters, not whole cases); Linowitz, supra note
204, at 68 (large firms' associates rarely meet clients and often prepare only fragments
of cases).
206 See supra note 3.
207 See supra note 13.
208 See American Bar Association Commission on Professionalism Report to the House of
Delegates, 112 F.R.D. 243, 260-61' (1986) (the legal profession is now preoccupied with
merely attracting clients and increasing billable hours); Brown, A Profession Losing its Soul,
72 A.B.A. J. 38, 40 (1986) (too many lawyers view law practice as merely a business, not
a profession); Janofsky, Is the "S" in "Esquire" Becoming a $ Sign?, 59 WIs. B. BULL. 13,
13-14 (1986) (the emphasis upon making money erodes the quality of legal profession, to
detriment of all); Linowitz, supra note 204, at 68 (the legal profession is now a business,
controlled by the bottom line).
209 Cf. Commission on Women to Develop Model Policies, 21 SYLLABUS, Spring 1990, at 1
(newsletter of the ABA Section on Legal Educ. and Admission to the Bar) ("The grow-
ing pressures for law firms to be successful businesses and for lawyers to produce even
greater billable hours results in lawyers becoming dehumanized.").
210 Freeman vividly describes being a corporate lawyer as,
boring and intellectually dissatisfying, not to mention emotionally destructive if
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with their lawyers, and the practice of law will be less important
in the larger scheme of things.
21 1
At its best, the practice of law has always been an interper-
sonal enterprise. 212 It has been a profession where individual
judgment and personal conscience have been the hallmarks of the
endeavor;213 it has been a profession where clients have been
treated as uniquely important individuals.1 4
In recent years, there has been a tendency, especially in larg-
er firms, to regard clients as fungible sources of income and law-
yers as interchangeable producers of marketable products.215 As
you are trying to maintain a life with human relationships in it.
The experience is not only boring but necessarily alienating, for you must
take on a role to do the job, a role in which you are the object of constant
scrutiny of other corporate lawyers as you attempt to become one of
them-while they themselves are all playing the very same role . . . . The elite
corporate lawyer should be a self-assured, calm individual. He or she should
play the role of legal intellectual and rationalizer. To perform in this role, asso-
ciates have to withdraw from their true selves so that they may conform to the
image. All kinds of crazy things happen to people in the process.
Freeman, supra note 204, at 320-21. See also Altman, supra note 204, at 15 (an increasing
number of lawyers are unhappy practicing law); Hochberger, supra note 204, at 13 (large
firms pay exorbitant salaries to dissuade dissatisfied associates from leaving); Manning,
From Learned Profession to Learned Business, 37 BUFFALo L. REv. 658, 664 (1988-89) (law-
yers primarily leave the profession because they dislike their work life).
211 See Brown, The Quiet Revolution in the American Law Profession: Remarks Before the
Commission on Professionalism of the American Bar Association, 14 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 855,
867 (1985) (the erosion of legal professionalism adversely affects lawyers' integral role in
American society).
212 Cf R. RODES, THE LEGAL ENTERPRISE 141 (1976) ("[O]ur most serious failing . . .
is our lack of attention to the quality of human relations within the legal enterprise it-
self."); T. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER 140 (1981) ('Justice . . . is a
gift people give to one another . . . . Justice can be administered, because the idea of
justice cannot be separated from the process of administering justice . . . . The lawyer,
as a just person seeking to be faithful to his client . . . is doing justice. ... ).
213 See Lee, Dedication Address, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 533, 539-40 (1985) ("There are
those among us who say that . . . concern, one lawyer for another . . . is a thing of
the past and is totally unrealistic. I hope they're wrong. Those performances represent
professionalism at its highest . . . They result from a genuine concern for the prob-
lems of other people.").
214 As eloquently stated by Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr at a meeting of the
American Law Institute:
[A]t its greatest, the [legal] profession stands not for profits, it stands for the
rule of law. It stands not for amassing billable hours, it stands for human dig-
nity, for the recognition of the ultimate value of every man, woman, and
child . . . It means fostering a sense of community, within the profession and
beyond.
Luncheon Address by Kenneth W. Starr, III, 66th Annual Meeting of the American Law
Institute (May 18, 1989), (quoted in Reavley, supra note 17, at 638).
215 Cf. Corti v. Fleisher, 93 Ill. App. 3d 517, 51, 417 N.E.2d 764, 769 (1981) (refus-
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the Chief Justice has remarked, one gets the sense that firms
which require associates to bill more than two thousand, hours
per year are treating associates "very much as a manufacturer
'would treat a purchaser of one hundred tons of scrap metal."2" 6
To be sure, there are many firms which genuinely strive to re-
spond to the individual needs and desires of both lawyers and
clients. But, there are reasons to conclude that these firms repre-
sent a decreasing segment of the profession.1 7
Pressures favoring conformity and assembly-line-like standard-
ization are readily apparent in legal education 218 and the prac-
tice of law. Students are taught-implicitly, if not explicitly-that
to be truly successful, one must earn high grades, write on law re-
view, and clerk for prestigious firms during the summer.219 The
ing to enforce a provision in an attorney employment agreement on the ground that to
do so would "allow clients to be unknowingly treated like objects of commerce, to be
bargained for and traded by merchant-attorneys like beans and potatoes"); Brown, supra
note 208, at 40 (large-firm associates have "become articles of commerce driven to con-
stant night and weekend work, generating, in treadmill style, the commodity of billable
hours"); Sella, Moving Out and Up: Legal Placement in the Age of Free Agency, 75 A.B.A. J.
82, 84 (Oct. 1989) ("'[F]irms haven't tended to the care and feeding of young asso~i-
ates . . . . It's benign neglect. And that's amplified at lower levels-lower associates feel
at times like canon fodder. Burnout sets in.'").
216 Rehnquist, The Legal Profession Today, 62 IND. L.J. 151, 153 (1986). See also
LaMothe, supra note 28, at 17 (Asking rhetorically: "What are the basic values of a law
firm where 2000 billable hours a year is increasingly considered the irreducible minimum
for the associate who wants to make partner or the partner who wants to advance?").
Large corporate firms often measure an associate's success "in terms of billable
hours, productivity and rates of return, with no regard for quality of work, expertise,
loyalty, seniority, public image, general reputation, integrity or other subjective character-
istics by which we tend to judge our fellow human beings outside the office setting."
Altman, Fostering Firm Culture Can Stop Dehumanization of a Practice, Nat'l LJ., Jan. 12,
1987, at 15.
217 Cf. LaMothe, supra note 28, at 15-16 (suggeting that "job conditions for lawyers
generally may be getting worse," noting evidence that partner sabbatical programs are
disappearing, that lawyers are working harder, that lawyers are increasingly concerned
about competition and profitability, and are expressing growing discontent).
218 See Lopez, supra note 205, at 307 (1989):
Legal education conceives of and treats people-their traditions, their experienc-
es, their institutions-as essentially fungible. It declares, at least tacitly, that who
people are, how they live, how they struggle, how they suffer, how they interact
with others, how others interact with them, and how they relate to conventional
governmental and corporate power need not be taken, into account in any sus-
tained and serious way in training lawyers. Generic legal education teaches law
students to approach practice as if all people and all social life were homoge-
neous.
219 T. SHAFFER, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE 46 (1977) ("Success in law
school requires conformity and effort . . . [and the] demands for conformity and effort
are heavy ... "); S. TUROW, ONE L AN INSIDE ACcOUNT OF LIFE IN THE FIRST YEAR
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aspiring student who eschews law review in favor of working for a
pro bono clinic, or who fails to clerk for a "good" firm between
second and third year, is under a heavy obligation to demonstrate
why he or she should not later be passed over for many job op-
portunities. In law practice, the evidence is much the same. While
women are being hired in unprecedented numbers, 220 they still
account for only a small portion of law firm partners. 2 Many
attribute the failure of women to break through the professional
"glass ceiling"222 encountered midway on the career ladder to
the fact that women often have demanded greater flexibility in
terms and conditions of employment. 223 Law firms frequently
have been unwilling to provide even minimal accommodation to
those who seek to diverge from the conventional path of long
hours, dull assignments and work on a full time basis.224 As a
result, "[women have] desert[ed] the megafirms in droves for lack
of mentors, client contact, camaraderie, and flexible hours." 225
A principal advantage that can flow from the profession's
accommodation of temporary lawyers is that such arrangements
can introduce a much needed measure of flexibility and individual
tailoring into the arena of legal employment.226 The presence of
AT HARVARD LAw SCHOOL 10 (1977) ("[T]he struggle for jobs in the future and for
first-year honors leads at most schools to the same emphasis on grades and the same
atmosphere of tension, competition and uncertainty.")..
220 See supra note 4.
221 See Repa, Is There Life After Partnership?, 74 A.B.A. J. 70 (June 1988) (only 8% of
large firms' partners are women). Cf. LaMothe, supra note 28, at 16 ("Overall, 94 % of
all law firm partners are men; and women partners are increasing by only about 1 per-
cent a year.").
222 Moss, Women in Law: The Glass Ceiling, 74 A.B.A. J. 49 (June 1988).
223 Cf Blodgett, Whatever Happened to the Class of '81?, 74 A.B.A. J. 56 (June 1988)
(discussing how unmet needs for flexible scheduling cause women to leave large-firm
practices); LaMothe, supra note 28, at 32 ("Young women are increasingly unwilling to
make the historical compromises of remaining single and childless in order to fit into
male-created institutions.").
224 Cf. Blodgett, supra note 223, at 58 (After the birth of her first child, one woman
associate left a firm because its personnel committee refused to authorize a three-day-per
week work schedule.); LaMothe, supra note 28, at 15 (normal life is all but impossible
for women in law firms); Blodgett, Temporaty Duty, supra note 96, at 17 ("My boss
wouldn't hear of part-time work or job-sharing, so I quit and started to look for
part-time Work as a lawyer.").
225 Moss, supra note 222, at 49.
226 See Zeldis, Working 'Temp' Makes Sense for Some Attoneys, Firms, N.Y.LJ., Dec. 24,
1987, at 1, col. 1 (discussing advantages). Cf LaMothe, supra note 28, at 31 ("Law firms
need to create programs to make firm life livable and attractive at all levels."); Address
by Barbara Bader Aldave, Bexar County Women's Law Association, Annual Bench
Brunch (Oct. 22, 1989) (recognizing need for "partners in law firms or decisionmakers
in corporations to consider implementing part-time and flex-time arrangements and pa-
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temporary lawyers in traditional work environments can provide a
sobering example of alternative modes of practice for lawyers too
easily absorbed in 'the monomaniacal pursuit of increased power
and greater wealth. It may be valuable to remind lawyers on the
partnership track that there can be more to life than one's career.
That value lies not in persuading attorneys to radically alter ca-
reer plans, but in injecting into the pursuit of professional goals a
sense of moderation and restraint. To the extent that some law-
yers rationally elect to forego income and power in favor of other
interests, and that some lawyers are able to successfully combine
private practice with a family, or with public service, or with avo-
cational interests, associate attorneys on the partnership track may
be less willing to permit law.firms to demand even greater bill-
able hours.227 So too, because the use .of .temporary lawyers
sometimes requires firms"2 8 to adjust their demands to the
unique needs or limited availability of those interested in taking
such positions, there is a modicum of hope that firms may begin
to demonstrate greater willingness to accommodate similar needs
on the part of full-time, permanent employees. 229 Firms might,
for example, be less resistant to granting leaves of absence or
permitting flexible work hours. The accommodation of individual
needs becomes possible once requests for special treatment are
perceived as important- and capable of resolution without undue
inconvenience. A few years ago it would have been virtually incon-
ceivable for a lawyer to ask a law firm to provide child care sup-
port, but as the need and desire for such services has become
more apparent, a number of major law firms have begun to pro-
vide and subsidize day care services for children of employ-
ees.230 These firms have recognized that accommodating such
rental leave policies" in order to alleviate problems currently faced by lawyers with chil-
dren).
227 Cf. Goldberg, supra note 3, at 60 ("The constant metering of a young lawyer's
hours squeezes out time for pro bono, outside interests and a personal life. There's also
pressure to specialize in a single area of law.").
228 Some placement agencies report that while a limited number of sole practitioners
utilize temporary lawyers, most are placed with law firms. See Goldman Interview, supra
note 30 (stating that bulk of work came from ten large firms in Washington, D.C. ar-
ea).
229 Cf LaMothe, supra note 28, at 16 ("Law firm partners should realize that by
paying attention to the so-called women's issues" they may improve the morale and pro-
ductivity of all [employees].").'
230 See Cohen & Brannigan, Washington Law Firms are Going Into the Day Care Busi-
ness, Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1990, at B6, cols. 5-6 (discussing four Washington, D.C.
firms).
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individual needs is conducive to attracting and retaining talented
lawyers and staff members,2 31 and ultimately to remaining com-
petitive.3 2 Similarly, numerous potential gains might flow from
the increased institutional flexibility fostered by the use of tem-
porary lawyers, including such indirect benefits as reduced absen-
teeism and greater productivity during work hours.233
2. Reconciliation of Supply and Demand
Expense and delay are two common characteristics of tle
delivery of legal services.234 Routinely, clients are asked to wait a
long time for the work they request; they are also forced to pay a
high price for the services they receive.235 In part, these unto-
ward features of legal representation are the result of a funda-
mental failure on the part of the profession to adjust the supply
of lawyer time and talent to fluctuations in client demand.
Supply/demand mismatch stems fiom the fact that tradition-
ally lawyers have been hired on a long-term basis, while the needs
of clients ebb and flow on a short-term scale. If, forexample, the
demands placed on a firm by clients are twice as high in October
as in August or September, conventional wisdom suggests that
only limited options are available for increasing lawyer services.
Among the alternatives, the firm can: (1) require attorneys to
work longer hours, (2) refer cases to other lawyers, or (3) perma-
nently hire additional legal talent.23 6  If one is attempting to
231 Cf. B. OLMSTEAD & S. SMITH, supra note 66, at viii (Flexibility is generally "seen
as a way to attract and retain good employees in a labor market that is steadily becom-
ing more competitive.").
232 Cf. id. at ix ("The key to remaining competitive is . .. an open-ended setting in
which the individual is allowed to grow at his or her own rate.").
233 Cf. Blodgett, Temporamy Duty, supra note 96, at 17 ("Less paid absenteeism, less
idle time and fewer sick days and fringe benefits are advantages of hiring part-timers.").
234 Cf. Comment, Fee Splitting With Nonlawyers, 12 J. LEGAL PROF. 139, 148 (1987)
(describing legal process as "both slow and expensive").
235 Cf. Bok, A Flawed System, HARV. MAC., 38, 40 (May-June 1983) ("[Tihe cost of
hiring a lawyer and the mysteries of the legal process discourage most people of modest
means from trying to enforce their rights."); Altman & Weil Releases Results: 1988 Survey
of Law Firm Economics, supra note 31, at 852 ("For lawyers with six to ten years of prac-
tice, the average rate for those in firms with fewer than nine lawyers is $101 per hour.
For lawyers in firms of seventy-five or more lawyers, the average is $128 per hour.").
236 Of course, a firm may be better able to cope with temporary increases in client
demand if it augments its nonlawyer staff, improves its technology and equipment, or
takes other measures not directly involving lawyers. The discussion in the text focuses on
increased demands for the type of work which, as a matter of professional ethics, cannot
be delegated to a non-lawyer and must be performed by a licensed member of the
bar-work calling for the exercise of independent legal judgment on a client's behalf.
[Vol. 66:359
TEMPORARY LAWYERING
avoid expense and delay, each of these alternatives has substantial
disadvantages.
While attorneys in a firm may be able to generate more work
by foregoing vacations, working weekends and staying longer
hours at the office, such efforts are subject to the principle of
diminishing marginal utility and the fact that there are a finite
number of hours in a day. Inasmuch as most attorneys already
put in long work weeks, it is reasonable to conclude that in-
creased efforts by fixed personnel frequently will be insufficient to
satisfy substantial periodic increases in client demand. Unless
work is turned away, or additional lawyers are hired, clients will
have to wait longer for legal services. In addition, costs iay be
higher for clients; once matters are delayed, duplicative research,
investigation, or legal analysis is often required before a project
can be completed.
Referring cases to other attorneys is alsp. an unsatisfactory
solution to the problem of temporary increases in client demand.
When a firm refers a case, it generally forfeits the right to earn a
profit-by providing legal services. Needless to say, pressures of
economic self-interest make it likely that a firm unable to satisfy
increased demands will resist referring cases, even when not do-
ing so causes clients delay. This is especially true When the rise in
the demand for legal services appears to be short-lived.
In limited situations, a firm making a referral is entitled to
collect a "forwarding fee" for doing nothing more than sending a
case to another firm.23 However, the opportunity in these cases
to earn a substantial fee by doing little more than making a
phone call or writing a letter is not sufficient to ensure that refer-
rals will readily be made. A forwarding fee is but one small part
of the total fee. Avarice, or less self-interested economic pressures,
may tempt a firm to endeavor to keep the entire fee for itself.
Moreover, because forwarding' fee arrangements unnecessarily
237 As late as the early 1980s, straight referral fees could be paid in only four states:
California, Maine, Massachusetts, and Texas. See Franck, Refen'al Fees: Everybody Does It
But Is It Okay, 71 A.B.A. J. 40, 40 (Feb. 1985). Recently, the restrictions on such pay-
ments have been relaxed by state adoption of new ethics codes patterned on the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"). Under Rule 5.4 of the Model Rules, a
fee may be shared with a forwarding lawyer, without regard to the services performed
by that lawyer, if (a) by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint
responsibility for the representation, (b) the client is advised of and does not object to
the participation of all lawyers involved, and (c) the total fee is reasonable. The com-
mentary to the rule makes clear that the client need not be advised as to the share of
the fee the forwarding lawyer will receive.
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increase the cost of legal services,"'8 they subject- the legal pro-
fession to further criticism. Under a strict referral fee, a firm is
paid a substantial amount for doing little, and the fee bears no
relation to the services performed.3 9
There are several disadvantages of permanent hiring as a
response to short-term fluctuations in client needs. First, such a
course commits a firm to increased expenditures for legal person-
nel without any assurance of a sustained increase in revenues. If
workload in fact subsides, this scenario is likely to result in higher
legal fees for clients. Second, permanent hiring can be particularly
inefficient in addressing specialized client needs. If a firm hires a
"specialist" to cope with these demands, it may find no need for
such expertise in the future, and the specialist may be unable to
be employed with equal efficiency in run-of-the-mill cases. In con-
trast, if a "generalist" is hired to address specialized needs, the
client may be subject to increased expenses and delay while the
new attorney "gets up to speed."
The use of temporary lawyers avoids many of these delays
and expenses. 240 Temporary. workers can alleviate diminutions in
work force strength resulting from extended searches for perma-
nent associates,24' maternity and paternity leave,242 prolonged
illness, sabbaticals, or temporary government service. Sole practi-
tioners who find it necessary to be in "two or more places at
once," or who have no time for necessary legal research, find that
it may be better to hire one or more temporary lawyers than to
take on a full-time associate.243 While temporary lawyers must
be hired, directed, and supervised, the time that these efforts
require is offset by the resulting increases in the total number of
238 Johnson, Yellow Pages Legal Ads in Texas: The Complexities of DR 2-101(B) & (C),
17 ST. MARY'S LJ. 1, 13-14 (1985) ("To the extent that forwarding arrangements add an
unnecessary layer of middlemen to the provision of legal services, they exacerbate a
critical problem besetting those who need the assistance of the profession, namely,
unaffordability.").
239 In contingent fee personal injury cases, a referring attorney often receives
one-third of the total fee. See G. HAZARD, ETHIcS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 98-99
(1978). Compare Franck, No Referral Fee for No Work, 71 A.B.A. J. 40, 44 (Feb. 1985)
(20% to 33 1/3%) with Halstrom, Referral Fees Are a Necessary Evil, 71 A.B.A. J. 40, 42
(Feb. 1985) (25% to 50%).
240 See McLean, Temp Attorneys: An Economical Alternative, Cal. L. Bus., Nov. 7, 1988,
at 3, col. 1 (discussing efficient compliance with short dealines).
241 See Berkman, supra note 61, at 24.
242 Cf. id. at 24 (child care leave).
243 See Blodgett, supra note 96, at 17. See also Marcotte, Boom in Lawyer Temporaries,




hours worked. Many employers have found that dissatisfaction
with the quality of temporary work is the exception, rather than
the rule. 44 If prudence is exercised in selection, and qualified
temporaries are given suitable tasks, it should be possible to in-
crease productivity beyond that degree which might be achieved
through harder work or longer hours on the part of a fixed
workforce. These gains do not require a firm to commit itself to
a permanent increase in personnel expenditures. 45 Moreover,
while temporary attorneys and placement agencies must be paid,
such costs need not be excessive. The pool of potential temporar-
ies is large, and in most cases placement agency costs are more
than offset by amounts which a firm can save on taxes and em-
ployee benefits. 46 These savings will be increasingly viewed as
important, for some sources have opined that in view of the re-
cent escalation in attorney salaries "[c]ontaining the cost of bene-
fits is the [number one] goal for law firms entering the
1990s. ' '24' Although expert temporary services may carry a high
price, it is arguably more economical and fair to acquire such as-
sistance on a short term basis, and charge them to the client who
needs them, than to attempt to address that client's needs without
expertise or permanently hire an expert when it is unclear wheth-
er such services will be needed in the future. 4 s In addition, by
Using a temporary specialist, a firm can test whether it should ex-
244 See Berkman, supra note 61, at 24.
245 By using temporary attorneys, law firms are able to generate new income without
a significant rise in overhead expenses. See Thomas, supra note 127, at 29.
One temporary lawyer agency indicates that it has two advertising themes: first,
"overworked/overdeadined"; second, "stay the same size and grow." According to the
agency, the firms utilizing its services generally fall within one of these categories. Either
the firm has too many deadlines and too little time, and therefore needs extra help for
short periods, or the firm is in a slight growth pattern, but is not assured of sufficient
continued growth to be able to hire additional full-time personnel. See Goldman Intewiew,
supra note 30.
246 See e.g., Berkman, supra note 61, at 24 (non-payment of benefits and overhead
results in a 50% savings to employer); Marcotte, supra note 69, at 30 (temporary lawyers
are cost effective because hiring firms pay no employee benefits or payroll taxes); Jones,
supra note 41, at 1020 (temporary attorneys are independent contractors and therefore
responsible for own benefits, social security, and withholding taxes).
247 Goldschmidt, Looking Ahead to Benefit Options, Tex. Law., May 14, 1990, at 8,
cols. 3 & 4..
248 It is not surprising that in the wake of the October 1988 stock market crash
several New York firms put a freeze on permanent hiring and called upon temporary
attorneys as a hedge against economic uncertainty until business improved. See Berkman,
supra note 61, at 24. Cf. Legal Temps, supra note 96, at 25, col. 4 (temporary attorneys
can be hired for a fraction of the cost that would be incurred by hiring an outside
lawyer).
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pand into a new field of law practice.24
C. Perils Inherent in Core/Ring Employment Configurations
As noted earlier,25° the use of the temporary workers to
augment the services of permanent employees is described by
theorists as an example of the core/ring configuration of
workplace management. Greater production efficiency is achieved
by this configuration, not by devoting greater or different resourc-
es to the training and support of a single, permanent group of
employees (the "stretch theory"), but by creating a tiered work
force consisting of both long-term and short-term employees, who
play different roles in producing goods or services.
2 51
The core/ring configuration holds definite advantages in
terms of reducing short-term labor costs, increasing production
flexibility, and promptly responding to changes in the market. 52
At the same time, however, the utility of this management scheme
is hedged by several perils. When groups within a tiered work,
force are entitled to different benefits, privileges, and job security,
there are risks of inter-group jealousy and non-cooperation, ac-
companied by lack of institutional loyalty and diminished motiva-
tion.253 Tiered systems also run the risk of creating classes of
"haves" and "have-nots," with the attendant possibility that certain
employees drawn from disfavored classes (e.g., women, racial mi-
norities, and immigrants) will be barred from entry into the most
lucrative, prestigious, or otherwise-desirable tiers of employ-
ment.
25 4
Whatever the magnitude of these concerns in other employ-
ment contexts,255 there is less reason to think that they are so
249 See Weston, supra note 179, at 38.
250 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
251 See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
252 See B. OLMSTEAD & S. SMITH, supra note 66, at 379 (a contingent employment
configuration gives an organization "rapid access to a quality talent pool").
253 But see id. (the use of contingent employees has not been studied sufficiently to
determine the long-term effects of this arrangement on morale and turnover); id. at 403
(discussing potential negative impact of contingent hires on retention and recruitment of
permanent workers).
254 See id. at viii (Some argue that a two-tiered work force may deprive a significant
number of workers of the chance to achieve their full potential.); id. at 383 (A
core/ring configuration could presage the beginning of a division of the American work
force into "haves" and "have nots.").
It has similarly been argued that dual tracking may ultimately result in staff attor-
neys being treated as second class professional citizens. See Second Path for Non-Partnear,
supra note 38, at 18; see also Couric, supra note 38, at 23.
255 See B. OLMSTEAD & S. SMITH, supra note 66, at 375 ("A negative aspect of the
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great in the field of law as to bar the use of temporary attor-
neys.256 No credible facts suggest that any class of attorneys will
be forcibly excluded from the ranks of permanent employment
and relegated to the potential vicissitudes and insecurity of tem-
porary lawyering. The prospect of such discrimination might legiti-
mately be a concern in other employment sectors. But, the fact
that lawyers have the benefit of a professional education, and
have relatively easy access to the corridors of power, tend to en-
sure that even those lawyers drawn from the weakest
socio-economic classes have considerably greater bargaining power
than the average worker. While that power does not guarantee
that some members of the profession may not try to use tempo-
rary lawyering as a vehicle for discrimination, it considerably re-
duces the chances that such discrimination will be successful.
257
There is every reason to think that lawyers who believe they are
victims of discrimination will readily seek redress in the courts
and in legislative and executive branch forums. 58
Certain precautions are in order when a firm seeks to avail
itself of the advantages of hiring temporary attorneys.259 Salary
and benefit disparities between temporary and full-time lawyers I
cannot be grossly disproportionate to the services performed and
the responsibilities assumed by either' group.6 Otherwise, the
expanded use of temporary employees is the growing number of involuntary
temps-workers who can find no regular employment. This is the segment of the contin-
gent work force that appears to be growing fastest.").
256 But see id. at 383 ("Since the rationale for using contingent workers is to lower
labor costs, the result may be permanently lower pay scales and loss of fringe benefits
as well as a loss of access to training and knowledge of the industry for many members
of the workforce. This may happen even with highly skilled, independently contracted profession-
als, such as lauers."(emphasis added)).
257 Compare B. HEINTZ & N. MARKHAM-BUGBEE, supra note 45, at 37 (arguing that
the creation of non-equity partnership positions will not likely be a successful vehicle for
relegating women, minorities, or persons of ethnic background to dead-end positions,
because court decisions have allowed lawyers to challenge partnership decisions that were
perceived as discriminatory).
258 See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (former law firm associ-
ate alleged that sex-based discrimination motivated denial of partnership status). See also
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (female accounting firm partnership
candidate alleged sex discrimination by firm). But see Madek & O'Brien, Women Denied
Partnerships: From Hishon to Price, 7 HOFSTRA LABOR L. J. 257, 258 (1990) (noting the
"complacency which American men and women display toward the issue of women's job
rights").
259 See generally B. OLMSTFAD & S. SMITH, supra note 66, at 397-98 (listing steps for
"Orienting Contingent Employees to the Workplace").
260 See id. at 380 ("Ihiequality breeds devisiveness."); id. at 382 ("[H]aving employees
who work side by side, performing the same tasks but with different conditions of work
1990) 405 .
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disadvantaged group (quite correctly) will perceive itself to be
unfairly treated and will contribute less productively to the work
of the firm. Also, the scheduling courtesies extended to tempo-
rary attorneys predictably may be resented, when a firm inflexibly
demands long hours of regular employees. 61 For example, if
during an extended period of high client demands, a firm permits
a temporary attorney to leave each day at 6:00 p.m., while requir-
ing regular employees to work until midnight, it should come as
no surprise that regular employees may be jealous of the tempo-
rary lawyer and that relations between these individuals may be
strained. Of course, a good manager can avoid these difficulties.
If the regular employees are made to feel that they, unlike the
temporary attorney, have a permanent stake in the venture, that
their input and work is especially valued, and that they will be
appropriately rewarded for their sacrifices, either now or in the
future, the regular attorneys may appreciate the added support
provided by the temporary lawyer, rather than resent the f~ct that
that individual is permitted to leave earlier. As is the case in
many contexts, effective communication and good interpersonal
relations with regular employees can determine whether a varia-
tion from the ordinary terms of employment is an asset or a lia-
bility.
In addition to fully explaining the role of temporary lawyers
to all co-workers, efforts must also be made to treat temporary
lawyers with appropriate professional respect.262 Similarly, care
must be exercised both in screening applicants for temporary
positions, to ensure that they really prefer less commitment than
regular employment demands,26 and in determining which tasks
are suitable for lawyers working on a non-regular basis." 4 If at-
and pay scales, can have a very negative effect on morale.").
261 See id. at 380 ("If scheduling flexibility is possible only on a contingent basis, the
morale of the firm's core work force will be eroded.")
262 Treating temporary lawyers with appropriate deference, in light of their educa-
tional attainments and professional standing, is undoubtedly one means of addressing
what some authorities believe is the difficult problem of motivating non-regular workers
with no long-term stake in the venture. See id. at 396 (Contingent workers sometimes see
themselves as "merely marking time or putting in their hours.").
263 See id. at 381.
264 See id. at 391. The cited authority perceives the potential disadvantages of contin-
gent employment, in terms of diminished benefits, impaired morale, potential discrimi-
nation, and the like, as being so great that the only safe course is for such employees
to be hired "only in cases where it would be inappropriate or impossible to fill the
position or handle the situation using regular employees on reduced or flexible sched-
ules." Id. at 384.
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torneys who need regular employment accept temporary work
merely because nothing else is available, it is less likely that they
will be content in their new positions. The same will undoubtedly
be true when temporary attorneys are given inappropriate tasks,
are inadequately supervised, or are deprived of the support they
need for completing assigned- projects.
With the foregoing considerations in mind, the discussion will
now turn to the three principal grounds on which temporary legal
services have been challenged: conflict of interest, improper fee
splitting, and breach of confidentiality.
D. Conflicts of Interest
The term "conflict of interest" covers exceptionally broad
territory and can refer to any of a multitude of sins. It encom-'
passes at least four distinct categories of cases-those in which
the interests of a client potentially conflict with the interests of:
(1) a past client;. 5 (2) a nonclient;2 66 (3) a present client;26 7
or (4) the attorney. 68 It is difficult to generalize about the poli-
cies underlying these standards. At a minimum, the law seeks, in
each of these areas, to ensure that a lawyer will exercise indepen-
dent professional judgment on behalf of each client,2 69 safe-
guard confidences,270 and provide zealous representation within
the bounds of the law.2
Although some authorities have asserted that a temporary
attorney placement agency must establish a sophisticated mecha-
nism for screening conflicts of interest before assigning any partic-
ipating lawyer to an employer-firm,272 others have taken a con-
trary position, admonishing law firms not to disclose even the
subject matter of the desired temporary services to the placement
agency.273 The following discussion makes it clear that often the
applicable conflicts inquiry is so fact-specific that it is impossible
for- an agency to do little more than identify the most obvious
conflicts. In the end, the attorneys who provide the legal services
265 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.9 (1989).
266 See generally id. at Rules 1.7(b) & 1.8(f).
267 See generally id.
268 See generally id. at Rules 1.7(b) & 1.8.
269 See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1980).
270 See generally id. at Canon 4.
271 See generally id. at Canon 7.
272 See Florida Op. 88-12 (1988), supra note 178, at 2.
273 See NYC Bar Op. 1988-3 (1988), supra note 178, at 5.
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(a) Movement Between Firms Under the Model Rules and Imputed
Disqualification.-The most serious ethical problem presented by
the use of temporary lawyers falls into the category of former-
client conflicts of interest. Within this category, it is generally
agreed that, absent consent by a prior client, an attorney is
barred from undertaking representation of a new client if that
representation is "substantially related" and "materially adverse" to
the representation of the prior client."' This rule takes on spe-
cial significance in the context of temporary lawyering because of
a related rule concerning the doctrine of "imputed disqualifica-
tion." Under that doctrine, a lawyer "associated" with a firm is
deemed to be disqualified from representing a client if any attor-
ney in the firm would be disqualified by reason of conflict of
interest."6 With limited exceptions not relevant here,277 a firm
is treated as a single attorney; if any lawyer is disqualified, all are
disqualified.278 Imputed disqualification is based upon the rea-
sonable assumption that attorneys within a firm discuss the affairs
of clients and presumably have access to confidential client infor-
mation concerning even those clients whom they do not personal-
ly represent.27 9
When an attorney moves from one firm to another, a ques-
tion arises as to the extent of the conflicts of interest that the
attorney brings to the new firm.28° When the attorney personal-
ly represented the former client in question, there is little doubt
that both the attorney and the firm to which the attorney has
274 Cf Florida Op. 88-12 (1988), supra note 178, at 2 (The primary burden must be
borne by the participating lawyer and the placement agency.).
275 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(a) (1989).
276 See id. at Rule 1.10(a).
277 For example, the usual rules of imputed disqualification do not apply to certain
conflicts involving former government attorneys, judges, law clerks, and neutral arbitra-
tors. See notes 309-12 infra and accompanying text.
278 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 comment (1989).
279 See Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, 607
F.2d 186, 196 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (Fairchild, C.J.) ("It is reasonable to presume
that members of a law firm freely share their client's confidences with one another. That
presumption of shared confidences underlies, either implicitly or explicitly, many of the
cases requiring the disqualification of counsel.").
280 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 comment (1989)
(discussing lawyers moving between firms).
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moved are disqualified from participating in any cases "substan-
tially related" and "materially adverse" to the representation of,
the prior client, absent consent.2st The more difficult question
is whether the attorney and the new firm are disqualified from
providing representation in cases which are "substantially related"
and "materially adverse" to the representation of prior clients who
were previously served not by the moving attorney, but by the
attorney's colleagues while the attorney was associated with the
former firm. There is a substantial question as to whether imput-
ed disqualification follows a departing attorney to the attorney's
new professional home and, if so, whether the imputed confi-
dences on which that disqualification is based will be re-imputed
to the attorney's new firm so as to bar representation of new
clients by other attorneys in the new firm.282 If both of these
questions were answered in the affirmative, temporary attor-
neys-persons who make their living by moving from firm to firm
as the need arises-would be regarded as ethical "Typhoid
Marys. ' 283 At each stop, the temporary attorney would infect a
firm with a whole host of conflicts problems, and leave with even
more problems than she arrived with. Soon the temporary attor-
ney would be regarded as a very unwelcome visitor who causes
employers to be disqualified from a wide range of cases.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct take a sensible
position with respect to conflicts of interest involving movement
between firms. The former-client conflict of interest rule is intend-
ed in large part to protect client confidences, 284 and the Model
Rules' standard is therefore articulated in terms of access to confi-
dential information. 285 The Rules provide that the departing at-
281 See G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 58, at 195-96 ("Plainly, a lawyer who has
formerly worked for a client X, whether on her own, as a member of a firm, or as a
law temp for a firm, cannot go to a different firm as a law temp and oppose client X
in a related matter."). See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rules
1.9(a), 1.10(a) (1989).
282 See generally American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1128-50 (5th
Cir. 1971) (discussing the double imputation issue).
283 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 58, at 191 (using such term). -
284 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 comments (1989). Cf.
Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motors Corp. 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975)
(The purpose of disqualification based on former representation is to "enforce the
lawyer's duty of absolute fidelity and to guard against the danger of inadvertent use of
confidential information.").
285 "When they were originally promulgated in 1983, the Model Rules treated all
problems of imputed disqualification in Rule 1.10 . . . In 1989, the ABA revised Mod-
el Rules 1.9 and 1.10, mainly by moving Rule 1.10(b)-which dealt with a lawyer's new
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torney and the firm to which the attorney moves are disqualified
only in those cases where the attorney obtained "actual knowledge
of information" about the affairs of the former client. 86 If the
proposed representation is "substantially related" and "materially
adverse" to the representation of the former client, and the at-
torney in question gained knowledge of that client's affairs, by
serving the former client or otherwise, then, absent consent both
the attorney and the new firm are disqualified. Thus, if the attor-
ney changing firms never learned of the affairs of the former
client, then neither the attorney nor the firm to which the attor-
ney moves is disqualified. 7 This is a sound position, for unless
the departing attorney gained access to confidential client infor-
mation, there is no chance that the confidences of the former
client will be breached.
The Model Rules' position with respect to former-client con-
flicts of interest and movement between firms minimizes the risk
that a temporary attorney, or the employers of that attorney, will
be subject to disqualification based upon the temporary attorney's
prior work for other employers. The temporary attorney, and the
firms with which the temporary attorney subsequently becomes
associated, will be disqualified from representing clients whose
interests are "substantially related" and "materially adverse" to the
representation of those former clients the temporary attorney
served personally (absent effective consent by the prior cli-
ent).288 But, neither the temporary attorney, nor that attorney's
subsequent employers, will be disqualified because a new client's
interests are "substantially related" and "materially adverse" to
those of a client represented by other attorneys in a firm with
firm-into 1.9, and changing its focus. As re-aligned and reworded, new Rule 1.9(b) now
focuses on the individual lawyer who has moved to a new firm; focus on that lawyer's
new firm remains in Rule 1.10 ... ." G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 58, at 188.
"The revision was perhaps unwise, for the new text loses much in familiarity, while gain-
ing very little in overall clarity and virtually nothing of substance." Id. at 174.1. As a
result of the described changes, there may be a discrepancy between the current num-
bering of the Model Rules and references to substantively equivalent provisions in state
codes adopted prior to the 1989 amendments or antecedent ethics opinions or court
decisions.
286 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.9(b) and comment (1989).
287 See id.
288 Cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at
3 (198.8) ("[U]nder Rule 1.9, a temporary lawyer who worked on a "matter for a client of
one firm could not thereafter work for a client of another firm on the same or substan-
tially related matter in which that client's interests are materially adverse to the interests
of the client of the first firm (in the absence of consent of the former client and sub-
ject to the other conditions stated in the Rule).").
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which the temporary attorney was previously associated-unless
the temporary attorney had in fact acquired relevant confidential
information about the former client's affairs.
(b) Avoiding Actual Knowledge of Confidential Information.-In
states adhering to the Model Rules' position, it is preferable for
conflict of interest purposes that temporary attorneys not become
broadly involved in the affairs of the firms for which they
work.289 Whether an attorney acquires confidential information
about clients whom the attorney has not personally served is gen-
erally a question of fact, and circumstantial evidence and the rea-
sonable inferences drawn therefrom typically aid the resolution of
this question.29 ° Where the evidence shows that a temporary at-
torney worked exclusively on a particular matter, dealt with a
limited number of persons in the firm, was not included in gener-
al discussions of firm business, and did not have access to the
files of other firm clients, it will be difficult to conclude that the
attorney gained actual information about the affairs of clients not
personally served during temporary work for the firm. 291 To
that extent, the temporary attorney and the attorney's subsequent
employers will less readily be found to 'have an impermissible con-
flict of interest. It may be difficult, however, to make a convincing
showing of limited involvement in firm affairs in the case of work
for a sole practitioner, for such employment typically takes place
in an intimate office environment.292 Moreover, while limiting a
temporary lawyer's involvement in the larger affairs of a law firm
may minimize conflict of interest problems, it may give rise to
other difficulties. Attorneys routinely excluded from professional
-discussions, or broadly barred from access to certain persons or
materials, may find work considerably less rewarding than if they
were treated as an equal. Many lawyers might be unwilling to ac-
289 See New Jersey Informal Op. 632 (1989), supra note 178, at 394 (To minimize
the risk of imputed disqualification, firms employing temporary lawyers should shield
'such lawyers from all information relating to clients for whom the temporary does no
work.).
290 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 comment (1989).
291 See id. (Where a lawyer has "access to the files of only a limited number of cli-
ents and participate[s] in discussion of the affairs of no other clients . . . it should be
inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually
served but not those [sic] of other clients.").
292 Cf Berkman, supra note 61, at 24 ("[S]olo practitioners, because of the typically
intimate office environment, should raise questions about possible conflicts both when
hiring a temporary lawyer and when someone they have used goes on to work for op-
posing counsel.").
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cept an employment arrangement necessitating that they be "out
of the loop." And those willing to abide by such terms may con-
clude that temporary lawyering does indeed entail second class
professional status. Of course, it is risky to indulge in generaliza-
tions. Some persons undoubtedly enjoy the opportunity to work
in relative isolation from others, and much will depend upon the
individuals involved. Still, it would be unwise to ignore the fact
that quarantining temporary attorneys from the life of the law
firm carries potential disadvantages.
(c) Peripheral Involvement.-It is possible that a temporary
lawyer's engagement may be so limited that the attorney and the
attorney's subsequent employers will not acquire any new conflict
of interest "baggage" based upon that work.293  When an
attorney's assignment is limited to research on a technical point
of law or a procedural issue under circumstances in which that
work is unrelated to specific facts, courts have held that it is pos-
sible for the attorney to rebut the presumption that an attorney
acquires confidential information about the client on whose behalf
work is undertaken. 94 In addressing this point, although not fo-
cusing specifically on temporary lawyers, Professors Hazard and
Hodes state:
Rule 1.9 [the general former-client conflict of interest
rule] (again in common with the other conflict of interest
rules) operates only if the lawyer has, or has had, a
client-lawyer relationship with each affected client, or has been
in a position to acquire confidential information about them.
If a lawyer was only tangentially involved in the prior matter,
or merely engaged in perfunctory discussions about a case in
general or even hypothetical terms, it could be said that no
professional relationship- was actually established. If so, the
lawyer has not "represented" anybody in the matter, and
would be free to represent someone else, even without the
consent of the first individual. Similarly, a partner or associate
in a firm who has no knowledge of a particular client's affairs
293 See id. (Professor Monroe Freedman states "that if a lateral associate, or in this
case a temporary lawyer, had peripheral involvement in a case, there may not be suffi-
cient access [to client information] to warrant a firm's disqualification.").
294 See Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motors Corp. 518 F.2d 751, 756 (2nd
Cir. 1975) ("[T]here is reason to differentiate for disqualification purposes between law-
yers who become heavily involved in the facts of a particular matter and those who




has not "represented" that client .... [W]hen he leaves the
firm he will not be under the ban of Rule 1.9."
These rules should apply to temporary lawyers just as readily
as they apply to attorneys who seek to establish more lasting em-
ployment upon changing firms.
(d) Appearances of Impropriety under the Model Code.-Not all
states adhere to the Model Rules' position with respect to former-
client conflicts of interest in the context of movement between
firms. 29  In some jurisdictions, the issue has been framed as
whether there is an "appearance of impropriety." 297 Where that
standard, which was embraced by the now-superseded Model
Code of Professional Responsibility,298 is still retained, tempo-
rary attorneys may encounter greater conflicts difficulties than
must be faced under the Model Rules. 29 9 This is especially true
when, over a period of time, a lawyer has done stints with several
of the major firms in a city.s°° It may reasonably be anticipated
that in view of the increasing use of disqualification motions,"'1
a temporary lawyer and the lawyer's employer may be charged
with a conflict of interest in cases where there is no risk that the
confidences of a former client will be disclosed, but only an as-
serted appearance of impropriety. For example, a temporary
295 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 58, at 176.2 (emphasis and parentheses in
original).
296 See Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 51:202 (Supp. 1987) (discussing
deviations from Model Rule 1.9).
297 See id. at 51:203 ("Some courts have relied on the Model Code's proscription
against the appearance of impropriety.").
298 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1980).
299 A recent ABA ethics opinion states: "The Code does not address specifically
representation of a client with interests adverse to a former client, but the standards
relating to confidentiality and disqualification rules applied by the courts ordinarily
would prohibit representation of the second client under the Code in the same circum-
stances as under the Rules." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professonal Responsibility, For-
mal Op. 88-356 (1988). To the extent that the foregoing is read to mean that a conflict
of interest exists under the Code where an attorney seeks to represent a client in a
matter "substantially related" and "materially adverse" to a former client, it is unobjec-
tionable. It is likely, however, that the Code's appearance of impropriety standard would
also require disqualification in other cases not falling within those precisely defined stan-
dards. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 comment (1989).
300 See Berkman, supra note 61, at 24 ("Conflict of interest could become a hot issue
if a new class of temporary lawyer develops-one filled with lawyers who over time have
done stints with many of the major firms in a city.").
301 See Manning v. Waring, 849 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[A] motion to vicari-
ously disqualify the law firm of an attorney who is himself disqualified .. . is becoming
an increasingly popular litigation technique.").
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lawyer's former employer may allege that there is an appearance
of impropriety where the temporary accepts a subsequent assign-
ment from a firm which is serving as opposing counsel in a case
wholly unrelated to the work which the temporary attorney per-
formed for the former employer.30 2 The appearance of impro-
priety standard is so vague303 that such charges may be given
credence, even though there is no risk of a breach of client confi-
dences."0 4 If that is the case, firms may be unwilling to hire law-
yers on a temporary basis, since. the risk of disqualification carries
with it serious consequences for both law firm and client, in-
cluding delay, expense, and professional embarrassment.0 5 The
afiswer to this dilemma is not to discourage the use of temporary
lawyers. The answer is to abandon the appearance of impropriety
standard in favor of a different rule which, like the Model Rules,
realistically seeks to balance competing interests, including those
considerations.0 . favoring ethical accommodation of temporary
lawyers.
. (e) Screening of Disqualified Temporary Attorneys "Associated
.With" a Firm. -Another alternative, which is potentially applicable
regardless of whether a jurisdiction adheres to the Model Rules'
"actual knowledge of information" standard or to the Model
Code's "appearance of impropriety" view, is to permit "screening"
of temporary attorneys. "Screening" is a method whereby an at-
torney in no way participates in a particular matter as a lawyer or
adviser, supplies and receives no material information, and derives
no direct financial benefit from the representation.0°  The
302 See, e.g., Berkman, supra note 61, at 24 (Deborah Trotter, a San Francisco lawyer
working as a temporary for a sole practitioner, mentioned that her next assignment was
with a major firm. Her temporary boss replied that the firm happened to be opposing
counsel in a case unrelated to her work. He immediately threatened to disqualify the
firm, according to Trotter. She turned down the assignment.).
303 See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 196 at 319-22 (criticizing the appearance of impro-
priety standard and noting that it has been denounced by other commentators).
304 Cf. Berkman, supra note 61, at 24 ("According to Professor Monroe Freedman of
Hofstra University School of Law, the simple appearance of conflict of interest may be
cause for concern. 'You clearly have a conflict of interest situation,' he explains, when a
temporary lawyer moves on to a firm representing his old firm's opponent.").
305 See G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 58, at 177 (detailing the consequences).
306 See supra notes 192-249 and accompanying text.
307 See TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 comment 3,
rep2inted in TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. art. 10, sec. 9 (Vernon 1990) (discussing screening);
Moser, Chinese Walls: A Means of Avoiding Law Firm Disqualification When a Peisonally Dis-
qualified Lawyer Joins the Firm, 3 CEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 399, 410-11 (1990) (discussing
requirements for effective screening).
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screening mechanism-sometimes referred to as the erection of a
"Chinese wall" 3 08-as been approved in many jurisdictions as a
reasonable means of avoiding disqualification of an entire firm
based upon a conflict of one of its attorneys. The cases in which
screening-has been permitted have typically involved former gov-
ernment attorneys,3°9 judges, 10  law clerks,1  and neutral ar-
bitrators, 12 although there is some precedent which does not
fall within these -categories."'3 In general, these decisions have
recognized that a prior client's interest in continued confidentiali-
ty and loyalty must sometimes be protected by a means other
than the stringent disqualification rule. For example, in the for-
mer government attorney context, it is widely agreed that screen-
ing is appropriate, for any other rule would impose "too severe a
deterrent against entering public service." '14 That is, adherence
to the usual standards of imputed disqualification could disqualify
a former government attorney's firm from a much broader circle
of cases than is typically true with respect to non-governmental
representation, since the actions of government frequently touch
the lives of a great number of individuals. 15 As discussed earli-
er,-16 there are important interests to be advanced by temporary
lawyering, including enhanced institutional flexibility, rec6ncilia-
tion of the supply and demand for legal services, and accommo-
dation of the needs of individuals and firms. If this is the case,
308 See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 196, at 401.
309 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11(a) (1989). See also C.
WOLFRAM, supra note 196, at 401-02 ("The tentative judicial applause that has greeted
screening has been confined to a small handful of cases dealing with the arguably differ-
ent conflict of interest problems of former government lawyers.").
310 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.12(c) (1989).
311 See id.
312 See id.
313 See, e.g., Manning v. Waring, 849 F.2d 222, 226 (6th Cir. 1988); Nemours Found.
v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 632 F. Supp. 418, 428 (D. Del. 1986); NFC, Inc. v. General Nutri-
tion, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 332, 334-35 (D. Mass. 1983); Lemaire v. Texaco, Inc., 496 F.
Supp. 1308, 1310-11 (E.D. Tex. 1980). See generally Moser, supra note 307, at 399 (argu-
ing in favor of screening as "a more rational approach" to imputed disqualification); id.
at 406-10 (discussing the "growing number" of courts relying upon Chinese Walls in
cases involving lawyers and the use of Chinese Walls in non-lawyer professional con-
texts).
314 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 comment (1989).
315 See G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 58, at 210 ("Since government lawyers
become involved in so many 'matters' involving so many different citizens, barring the
entire firm of a former government lawyer would make such a lawyer virtually unemploy-
able in the private sector in areas of his or her technical competence. This in turn
would deter lawyers from entering government in the first place.").
316 See supra notes 192-249 and accompanying text.
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there is a reasonable foundation for the argument that screening
should be viewed as a permissible avenue for avoiding conflicts of
interest in the context of temporary legal employment. This posi-
tion has found support in the writings of respected legal ethics
commentators3 17 and in the language of a recent American Bar
Association ethics opinion.31 s In discussing the issue, the ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
wrote:
The basic question [with respect to conflicts of interest] is
under what circumstances a temporary lawyer should be treat-
ed as "associated in a firm" or "associated with a firm" [as
those terms are used in Model Rule 1.10] ....
... [A] temporary lawyer who works for a firm, in the
firm office, on a number of matters for different clients, under
circumstances where the temporary lawyer is likely to have ac-
cess to information relating to the representation of other firm
clients, may well be deemed to be "associated with" the firm
generally under Rule 1.10 as to all other clients of the firm
[and therefore the firm will be subject to imputed disqualifica-
tion], unless the firm, through accurate records or otherwise,
can demonstrate that the temporary lawyer had access to infor-
mation relating to the representation only of certain other
clients. If such limited access can be demonstrated, then the
temporary lawyer should not be deemed to be "associated
with" the firm under Rule 1.10 [and the firm should not be
subject to imputed disqualification under Rule 1.10(a)].319 Al-
so, if a temporary lawyer works with a firm only on a single
matter under circumstances like the collaboration of two inde-
317 See G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 58, at 196 ("This resolution seems
sound, and takes proper account of the twin principles involved in imputed disqualifica-
tion-guarding against leaked confidences and guarding against a disloyal switching of
sides.").
318 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356
(1988).
319 Model Rule 1.10(a) speaks in terms of a lawyer being "associated in" a firm. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT 'Rule 1.10(a) (1989) (emphasis added). To the
extent that Formal Opinion 88-356-which was promulgated prior to the 1989
amendments to the Model Rules (see supra note 285)-talks in terms of a lawyer being
"associated with" a firm, the opinion focuses on the language of subsections 1.10(b) (now
Model Rule 1.09(b)) and 1.10(c) (now 1.10(b)) of the former Rule. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1988) (emphasis added). However, the ABA opinion
recognized that there was "no substantive difference between the terms 'in' and 'with' in
the context of the Rule." (ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 88-356, at 4 n.5 (1988)). Therefore, it is appropriate to interpret the opinion as also
dealing with imputed disqualification under Rule 1.10(a).
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pendent firms on a single case, where the temporary lawyer
has no access to information relating to the representation of
other firm clients, the temporary lawyer should not be deemed
"associated with" the firm generally for purposes of Rule 1.10
[and the firm should not be subject to imputed disqualification
under Rule 1.10(a)]. This is particularly true where the tempo-
rary lawyer has no ongoing relationship with the firm and does
not regularly work in the firm's office under circumstances
likely to result in disclosure of information relating to the
representation of other firm clients.
As the direct connection between the temporary lawyer
and the work on matters involving conflicts of interest between
clients of two firms becomes more remote, it becomes more
appropriate not to apply Rule 1.10 to disqualify a firm from
representation of its clients or to prohibit the employment of
the temporary lawyer. Whether Rule 1.10 requires imputed
disqualification must be determined case by case on the basis
of all relevant facts and circumstances, unless disqualification is
clear under the Rules.
3 20
The issue of screening is somewhat different from the ques-
tion of whether an individual attorney has gained actual informa-
tion about the affairs of a client not personally served. "Screen-
ing," as the term is normally employed, refers t6 mechanisms
within a firm designed to ensure that confidential knowledge
possessed by an individual attorney has not been, and will not be,
shared with, or used for the benefit of, other attorneys in the
firm who represent a client whom the individual attorney could
not ethically represent. In contrast, whether an attorney has ac-
quired actual information about the affairs of another lawyer's
client relates not to the question of whether representation may
be undertaken while the attorneys are members of the same firm,
but whether representation may be undertaken, either by the
departing attorney or by the remaining attorneys, once the rela-
tionship between the attorneys has been severed. Undoubtedly,
there may be cases where an individual attorney within a firm is
320 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at 4-7
(1988) (footnote added). See also id. at 4 ("The question whether a temporary lawyer is
associated with a firm at any time must be determined by a functional analysis of the
facts and circumstances involved in the relationship between the temporary lawyer and
the firm consistent with the purposes of the Rule,"); New Jersey Informal Op. 632
(1989), supra note 178, at 394 (if a temporary lawyer is deemed to be "associated with"
the law firm, then under Rule 1.10 the firm may be restricted or prohibited from repre-
senting those clients who the temporary lawyer is restricted or prohibited from repre-
senting).
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so effectively quarantined that the attorney's colleagues are effec-
tively screened from any conflict affecting the individual attorney,
and the individual attorney gains no confidential information
about the clients of other attorneys in the firm. But, whether a
particular attorney is a "source" of confidential information is a
separate question from whether that attorney is positioned to
"receive" confidences. These questions must be treated separately,
even though the factors bearing upon these inquiries may over-
lap.3 21
2. Interests of Third Persons
A second potential conflict of interest faced by temporary
attorneys involves the exercise of influence by third persons. It is
generally agreed that a lawyer may not enter into any arrange-
ment in which third persons are permitted to interfere with the
lawyer's exercise of independent professional judgment on behalf
of a client. 22 Thus, it is uniformly recognized that a lawyer's fee
may not be paid secretly by a third person.3 23 Likewise, the di-
321 Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 comment (1989) (In dis-
cussing imputed disqualification, the commentary states: "[I]t is relevant in doubtful cases
to consider the underlying purpose of the Rule that is involved. A group of lawyers
could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not
represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes
of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another.").
322 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-21 (1980). MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1989). Model Rule 1.7, the general conflict of
interest rule, provides as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will
be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely
affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a
third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be ad-
versely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multi-
ple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall in-
clude explanation of the implications of the common representation
and the advantages and risks involved.
323 Model Rule 1.8(0 provides:
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one
other than the client unless:
(1) the client consents 'after consultation;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of profes-
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rectors of a legal services organization normally may not meddle
in the handling of particular cases by organization staff attorneys
if such cases fall within broad, previously established policy guide-
lines. 24
In the context of temporary lawyering, there is potential for a
third-person conflict of interest because a placement agency often
plays a roll in facilitating the provision of legal services. This po-
tential is all the more substantial because the temporary lawyer
may find it essential to remain in the good graces of the agency
in order to obtain repeated placements. 25 If the agency is per
mitted to influence the nature or extent of client representation,
then a lawyer acts unethically by participating in the arrangement.
Thus far, there is little indication that placement agencies
have any inclination to interfere in the work performed by the
attorneys they place in temporary positions. While the issue has
been addressed by various ethics committees3 6 and courts,
3 27
one is left with a sense that the problem is largely theoretical.
This may be due in part to the fact that most agencies are head-
ed by lawyers28 -persons cognizant of the applicable ethical
strictures-who are eager to win acceptance of temporary lawyer-
ing and are themselves subject to professional discipline. In the
usual case,329 once an employer has hired a temporary attorney,
the placement agency has little contact with either the employer
or the attorney, except in relation to the transfer of monies or
sional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as re-
quired by Rule 1.6.
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(f) (1989). The reason for the rule is
that "if a lawyer is compensated from a source other than his client, he may feel a
sense of responsibility to someone other than his client." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-22 (1984).
324 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974).
325 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356
(1988) (recognizing a "lawyer's need to maintain the goodwill of the placement agency");
NYC Bar Op. 1988-3 (1988), supra note 178, at 3 ("While the Agency may not as a
technical matter be the participating attorney's employer, it is nonetheless in a 'position
to bring pressure to bear on them by refusing to continue listing their services if they
do not accede to its demands.").
326 See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
88-356, at 13-14 (1988); New Jersey Informal Op. 632 (1989), supra note 178, at 394
(basing its analysis on the assumption that the placement agency has no ability to influ-
ence the manner in which the temporary attorney performs work for a firm).
327 See Oliver v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 779 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. 1989).
328 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
329 See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
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for purposes of ascertaining whether the placement has resulted
in any problems which the agency can resolve.
It would be improper for an agency to attempt to induce an
attorney to prolong an assignment, so that both the attorney and
the agency could earn greater fees, or to seek termination of an
assignment, so that the attorney could be directed to a more lu-
crative placement.330 As of yet, there are no indications that
such problems have occurred in the nascent enterprise of tempo-
rary lawyering.
3. Multiple Clients
Multiple-client conflicts of interest are often not a problem
because many temporary lawyers work for only one employer at a
time and are assigned to a single case by that employer. However,
when temporary attorneys are simultaneously engaged by different
firms, or work for a variety of clients while employed by one
firm, multiple-client conflicts of interest may arise. 3 In the lat-
ter case, such conflicts should be easy to identify, and the tempo-
rary attorney will be subject to the same standards that apply to
all attorneys in the firm. Under the general conflict of inter-
est and imputed disqualification3 s provisions of the Model
Rules, the temporary attorney may not, absent effective client con-
sent, represent a client whose interests are "directly adverse" to
the interests of any other client of any attorney in the firm.33 4
Under the parallel provisions in the Model Code, 35 the out-
come is essentially indistinguishable. 6
330 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356
(1988) (The agreement between a temporary attorney and placement agency "should
make clear in explicit terms that the agency will not exercise any control or influence
over the exercise of professional judgment by the lawyer, including limiting or extending
the amount of time the lawyer spends on work for the clients of the employing firm.").
331 See id. at 3 (discussing multiple client conflicts of interest arising from simulta-
neous work for different firms).
332 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1989).
333 See id. at Rule 1.10.
34 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at
3 (1988) ("[A] temporary lawyer could not, under Rule 1.7, work simultaneously on mat-
ters for clients of different firms if the representation of each were directly adverse to
the other (in the absence of client consent and subject to other conditions set forth in
the Rule).").
335 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1980).
336 See ABA Comm, on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at
3 (1988) ("[A] temporary lawyer could not, under DR 5-105, work simultaneously for cli-
ents of different firms with differing interests except as permitted by DR 5-105(C)."); id.
at 7 ("[The purpose of DR 5-105(D), the imputed disqualification provision of the Code,
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These same ethical constraints apply to multiple-client con-
flicts of interest arising from a temporary attorney's simultaneous
work for multiple firms.3 ' However, such conflicts may be more
difficult to avoid. Only by being apprised of the full range of
representation of each firm can a temporary attorney serving mul-
tiple firms ensure that no attorney in any of the firms is repre-
senting interests directly adverse to those represented by any oth-
er attorney in the firms. If such a conflict exists and the tempo-
rary attorney is treated as "associated" with the firms for purposes
of imputed disqualification, 38 then the temporary attorney, and
every other attorney in the firms in question, is subject to disqual-
ification, absent client consent or some provision for screening, in
connection with former client conflicts of -interest.3 39 Because
disqualification may impose a high cost on both law firms and cli-
ents, 34  a temporary attorney is well advised to avoid simulta-
neous employment by multiple firms, unless therie is no significant
chance of a multiple-client conflict of interest.
4. Interests of the Temporary Lawyer
A fourth area of attorney conflicts of interest involves con-
flicts between the interests of the client and the interests of the
attorney. These conflicts may take a variety of forms. They may
arise, for example, from the clash between attorney's pre-existing
economic, familial, or other personal interests and the objectives
of the client;341 from the attorney's legal or moral obligations to
coincides with the purpose of Rule 1.10. The Committee is of the opinion that the fore-
going functional analysis applies equally under DR 5-105(D).").
337 Cf. id.-at 3 (discussing simultaneous work for different firms).
338 See supra note 320 and accompanying text. See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at 7 (1988):
The distinction drawn between when a temporary lawyer is or is not associated
with a firm is only a guideline to the ultimate determination and not a set rule.
For example, if a temporary lawyer was directly involved in work on a matter
for a client of a firm and had knowledge of material information relating to the
representation of that client, it would be inadvisable for a second firm repre-
senting other parties in the same matter whose interests are directly adverse to
those of the client of the first firm to engage the temporary lawyer during the
pendency of the matter, even for work on other matters.
339 See supra notes 307-20.
340 See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
341 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1989) ("lawyer's own
interests"); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 80 (1984) ("A lawyer may not allow his or her professional judgment on be-
half of a client to be affected adversely by the lawyer's own financial, property, or other
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non-clients which threaten to impede the attorney's zealous repre-
sentation of the client;342 or from the fact that the attorney and
client plan to jointly participate in a business transaction in which
the interests of the two are potentially adverse.3 4' Usually prob-
lems within this category form a substantial portion of the ethics
of conflict of interest. Nevertheless, there is little reason to think
that the rules governing attorney-based conflicts will play a signifi-
cant role in the development of temporary lawyering.
While temporary attorneys undoubtedly must guard against
such conflicts while on assignment with a firm, the application of
ethical standards to these cases would appear to be straightfor-
ward. For example, if a temporary lawyer has a substantial finan-
cial interest which threatens to adversely affect the attorney's abili-
ty to represent a client of the employer-firm, the attorney must
decline the assignment-just as an attorney regularly employed by
the firm would have to forego the representation under similar
circumstances. As is the case with former-client conflicts of inter-
est and multiple-client conflicts of interests, the difficulties with
respect to attorney-based conflicts appear to relate primarily to
the application of the imputed disqualification rule. With limited
exceptions, 344 attorney-based conflicts normally may be imputed
to other attorneys in a firm. If, as discussed earlier,345 a tempo-
rary attorney is "associated" with a firm for purposes of conflict
personal interests.").
342 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1989) ("responsibilities
to . . . a third person").
343 See id. at Rule 1.8. Model Rule 1.8(a) provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or know-
ingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest ad-
verse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest
are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and trans-
mitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably
understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
344 Model Rule 1.8 is titled "Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions." These
transactions may reasonably be described as attorney-based conflicts, as distinguished
from conflicts involving multiple clients, former clients, or third parties. Not all of the
'prohibited transactions" addressed by Model Rule 1.8 are bases for imputed disquali-
fication. Model Rule 1.10(a) provides only that "[w]hile lawyers are associated in a firm,
none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone
would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1989).
345 See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 66:359
TEMPORARY LAWYERING
of'interest, then the temporary attorney must not only avoid any
conflict between the attorney's interests and those of the client
the attorney serves, but also any conflict with the interests of cli-
ents served by other attorneys in the firm. If the temporary attor-
ney cannot serve a client, it will generally be the case that other
members of the firm cannot serve that client.
Firms can deal with these difficulties by carefully determining
at the outset of the temporary employment, relationship whether
the interests of the temporary lawyer clash with the interests of
firm clients. An alternative course is to attempt to isolate the tem-
porary attorney from the work of the firm in which the attorney
is not personally involved. If courts accept the screening argument
discussed earlier in connection with former-client conflicts of in-
terest,s46 then it is possible to argue that a screened temporary
attorney is not "associated" with the firm for the purposes of im-
puted disqualification. Thus far, the opinions discussing the ethi-
cal permissibility of temporary legal services have not focused on
attorney-based conflicts as a matter of special concern.
E. Confidentiality
It is somewhat surprising that confidentiality has been singled
out by various ethics opinions34 7 and writers3 4 as a potential
area of concern with respect to the employment of temporary
lawyers. The rules governing client confidences operate essentially
the same in this context as in others. There is no reason to think
that temporary lawyers are more likely to breach their obligation
of confidentiality than regularly employed attorneys.
Absent special circumstances, a temporary lawyer is ,obliged
not to reveal confidential information obtained while working for
a client 49 or obtained about other firm clients during the
attorney's employment as a temporary lawyer.350 Moreover, un-
der the Model Rules,351  although not under the Model
346 See supra notes 307-321 and accompanying text
347 See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
88-356, at 7-9 (1988).
348 See, e.g., supra note 183.
349 See generally MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1989); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980);, ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at 7-8 (1988). See also Florida Op. 88-12
(1988), supra note 178, at 2 (A teniporary lawyer is ethically obligated to preserve in
confidence any information obtained in the course of representation.).
350 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at
8 (1988) (rule stated).
351 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1989) (The application of
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Code, 52 an attorney is prohibited from revealing information
"even if the lawyer's knowledge of the information did not arise
from the representation or through the firm and even if knowl-
edge was acquired before the lawyer-client relationship exist-
ed.135 ' To the extent that this additional obligation under the
Rules is significant (which, at the least, is difficult to predict in
the abstract), the question remains whether that obligation is im-
posed upon a temporary attorney with respect to all clients of an
employer-firm or only with respect to the clients personally served
by the temporary attorney. Quite sensibly, the ABA ethics com-
mittee has taken a position congruent with its approach to imput-
ed disqualification and has concluded that the answer "depends
upon the nature of the relationship between the temporary lawyer
and the firm.'"54 Formal Opinion 88-356 states:
[A] temporary lawyer who works for a firm, in the firm office,
on a number of matters for different clients, under- circum-
stances where the temporary lawyer is likely to have access to
information relating to the representation of other firm clients
ordinarily would be deemed to be "associated with" the firm as
to all other clients of the firm, unless through accurate records
or otherwise, it can be demonstrated that the temporary lawyer
had access to information relating to the representation only
of certain other clients. If such limited access cannot be dem-
onstrated, the temporary lawyer in that situation must not
disclose information relating to the representation of persons
known to the lawyer to be firm clients regardless of the source
of the information.
Under other circumstances, however, the relationship of
the firm with the temporary lawyer is more like the relation-
ship between a firm and a totally independent lawyer. This
ordinarily is the case where the temporary lawyer has been
screened from access to information relating to the representa-
tion of firm clients for whom the temporary lawyer is not
working, whether the temporary lawyer is working in the firm
Rule 1.6 does not depend upon the source of the information relating to the representa-
tion of a client.).
352 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980) (DR 4-101
protects only information subject to the attorney-client privilege and information "gained
in the professional relationship" which would be embarrassing or detrimental to the
client or that the client has asked be held inviolate, not information gained outside the
attorney client relationship).





office or not. In that situation, the temporary lawyer's obliga-
tions under Rule 1.6 are, in the Committee's opinion, limited
to not revealing (1) information relating to the representation
of any client for whom the temporary lawyer'is working, and
(2) information relating to the representation of other firm
clients only to the extent that the temporary lawyer in fact
obtains the information as a result of working with the
firm.355
A similar approach to the issue has been taken by the New Jersey
356 the7ethics committee 35' and the Kentucky Supreme Court. 57
F. Impermissible Fee Splitting
On more than one occasion, temporary lawyering has been
attacked on the ground that it involves an impermissible splitting
of fees."5 ' To intelligently address these charges, one must rec-
ognize that there are two different sets of fee splitting rules and
that these standards are animated by different considerations. The
first set of rules, the "attorney fee splitting rules," governs the
sharing of fees with attorneys outside of one's firm, and is argu-
ably relevant to those arrangements pursuant to- which an
employer-firm compensates a temporary attorney for providing
legal services. The second set of fee splitting rules, the "nonlawyer
fee splitting rules," prohibits the sharing of fees with nonlawyers,
and potentially impacts the compensation of placement agencies
for channeling attorneys to temporary positions.
355 Id.
356 See New Jersey Informal Op. 632 (1989), supra note 178, at 394 (Where a tempo-
rary attorney has access to information relating to the representation of clients other
than the matters on which the attorney is working, the temporary attorney must not
disclose information relating to the representation of persons known to be firm clients,
regardless of the source of the information. Where, however, the temporary attorney has
been screened from access to information relating to firm clients for whom the tempo-
rary attorney is not working, different rules apply and disclosure is prohibited only
where the information relates to a firm client served by the temporary attorney or where
the information was obtained as a result of working for the firm.).
357 See Oliver v. Board of Governors, Ky. Bar Ass'n, 779 S.W.2d 212, 219-20 (Ky.
1989) (extensively quoting with approval ABA Formal Op. 88-356).
358 See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
88-356, at 9-11 (1988); Florida Op. 88-12 (1988), supra note 178, at 3 (issue discussed);
New Jersey Informal Op. 632 (1989), supra note 178, at 394.
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1. Fee Splitting Among Lawyers and the Necessity of Obtaining
a Client's Consent to Employment of a Temporary Attorney
Under both the Model Code 59 and the Model Rules, 60
fee splitting with an outside lawyer is permissible only where the
client consents to the outside lawyer's involvement in the case
and the total fee is reasonable. In addition, the Model Code re-
quires that any such division be in proportion to the services per-
formed and the responsibility assumed. 6' This last requirement
has been considerably liberalized by the Model Rules, 62 which
provide that fee splitting is also permissible in any instance where
the client, even without knowledge of the relevant percentag-
es,363 consents in writing to a division of fees and each attorney
assumes joint responsibility for the representation.364
In the context of temporary lawyering, the significance of the
attorney fee splitting rules lies not in the fact that they impose a
reasonable fee requirement. Few would contend that, under any
circumstances, an attorney may charge an unreasonable fee. Nor
does their significance lie in the rules' possible imposition of a
proportionality str'icture. In the usual case, a temporary attorney
is paid an hourly salary and there should be little difficulty estab-
lishing that the amount of that payment is proportional to the
services rendered. The import of the attorney fee splitting rules is
that, if applicable to the employment of temporary lawyers, they
require the disclosure of such arrangements to clients and the
consent of those clients.
It is not difficult to imagine that, for any of a variety of rea-
sons, a firm may not want to disclose the fact that it is employing
a temporary lawyer to work on a client's case. Where the tempo-
rary attorney's term of employment will be brief, but will involve
,services benefiting multiple clients, a firm, simply may not want to
be troubled with securing informed consent from each of the
affected clients. A firm might also not want to reveal to clients
that it is presently overburdened and that it has been forced to
employ temporary legal talent, or that the recent defection of
several attorneys has left the firm seriously short staffed, or that
359 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107(A)(1), (3) (1980).
360 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e)(2), (3) (1989).
361 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107(A)(2) (1980).
362 See G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 58, at 85 ("more lenient view").
363 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 comment 4 (1989).
364 See id. at Rule 1.5(e)(1).
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an assignment requires expertise which the firm does not have.
Such issues will arise once disclosure is required to obtain client
consent.
Critical to determining whether the attorney fee splitting
rules apply to compensation of a temporary attorney is the lan-
guage of the provisions. Model Rule 1.5(e) states that the require-
ments of that Rule apply to a "division of a fee between lawyers
who are not in the same firm." 65 Similarly, Disciplinary Rule
2-107(A) of the Model Code states that it governs an attorney's
sharing of a "fee for legal services with another lawyer who is not
a partner in or associate of his firm or law office,""' which Eth-
ical Consideration 2-22 interprets as prohibiting unconsented shar-
ing of fees by an attorney with "another lawyer outside of his
firm." 6v A 1988 American Bar Association ethics opinion deal-
ing with temporary lawyeis states, in its discussion of DR 2-107(A)
and EC 2-22, that "where a temporary lawyer is working un-
der ... close firm supervision . . . , such employment does not
involve 'association with a lawyer outside the firm' within the
meaning of this Ethical Consideration."86  Therefore, presum-
ably, the Model Code's attorney fee splitting rules do not apply in
cases of "close supervision." The result would likely be the same
under the Model Rules, for the opinion expressly notes that the
"underlying purposes of the [Model Rules and Model Code] provi-
sions and their functional analyses are similar."3 69 The signifi-
cance of "close supervision" is illuminated by a passage in the
opinion which states:
The Committee is of the opinion that where the tempo-
rary lawyer is performing independent work for a client with-
out the close supervision of a lawyer associated with the law
firm, the client must be advised of the fact that the temporary
lawyer will work on the client's matter and the consent of the
client must be obtained. This is so because the dient, by re-
taining the firm, cannot reasonably be deemed to have con-
sented to the involvement of an independent lawyer. On the
other hand, where the temporary lawyer is working .under the
direct supervision of a lawyer associated with the firm, the fact
365 Id. Rule 1.5(e).
366 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107(A) (1980).
367 Id. at EC 2-22.
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that a temporary lawyer will work on the client's matter will
not ordinarily have to be disclosed to the client. A client who
retains a firm expects that the legal services will be rendered
by lawyers and other personnel closely supervised by the firm.
Client consent to the involvement of firm personnel and the
disclosure to those personnel of confidential information neces-
sary to the representation is inherent in the act of retaining
the firm.3
7 0
The ABA opinion's position on the "outside" lawyer requirement
in attorney fee splitting is in many respects consistent with its ap-
proach,7' to the issue of whether a temporary attorney should
be regarded as "associated" with a firm for purposes of imputed
disqualification. In other words, the resolution of the issue de-
pends not upon satisfaction of a "bright line" test, but rather a
more flexible inquiry taking into account the nature and circum-
stances of the services performed, particularly those facts which
demonstrate or disprove that the attorney acted independently
from other lawyers in the firm. If an attorney enjoys a high de-
gree of independence in furnishing legal services, under the ABA
approach the temporary attorney is treated as the equivalent of
an "outside" lawyer, and the attorney's participation in the repre-
sentation must be approved by the client. In contrast, if the tem-
porary attorney's work is subject to close supervision by lawyers in
the firm, disclosure and consent are not required.
The ABA opinion complicates the analysis of the attorney fee
splitting issue by stating:
Assuming that a law firm simply pays the temporary lawyer
reasonable compensation for the services performed for the
firm and does not charge the payments thereafter to the client
as a disbursement, the firm has no obligation to reveal to the
client the compensation arrangement with the temporary law-
yer. Rule 1.5(e), relating to division of fees between lawyers,
does not apply in this instance because the gross fee the client
pays the firm is not shared with the temporary lawyer. The
payments to the temporary lawyer are like compensation paid
to nonlawyer employees for services and could also include a
percentage of firm net profits without violation of the Rules or
the predecessor Code. See ABA Informal Opinion 1440 (1979).
If, however, the arrangement between the firm and the
temporary lawyer involves a direct division of the actual fee
370 Id.
371 See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
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paid by the client, such as percentage, division of a contingent
fee, then Rule 1.5(e)(1) requires the consent of the client and satis-
faction of the other requirements of the Rule regardless of the extent
of the supervision.'7 2
These statements, in particular the last quoted ientence, may
be read to suggest that the ABA Committee endorsed the view
that the rules on attorney fee splitting are applicable to "inside"
(i.e., closely supervised) attorneys who are compensated on a per-
centage basis. Such a reading "would be inconsistent with Model
Rule 1.5(e), which, by its very terms, is applicable only to "lawyers
who are not in the same firm."373 To -avoid this dilemma, the
preferable course is to interpret the ABA opinion as providing
that, for purposes of the attorney fee splitting rules, a temporary
attorney is best treated as a member of a different firm either
when the attorney is not closely supervised, or when the attorney
has a special financial stake in the litigation aside from any inter-
est in fair compensation for services performed. If so interpreted,
the "outside" attorney requirement is satisfied. The disclosure and
client consent requirements are then likely to apply in those cases
where it is probable that clients will have the greatest interest in
scrutinizing the temporary attorney's involvement: namely, cases
where the temporary attorney may have a substantial impact on
the client's affairs, due to the lack of'supervision, or where the
temporary attorney's judgment might be unreasonably clouded by
financial self-interest based on the temporary attorney's stake in
any profit arising from the representation. As such, the proffered
interpretation is. consistent with the policies underlying the attor-
ney fee splitting rules, which in part seek to ensure that a client
has an opportunity to decide who will provide legal representa-
tion.37 4 The proposed reading is also 'consistent with Model Rule
372 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at 10
(1988) (emphasis added).
373 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (1989).
374 Five potential justifications for the'attorney fee splitting rules, not all of which
are persuasive, are discussed in Ethical Limitations on Creative Financing, supra note 1, at
553-55 & n.55 ((1) avoidance of unnecessary increases in the cost of legal services; (2)
protection of an attorney's exclusive right to a fee; (3) avoidance of unnecessary "com-
mercialization" of the profession; (4) prevention of "stirring up" of litigation; and (5)
assurance that the client knows who will 'be working on his or her case). The attorney
fee splitting rules' salutary objective of providing a client with notice of who will do the
client's work and be privy to the client's secrets has been recognized by court decisions
(see, e.g., Fontenot & Mitchell v. Rozas, 425 So.2d 259, 261 (La. Ct. App. 1982), cert.
denied, 432 So. 2d 268 (La. 1983)) and underlies other rules of ethics (see ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at 9-10 (1988) ("[T]he un-
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1.4, which states that an attorney has an obligation to take reason-
able steps to ensure that a client has "sufficient information to
participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of
the representation and the means by which they are to be pur-
sued. 3
75
The ABA opinion, however, also includes expressions which
suggest that compensation of a temporary lawyer will rarely, if
ever, threaten to violate the attorney fee splitting rules. The opin-
ion states in part: "[A]bsent a division with the temporary lawyer
of the actual fee paid by the client to the firm, the client need
not be informed of the financial arrangement with the temporary
lawyer under the Model Code since it does not involve a division
of the gross fee between lawyers.3' When read together with
other portions of the opinion,37 7 this sentence strongly suggests
that the payment of an hourly fee to a temporary attorney for
services performed does not qualify as "fee splitting" within either
the Model Rules or the Model Code. Thus, regardless of whether
the temporary attorney is treated as an attorney "outside" the
firm, there may be no sharing of fees that require disclosure of
the arrangement and client consent. Indeed, under the ABA inter-
pretation, it seems probable that the attorney fee splitting rules
will pose only a minor obstacle to the development of temporary
lawyering, limited in application to those cases where the tempo-
rary attorney receives some portion of the gross fee paid by the
client, which portion is not determined on an hourly or per diem
basis.
However, even if the attorney fee splitting rules do not man-
date disclosure, disclosure may be warranted on other ethical or
derlying policy [of Rule 7.5(d) is] that a client is entided to know who or what entity is
representing the client.")).
375 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.4 comment (1989). See also id.
at Rule 1.2(a) (discussing the obligation to consult a client about the means by which
the objectives of the representation are pursued).
376 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at
11 (1988).
377 See supra note 372 and accompanying text (stating in part: "Rule 1.5(e), relating
to division of a fee between lawyers, does not apply in this instance because the gross
fee the client pays the firm is not shared with the temporary lawyer. The payments to
the temporary lawyer are like compensation paid to nonlawyer employees for services
and could also include a percentage of firm net profits without violation of the Rules or
the predecessor Code."). See also NYC Bar Op. 1989-2 (1989), supra note 178, at 171
(Since the agency unquestionably provides services in locating, recruiting, screening, and
placing temporary lawyers and those services are not legal services, the compensation
paid by the law firm to the agency for those services is not a legal fee within the mean-
ing of DR 3-102(A), regardless of whether the agency's fee is fixed or proportionate to
the temporary attorney's compensation.).
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prudential grounds. One state, Kentucky, has rejected the
supervision-based distinctions set forth in the ABA opinion. In
their place, Kentucky "recommend[s]":
disclosure to the client of the firm's inltention, whether at the
commencement or during the course of representation, to use
a temporary attorney service on the client's case, in any capaci-
ty, in order to allow the client to make an intelligent decision
whether or not to consent to such an arrangement."78
The Florida ethics committee also requires disclosure whenever
"the client would likely consider the information material." 79
Similarly, the New York City ethics committee has held that dis-
closure is required under DR 7-102 of the Code. which provides
that except with the consent of the client, a lawyer shall not ac-
cept compensation from one other than the client."8 ' Whether
or not disclosure is mandatory under 'any of these rationales, a
course of action-such as full disclosure-which treats clients as
intelligent, independent agents, and which enables them to decide
their own affairs, has considerable merit.
2. Fee Splitting With Nonlawyers
With limited exceptions not here relevant,... both the Mod-
el Rules3 s2. and the Model Code... prohibit an attorney from
splitting fees with a nonlawyer. These rules are primarily intended
to protect the lawyer's independent professional judgment from
interference by nonlawyers who are motivated by financial
self-interest and not bound by the ethical obligations of attor-
neys.384 The rules also help to ensure that the total fee paid by
378 Oliver- v. Board of Governors, Ky. Bar Ass'n, 779 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Ky. 1989).
379 Florida Op. 88-12 (1988), supra note 178, at 3.
380 See NYC Bar Op. 1988-3 (1988), supra note 178, at 6.
381 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(a)(1), (2) (1989) and MOD-
EL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY DR 3-102(A)(1), (2) (1980) (the death of a
lawyer); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(a)(3) (1989) and MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-102(A)(3) (1980) (compensation or retire-
ment plans for nonlawyer employees).
382 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1989).
383 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-102(A) (1980).
384 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 comment (1989);
Grassman v. State Bar, 18 Cal. 3d 125, 553 P.2d 1147, 132 Cal. Rptr. 675 (1976) ("pro-
hibited fee splitting between lawyer and layman ... poses the possibility of control by
the lay person, interested in his own profit, rather than the client's fate").
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a client is not unreasonably high38 5 and that nonlawyers do not
engage in the practice of law.386
An agreement which compensates a temporary attorney place-
ment agency other than by paying a flat fee 387 may run afoul of
the nonlawyer fee splitting rules. 8 As noted earlier,8 9 in ex-
change for their "match-making" services, agencies normally are
paid an amount which varies according to the length of the tem-
porary attorney's placement. Typically, that amount is either a
percentage of the hourly fee earned by the temporary attorney or
a flat fee per hour unrelated to the amount of the temporary
attorney's compensation. In such cases, the agency's compensation
is equivalent to a percentage of the temporary lawyer's hourly
salary.
In addressing the nonlawyer fee splitting issue in the context
of temporary lawyering, the ABA ethics committee has taken the
position that:
[A]n arrangement whereby a law firm pays to a temporary
lawyer compensation in a fixed dollar amount or at an hourly
rate and pays a placement agency a fee based upon a percent-
age of the lawyer's compensation[] does not involve the shar-
ing of legal fees by a lawyer with a nonlawyer in violation of
Rule 5.4 or DR 3-102(A) of the Code."'0
This conclusion has been accepted by some authorities 391
and rejected by others. 92 While there are good arguments to
385 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1440
(1979) (justification asserted). But see G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 58, at
471-472.1 (arguing that the prohibition against fee splitting with nonlawyers may be root-
ed in economic protectionism).
386 See Comment, Fee Splitting With Nonlauoyers, 12 J. LEGAL PROF. 139, 143 (1987).
387 See Florida Op. 88-12 (1988), supra note 178, at 3 (indicating that violations of
the nonlawyer fee splitting rules may be avoided if a placement agency charges customer
firms a flat fee); NYC Bar Op. 1988-3 (1988), supra note 178, at 5 (same); NYC Bar Op.
1988-3-A (1988), supra note 178, at 1 (same).
388 See, e.g., New Jersey Informal Op. 632 (1989), supra note 178, at 394 (discussing
issue); Florida Op. 88-12 (1988), supra note 178, at 3 (finding violation).
389 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
390 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at
12 (1988).
391 See District of Columbia Op. 39 (1977), supra note 55, at para. 10.738 ("Proceed-
ing on the assumption that the referred lawyer becomes an employee of the hiring law
firm or lawyer, even though a temporary or part-time one, there is no sharing of legal
fees with a layman. The referred lawyer is paid a salary, based on an hourly rate, from
which a fixed part is paid to the agency. A fee is what a lawyer charges a client and is
not a salary paid to an employee who does a part or all of some work.")
392 See Florida Op. 88-12 (1988), supra note 178, at 3 (If nonlawyers are involved in
the ownership 'or management of the placement agency, a billing system which charges a
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support the conclusion, the reasoning offered by the ABA com-
mittee is not entirely persuasive. The committee states, in support
of its position: I
There is a distinction between the character of the compensa-
tion paid to the lawyer and the compensation paid to the
placement agency. The temporary lawyer is paid by the law
firm for the services the lawyer performs under supervision of
the firm for a client of the firm. The placement agency is com-
pensated for locating, recruiting, screening and providing the
temporary lawyer for the law firm just as agencies are compen-
sated for placing with law firms nonlawyer personnel (whether
temporary or permanent).3 93
This arguably explains why a* temporary lawyer may not be
charged with impermissibly sharing fees with: a nonlawyer, even
when a placement agency receives monies from an employer-firm
intended to compensate both the temporary lawyer and the agen-
cy. The portion of the total amount received by the agency that
was intended by the employer-firm to cover the agency's place-
ment services was never a legal fee belonging to the temporary
lawyer. Consequently, the temporary lawyer could not be charged
with impermissibly sharing a fee with the agency by allowing the
agency to retain that portion of the total- monies, received by the
agency which was intended to compensate placement services.
However, the nonlawyer fee splitting issue may be viewed
from a different perspective-namely whether the employer-firm has
impermissibly split its fee with the ,placement agency. If it has done so,
then lawyers in the employer-firm may be subject to discipline. More-
over, if the temporary attorney has knowingly facilitated the arrange-
ment, that attorney might also be charged with wrongdoing for having
engaged in "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice."3' This distinction is not sufficient to preclude a finding that a
placement agency shares in the fees of the employer firm. In other
words, the fact that the agency is not being compensated for providing
legal services is irrelevant to the, issue of whether the firm has
impermissibly shared its fees with the agency. The ABA opinion further
provides:
certain amount per hour, with only a portion of that amount being paid to the lawyer,
must be considered an 'impermissible splitting of fees'with nonlawyers.).
393 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and ProfessionalResponsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at
12 (1988).
394 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(d) (1989); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5) (1980).
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Moreover, even assuming there is a total amount com-
prised of a lawyer's compensation and the placement agency
fee that is split, the total is not a "legal fee" under the com-
monly understood meaning of the term. A legal fee is paid by
a client to a lawyer. Here the law firm bills the client and is
paid a legal fee for services to the client. The fee paid by the
client to the firm ordinarily would include the total paid the
[temporary] lawyer and the agency, and may also include
charges for overhead and profit. There is no direct payment of
a "legal fee" by the client to the temporary lawyer or by the
client to the placement agency out of which either pays the
other. 9 5
This language may explain why a temporary lawyer typically'can-
not be charged with impermissibly sharing a fee with a nonlawyer,
but it does not explain why an employer-firm may not be charged
with violating the same prohibition. If viewed from the latter per-
spective, the statements seem to suggest that the amount paid to
a placement agency by a law firm is not paid as a legal fee, and
therefore there is no impermissible sharing of fees, because the
payment does not flow from the client directly to the placement
agency.
Surely this is not correct. The nonlawyer fee splitting rules
are limitations on the action of a "lawyer or law firm";39 they
are not restrictions on the conduct of a client. To hold that for
these rules to be violated a payment must flow from the client to
the placement agency without passing through the hands of the
firm would mean that it is only possible for lawyers in a firm to
run afoul of the nonlawyer fee splitting rules by acting indirectly.
Such a requirement would serve no purpose, particularly in the
absence of supporting statutory language. Moreover, such an in-
terpretation would be inconsistent with the ABA's position on the
attorney fee splitting rules. As discussed earlier, 9 7 if a firm pays
a temporary lawyer a percentage of its gross fee, there is an im-
permissible splitting of fees. Likewise, if a similar percentage of
the firm's gross fee is paid to the placement agency, the payment
should be regarded as the sharing of a fee, regardless of the fact
that the payment is disbursed by the employer-firm rather than
the ultimate client.
395 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at
12 (1988).
396 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(a) (1989); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-102(A) (1980).
397 See supra note 372 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, the ABA. Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility is correct in concluding that the nonlawyer fee
splitting rules should not prohibit a payment to a placement agen-
cy based on a percentage of a temporary lawyer's compensation.
First, the policies underlying the rule are inapplicable to such
arrangements. As the ABA Committee's opinion correctly states,
"the [principal] rationale for the rule forbidding the sharing of
legal fees with nonlawyers, the maintenance of the lawyer's profes-
sional independence, does not support the view that these ar-
rangements involve [impermissible] fee splitting." 98 Such ar-
rangements confer upon agencies no special ability or significant
incentive to interfere with a firm's exercise of judgment concern-
ing the representation of affected clients. Theoretically, an agency
might hope to prolong a temporary attorney's placement with a
firm, since the longer the placement, the greater the agency's
compensation for facilitating the match. But, it is probable that
any such temptation is more than offset by the fact that most
agencies are run by lawyers who are personally subject to profes-
sional discipline for interfering with another attorney's relation-
ship with a client. 9
The other policies underlying the nonlawyei fee splitting
rules-prevention of unauthorized practice400 and avoidance of
unreasonable fees40°-also do not warrant the application of the
nonlawyer fee splitting rules to arrangements compensating an
agency based on a percentage of the temporary lawyer's compen-
sation. There is little risk that an agency will engage in unautho-
rized practice of law since such agencies typically have no contact
with firm clients and only limited contact, if any, with either the
employer-firm or the temporary attorney once a placement has
been arranged.02 In addition, because temporary lawyering is
"an efficient and cost-effective way for law firms to manage their
398 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at 11
(1988).
399 Presumably such actions would qualify as conduct prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(d) (1989); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5) (1980). Of course, if there are no
nonlawyers involved in the operation of the placement agency, it might successfully be
argued that the nonlawyer fee splitting rules are wholly inapplicable to issues involving
compensation of the agency. See Florida Op. 88-12 (1988), supra note 178, at the 331
(accepting the argument).
400 See supra note 387 and accompanying text.
401 See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
402 See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
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workflow and deployment of resources,"" 3 there is little risk
that such arrangements will unreasonably increase the cost of
legal services. "There is no reason to assume that the actual cost
to the law firm of the temporary lawyer hired through an agency
(and consequently the impact on the fee to the client) would be
higher than the cost of that lawyer's services hired direct by the
firm, without the intervention of a placement agency.
'40 4
Relying upon a similar analysis of the interference and cost-
containment policies discussed above, at least three state ethics
committees have concluded, in agreement with the ABA Commit-
tee, that the payment of a placement fee to an agency based on a
percentage of the temporary attorney's compensation does not
result in impermissible fee splitting with a nonlawyer. °5
Arrangements'which provide for an agency to be paid a per-
centage of the temporary lawyer's compensation are essentially
indistinguishable from other professional practices that do not
run afoul of applicable rules of attorney conduct. As the ABA
Ethics Committee has stated,
There is no meaningful difference between the practice of
lawyer placement agencies charging a fee to a law firm for
recruiting a permanent associate or partner, which often is a
percentage of the lawyer's first year compensation (a practice
not challenged), and a fee based on the temporary lawyer's
actual compensation paid over a period of less than a
year."°
In addition, similar arrangements are used with respect to perma-
nent or temporary employment of nonlawyers °7 As to the rea-
sonableness of the total fee to each client on whose matters the
temporary lawyer works, "the case is no different than that of a
law firm hiring a temporary secretary or other temporary help
through an agency."408
403 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at 12
(1988). See also supra notes 234-249 and accompanying text.
404 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at 12
(1988).
405 See New Jersey Informal Op. 632 (1989), supra note 178, at -394; NYC Bar Op.
1989-2 (1989), supra note 178, at 171; DC Bar Op. 39 (1977), supra note 55, at
10.738. See also Oliver v. Board of Governors, Ky. Bar Ass'n, 779 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Ky.
1989).
406 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at 12
(1988) (parentheses in original).
407 Id. at 11.
408 See id. at 12.,
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Compensation arrangements with some placement services
have been structured so that the employer-firm pays the tempo-
rary attorney directly for the legal work performed and then sepa-
rately pays the placement agency an amount proportional to the
temporary attorney's expected compensation. 409 The Connect-
icut41 ethics committee has concluded that this arrangement for
separately negotiating and paying the fees of the recruiting agency
and the temporary lawyer precludes the possibility of a fee split-*
ting issue arising. On similar grounds, the New York City ethics
committee requires that the agreement between the placement
agency and the law firm separately state the fee paid to the agen-
cy and identify that fee as compensation for the agency's servic-
es. 411 Such action, the committee reasons, will guard against the
possibility that a placement agency might indirectly share in a
legal fee. The New York City committee also requires that if a
firm plans to bill a client for the costs of temporary legal services,
rather than absorb those costs in overhead, the costs must be
separately stated for the client, like other disbursements for
non-legal services, and not included in the legal fee charged by
the firm to the client.
4 12
The Supreme Court of Kentucky has endorsed a separate
payment approach, but not for fee splitting reaons.413 The Ken-
tucky court concluded that an arrangement whereby a temporary
attorney is paid by the placement agency has "the potential to
jeopardize the professional independence of the temporary attor-
ney rendering legal services to the ultimate client."4 14 Citing
Model Rule 5.4(c), which provides that a "lawyer shall not permit
a person who . . . pays the lawyer to render legal services for an-
other to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judg-
ment,"" 5 the court stated that "an attorney's primary loyalty
will, as a practical matter, rest with the person or entity who pays
him."416 In support of that conclusion, the court quoted the eth-
ics committee of the New York City Bar:
The temporary placement agency may well seek to extend the
time a lawyer spends on. a particular matter or, alternatively, to
have the lawyer finish one project quickly so that the lawyer is
409 See Connecticut Informal Op. 88-15 (1988), supra note 178, at 1.
410 See id.
411 See NYC Bar Op. 1989-2 (1989), supra note 178, at 171.
412 See id.
413 Oliver v. Board of Governors, Ky. Bar Ass'n, 779 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Ky. 1989).
414 Id. at 215.
415 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1989).
416 Oliver, 779 S.W.2d at 215.
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available to undertake a more lucrative project. The agency's
position on such matters would be influenced chiefly by prof-
its, not by the client's interests. 17
The Kentucky court nevertheless found that "no adverse impact
upon the temporary lawyer's independent professional judgment
in the lawyer's work for the law firm ... [would result] from
payment of a placement agency fee as a percentage of or in pro-
portion to the lawyer's compensation.""4 1 Whether other courts
would reach the same conclusions-namely, that the employer
firm must pay the temporary lawyer and the placement agency
separately, but that no problem arises from the fact that the agen-
cy receives an amount equivalent to a percentage of the lawyer's
compensation-is at least open to question. It would seem that
the danger, if any, of an agency seeking to prolong or shorten
the length of a particular placement arises from the fact that the
agency's compensation is tied to the length of the placement, not
from the fact that the temporary lawyer's compensation may be
routed through the hands of the placement agency.
While a separate payment arrangement may chart a safe
course, such artificial segregation of the compensation of an agen-
cy and a temporary lawyer would not appear to be required by
the nonlawyer fee splitting provisions of either the Model Code
or the Model Rules. So long as the agency and the temporary
attorney ultimately receive the amounts to which they are entitled,
no principle of legal ethics is offended by allowing a placement
agency to collect on a temporary attorney's behalf the amounts
which that attorney is dpe. Nor are there persuasive reasons to
preclude an employer-firm from transmitting to a placement agen-
cy both the agency's fee and the temporary lawyer's compensation
by means of a single check.
V. GUIDELINES: CHARTING A CONSERVATIVE COURSE
While there is considerable risk in attempting to reduce a
complex and relatively uncharted area of legal ethics to a simple
set of guidelines, the following suggestions begin to define a con-
servative course for the benefit of those ,attorneys who wish to
participate in arrangements for temporary legal services with mini-
mal risk of professional discipline or related sanctions. This list of
417 Id. (quoting NYC Bar Op. 1988-3 (1988), supra note 178).
418 Id. (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsiblility, Formal Op.
88-3556, at 12 (1988)).
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guidelines is not comprehensive and does nothing more than
identify the more important considerations in this field of legal
ethics. As in so many areas of law practice, the best course is for
the individuals involved in the temporary lawyering enterprise to
clearly spell out in writing the rights and responsibilities of the
parties.4 19
Attorneys serving as temporary lawyers should:
(1) ensure that any agreement between the temporary
attorney and a placement agency makes "clear in explicit terms
that the agency will not exercise any control or influence over
the exercise of independent professional judgment by the law-
yer, including limiting or extending the amount of time the
lawyer spends on work for the clients of the employing
firm;"
4 20
(2) arrive at a clear and definite understanding with the
employer firm concerning the terms and conditions of employ-
ment, including the anticipated extent of involvement in, or
access to, information concerning the affairs of firm cli-
ents;
421
(3) "observe strict confidentiality regarding any informa-
tion obtained in the course of temporary employment"
42
and clearly apprise the placement agency of this obligation;
(4) "maintain a record of clients -and matters worked
on;" 423 and(5) if working for multiple firms simultaneously, "make
every effort to avoid exposure within those firms to any infor-
mation relating to clients on whose matters the temporary
lawyer is not working."
424
419 See NYC Bar Op. 1988-3 (1988), supra note 178, at 5 (recommending that guide-
lines be memorialized in a written agreement between the agency and the temporary
lawyer).
420 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at
13-14 (1988). See also, Oliver v. Board of Governors, Ky. Bar Ass'n, 779 S.W.2d 212,
215-16 (Ky. 1989) (adopting ABA opinion language). Florida Op. 88-12 (1988), supra note
178, at 2 (a temporary lawyer's contract with a placement agency must specify that that
lawyer cannot permit the agency to control the lawyer's exercise of independent profes-
sional judgment).
421 See Marcotte, supra note 69, at 30 ("it's important for the [law firm] client and
[the temporary] lawyer to have a detailed understanding of what the obligations ire at
the outset").
422 Oliver, 779 S.W.2d at 213 (describing practice).
423 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at 7
(1988). See also New Jersey Informal Op. 632 (1989), supra note 178, at 394 (it is incum-
bent upon temporary attorneys to maintain complete and accurate records of all matters
on which the temporary attorney does work); Oliver, 779 S.W.2d at 213.
424 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at 7
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Law firms employing temporary attorneys should:
(1) prior to hiring a temporary lawyer, fully inquire into
conflicts of interest which might arise based on that lawyer's
prior or present work for other clients or firms,425 and re-
frain from hiring any temporary attorney if employment would
place that attorney in a conflicts position;426 -
(2) in any case where there is reason to think that a client
might object to the employment of a temporary lawyer, "ob-
tain the client's consent and provide information on the
lawyer's former affiliations;"
427
(3) "to the extent practicable, screen each temporary law-
yer from all information relating to clients for whom the tem-
porary lawyer does not work;"428
(4) "maintain a complete and accurate record of all mat-
ters on which each temporary lawyer works;"429 and
(5) "make certain that the compensation received by the
temporary lawyer, whether paid directly by the firm to the
lawyer or paid by the placement agency to the lawyer from
sums which the firm pays the agency, is adequate to satisfy the
firm that it may expect the work to be performed competently
for the firm's clients"4sM and that the lawyer is competent to
handle the matters assigned.4"'
(1988).
425 Cf. Id. (Where a temporary lawyer works for two firms, "[t]he second firm should
make appropriate inquiry and should not hire the temporary lawyer or use the tempo-
rary lawyer on, a matter if doing so would disqualify the firm from continuing its repre-
sentation of a client on a pending matter."); Florida Op. 88-12 (1988), supra note 178, at
330 (a firm should not attempt to hire a temporary lawyer if doing so would place the
lawyer in a conflict position).
426 See Florida Op. 88-12 (1988), supra note 178, at 2 (recognizing such a duty).
427 Berkman, supra note 61, at 24 (attributing advice to Professor Monroe Freed-
man).
428 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at 7
(1988).
429 Id. See also New Jersey Informal Op. 632 (1989), supra note 178, at 394 (it is in-
cumbent upon firms to maintain complete and accurate records of all matters on which
each temporary attorney does work); Oliver v. Board of Governors, Ky. Bar Ass'n, 779
S.W.2d at 213.
430 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356, at 14
(1988); Oliver, 779 S.W.2d at 216 (adopting ABA opinion language).
431 See NYC Bar Op. 1988-3 (1988), supra note 178, at 6 (stating guideline). Cf Flori-
da Op. 88-12 (1988), supra note 178, at 2 (recommending that the contract between the
placement agency and the temporary lawyer should state that the lawyer will not be




As society matures, expectations concerning acceptable profes-
sional conduct change to reflect the emerging needs of society
and its willingness and ability to devote resources to those needs.
Thus, professional conduct which at one time and place" might
have been deemed unobjectionable may come to be regarded as
unethical." 2 Similarly, conduct previously considered beyond the
pale of acceptability may develop into the professional norm.433
In resolving questions of professional ethics, it is important
to be sensitive to the evolving context in which these issues arise.
The propriety of temporary lawyering can only be determined in
light of both the on-going transformation of the legal profession
and the basic changes in the American workforce which have
recently taken place.
One might confidently assert, as certain jurists have, that
"there is no convincing evidence that the temporary [lawyer] em-
ployment service is needed or of any benefit to the ublic or the
legal profession;""' that there is "no reason to believe that the
traditional method used by new attorneys to approach law firms
seeking employment requires intervention by a profit-making
placement agency;"4 5 and that there is no basis for concluding
that attorneys who have "limited time or who wish to restrict
their legal associations can[not] do so freely on an individual basis
as they have done for centuries." '436 One might also indignantly
charge that agencies placing temporary attorneys "reduce the
professional image of lawyers and cheapen[] the sacred responsi-
bility of lawyer to client."43 7 Such claims, however, ignore the
realities of practicing law in an ever-more-competitive profession
432 An excellent example is the changing standards with respect to political activity
by members of the judiciary. Whereas it was once the case that sitting judges frequently
engaged in such conduct (see B. MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION:
THE SECRET POLITICAL ACTIvIIES OF TWO SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (1982) (surveying
Justices in politics from 1789 to 1916)), the same types of activity are now broadly pro-
hibited in virtually every jurisdiction (see CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (1972)).
433 The metamorphosis of the ethical standards, applicable to lawyer advertising is a
classic example. See generally Wallace & McKelvey, Regulating Lawyer Advertising, 18 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 761 (1987).
434 Oliver, 779 S.W.2d at 221 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting in an opinion in which
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which now numbers more than three-quarters of a million mem-
bers. These claims further fail to recognize the difference between
an innovation which is "cheap" and one which is cost efficient, or
the fact that the legal profession's "image" might well be im-
proved by the adoption of practices which are characterized by
flexibility and willingness to accommodate the needs of the indi-
vidual. In short, such views represent an approach to legal ethics
which is either uninformed or frozen in the past.
Those persons who carefully consider the advent of tempo-
rary lawyering will find that it offers the profession an opportuni-
ty to intelligently address pressing individual and institutional
needs. It warrants the support of the profession, limited only by
those measures necessary to insure that the interests of clients are
faithfully served and that clients are given the maximum opportu-
nity to intelligently decide their own affairs.
